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ABSTRACT 
Two themes run throughout this chronologically organized, extensively documented paper: 
The first is the pervasiveness of racial issues and racial conflicts in Memphis from 1955 to 
1 9 7 1 ,  the period on which the paper centers. The second is the interconnection between 
electoral politics and electoral rules. That these are central and tragic themes in southern 
history is precisely the point: Memphis has never entirely outgrown the worst parts of its 
southern heritage. 
The two themes imply one conclusion: The changes in Memphis's electoral rules in this 
period came about for racially discriminatory reasons. More particularly, the designated post 
and majority vote requirements were adopted primarily for the purpose of preventing African­
Americans from enjoying a fair opportunity to elect candidates of their choice, and at-large 
seats on the Memphis City Council and School Board were maintained because of the same 
racially discriminatory motives. Key elements of the redrawing of election district boundaries 
in 1971 were probably influenced by a desire to keep as many council seats as possible in white 
hands. 
In the mid- and late-nineteenth century, as in the mid- and late-twentieth, white political 
and business leaders in Memphis put down political threats from the lower social orders, 
especially African-Americans, by changing electoral laws. Events of more than a century ago 
are apposite because they show that similar "solutions" have repeatedly been applied to similar 
"problems" in Memphis, as elsewhere in the United States. If racially discriminatory purposes 
moved men of the 1 870s and 80s to rewrite electoral laws, as historians have found, then we 
should at the very least be alert to the possibility of racial motivation behind later electoral 
laws. 
Particularly important were moves, first proposed by wealthy white Memphians a few 
months after the enfranchisement of blacks in Tennessee, to replace the ward-based local 
government with a five-man commission appointed by the governor. In 1 879, after a terrible 
yellow fever epidemic, similar forces managed to convince the state to replace the local 
government with a "taxing district," whose officials were eventually to be elected at large. 
Thereafter, lower status groups held proportionately many fewer elective offices, although they 
were not excluded altogether until the passage of registration, secret ballot, and poll tax laws in 
1889-90. There were no district elections for local government in Memphis from 1 8 79 until 
1 967. 
Blacks were allowed to cast ballots, or, often, to have their nominal ballots counted, under 
the regime of E.H. Crump. After 1927, Crump's control was so complete that he did not need 
black support to survive, and he effectively ran the leading black politician out of town. 
Whatever corruption, violence, and degradation of the democratic process existed under Crump 
was not the fault.-0f blacks .... Indeed, African-Americans.were much.more-often the victims than 
the beneficiaries of Crump's dictatorship, for the boss was a virulent racist who had those 
blacks whom he could not browbeat physically beaten, and who enthusiastically embraced the 
Dixiecrat party in 1948. By 1951 ,  a smaller number of blacks were registered to vote in 
Memphis than there had been in 1 914. It was in this environment that those whites who framed 
the electoral laws of the post- 1954 period, and those blacks who opposed them, grew up. 
From 1909 through 1 955, Memphis City Commissioners, except for the mayor, were elected 
without running for specific posts. The top four in a "free-for-all" race were chosen, and they 
then decided among themselves what departments each would head. Four members of the 
Board of Education were chosen by the same process. In 1 955, however, black Baptist minister 
Roy Love finished fifth out of sixteen candidates for the school board, missing election by less 
than 6,000 votes out of 260,000 cast. Before the next municipal election, two local private acts, 
backed unanimously by the Shelby County delegation and passed as a matter of courtesy by the 
state legislature, required that each candidate for the Commission and Board of Education run 
for a specific post. This prevented black "single-shotting," a widely understood and often 
discussed tactic by which a politically cohesive minority can elect candidates of its choice, even 
in at-large elections. Statements made during this period, as well as the sequence of events, 
make clear the racial motivation of this change in electoral laws. 
The framers, however, forgot to include a majority vote requirement. When a strong black 
candidate, Russell Sugarmon, and four serious white candidates announced for an open seat on 
the Commission in 1 959, Commissioner Henry Loeb, then and thereafter the leader of the 
segregationist forces in Memphis government, asked Gov. Buford Ellington to call a special 
session of the state legislature purely in order to pass a runoff law for Memphis. After 
Ellington declined, and an attempt to set up a local white primary was abandoned because of 
doubts about its legality, the vestiges of retiring Mayor Edmund Orgill's organization, both daily 
newspapers, Loeb, Commissioner Claude Armour, and several white civic organizations 
orchestrated a bandwagon for one of the white candidates, Bill Farris, who was elected. 
Sugarmon's threat to the white monopoly on political offices provided an unmistakable 
lesson on the necessity of including a runoff in the at-large, designated post scheme, and led to 
renewed attempts to pass such a law for Memphis. Even though Loeb and a unanimous city 
commission twice backed a runoff amendment, it failed to pass the legislature. 
In 1961 -62, the Chamber of Commerce spearheaded an attempt to consolidate Memphis and 
Shelby County into one metropolitan government. Although the initial draft provided for 
district elections, the Charter Commission eventually proposed an all at-large plan. The one 
black on the ten-man Charter Commission, Lt. George W. Lee, protested, because he said that 
no black could win an at-large election in Memphis, and he was joined by virtually every black 
community leader. Black and AFL-CIO opposition, conjoined with that of the county political 
organization and some middle-class whites who were afraid of higher taxes, defeated metro 
government soundly. 
Frustrated at their inability to pass such regulations as the runoff law, Memphis's civic 
leaders put a "home rule" amendment on the November, 1 963 ballot. Although black leaders 
opposed it, fearing that it would facilitate the passage of discriminatory provisions, it was too 
difficult to rally the community against such an abstract, seemingly harmless proposal, and it 
passed. 
Dispirited by their defeat in 1 959, blacks in 1 963 ran no candidates for mayor or 
commissioners, but only for less visible at-large posts on the board of education and for a 
vacant city judgeship. A formalized bar association primary, publicized for weeks in the 
newspapers, conducted with city voting machines, and continuing for several rounds until one 
white candidate received a majority, kept the judgeship safely in white hands and once more 
demonstrated for all to see the usefulness of the runoff in preserving a white monopoly on 
offices. In the mayoral contest, a majority of blacks rejected the endorsee of most black 
leaders, Bill Farris, and instead voted for a shrewd and contentious "populist" candidate, William 
B. Ingram. Black candidates for the Board of Education once again proved that, no matter how 
noncontrov.erJ;iaLand .seemingly .well,qualified, .a black .. �ould not .be elected in an at-large 
election in Memphis, even if he were endorsed by one of the daily newspapers. 
In 1 965-66, leaders from the Chamber of Commerce and other governmental reformers 
renewed their effort to replace the commission form of government with a council-manager or 
council-mayor. Having learned several lessons from the 1 962 metro loss, they involved black, 
labor, and Republican leaders from the beginning. The most controversial issues, which badly 
split the "Program of Progress" ("POP") committee of 25 members, were whether to replace at­
large elections wholly or in part with district contests and whether to include a runoff provision 
in the new charter. Throughout the discussion, the issues were treated primarily as racial 
controversies, and everyone agreed that it would be much more difficult for blacks to be elected 
under at-large systems and with runoffs. Black leaders, who preferred all or the vast majority 
of seats to be elected by districts, almost unanimously opposed the 7 district, 6 at-large final 
plan, and accepted it only reluctantly, as at least better than the current all at-large system. 
Had the POP charter included a runoff requirement, they would almost certainly have opposed 
the whole charter in the referendum, so the POP committee finessed the issue. The City 
Commission put the runoff question on the August primary ballot and the POP charter on the 
November general election ballot, partly for fear that black opposition to the former would spill 
over to the latter, and partly because they thought that whites would be more likely to accept 
some districts in the POP plan if they knew that the runoff would keep the vast majority of 
council seats white. The voters accepted (although they did not frame) both the runoff and the 
POP charter. 
In the 1 967 elections, the new system worked almost exactly as designed. The widespread 
view that no black could possibly win in an at-large runoff destroyed the first campaign for 
mayor by a black in Memphis's history and discouraged any serious African-American 
candidacy for an at-large city council seat. Black candidates won two solidly black council 
districts, placed third in another that was 38% black, and eked out a victory in a 4 7% black 
district against a weak white opponent. Whites won 1 0  of 1 3  council seats, and their favored 
candidate in the runoff, Henry Loeb, beat Mayor Ingram by gaining the "white backlash" vote 
in a very racially polarized election. 
White incumbents also swept the school board seats, which were all still elected at large. 
The board, all-white from the 1 880s until 1970, despite the growing proportion of black 
students in the school system, had thrown nearly every possible impediment in the way of 
integration. By 1 969, in the wake of the garbage strike and the assassination of Martin Luther 
King, Jr., blacks, in a militant mood, launched a massive school boycott. To split the black 
leadership and end the boycott, a majority of the school board promised to appoint two blacks 
as interim "advisers" and to press the legislature to allow at least some school board members to 
be elected by districts, which everyone agreed was the only way to elect a black to the board. 
After some jockeying in the 1 970 legislature, it was agreed that the board would use the same 
seven districts as the City Council, and that two other members would be elected at large. 
Winners for every seat would have to be elected by a majority. Everyone assumed, of course, 
that the at-large members would be white. Again, blacks leaders accepted the compromise as at 
least better than the status quo. 
In 1 97 1 ,  there was another, rather half-hearted attempt to consolidate Memphis with 
Shelby County. Because of continual annexations, 9 1 %  of Shelby's people lived in Memphis as 
it was. Again, blacks opposed metro, this time because they did not want to add white flight 
suburbanites to a city in which their proportion and influence were increasing. Metro failed 
again. After that vote, the City Council reapportioned itself, significantly decreasing the black 
proportion in the district with the highest proportion black that was currently represented by a 
white councilman. Interdistrict transfers put more blacks in an overwhelmingly black district 
and more whites in an overwhelmingly white district. 
To sum up in one sentence: Memphis politics has been racial politics, and Memphis's 
election laws were the most effective weapons in maintaining white political power for so long. 
WAS MEMPHIS'S ELECTORAL STRUCTURE ADOPTED OR MAINTAINED 
FOR A RACIALLY DISCRIMINATORY PURPOSE? 
"In fact, the political history of this community [Memphis] will show that, 
in every instance when the Negro unity and voting strength materialized 
to such an extent that the chance for electing a Negro to an important 
post became better than average, rules for election to that post were 
changed in subsequent elections."1 
--Jesse H. Turner 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The rules for the election of the Memphis City Council and Board of Education contain 
three provisions that have been repeatedly singled out for having racially discriminatory effects: 
election at large, instead of by wards or districts; the use of "designated posts" to name those 
officials, instead of having every candidate run against every other candidate; and the 
requirement that winners get over 50% of the votes. If there are no designated posts, 
voters from minority ethnic or other groups can concentrate their ballots on one or two 
candidates and possibly elect their choices even if a majority group is hostile. Plurality-win 
systems similarly benefit minority groups because their preferred candidate may be able to 
avoid runoff elections with the preferred candidate of an antagonistic majority group, if the 
majority group splits. These facts are obvious, and, from the First Reconstruction in the 
nineteenth century to the present, southern whites have employed these and similar devices to 
put African-Americans at an electoral disadvantage.2 Indeed, the Senate Report on the Voting 
1Hearings of the United States Commission on Civil Rights: Hearings Held .in Memphis.
Tennessee, June 25-26. 1962 (Washington: GPO, 1962), p. 1 30. Turner was President of the 
Memphis chapter of the NAACP in 1962. 
2See J. Morgan Kousser, "The Undoing of the First Reconstruction: Lessons for the Second," in 
Chandler Davidson, ed., Minority Vote Dilution (Washington: Howard Univ. Press, 1984), pp. 
27-46 (originally delivered as testimony before the House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee 
on Civil and Constitutional Rights in 1981 ). 
Rights Act in 1 982 specifically mentioned all three devices as ones that are often racially 
discriminatory when employed in jurisdictions where voting is racially polarized.8 
That legislative and other districts can be and often have been drawn in a racially 
discriminatory fashion is also well known. From the egregious Mississippi and South Carolina 
congressional district maps adopted at the end of Reconstruction, to the famous Tuskegee 
gerrymander, which gave the Supreme Court no option but to enter the political thicket, to the 
recent Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors case, scholars and judges have identified 
certain district lines as blatant ethnic gerrymanders. 4 
What does evidence of the type that historians generally employ in scholarly work show 
about the motivation behind the adoption and maintainence of these electoral rules in Memphis? 
Were their obvious effects understood at the time, or could they have been unintended? Were 
there other, non-racial reasons for adopting them that were so compelling that, even if there 
had not been any racial purpose, would have been adopted anyway? If it is not possible to 
weigh the purposes of those who framed the laws with fine precision, can one at least say 
whether they were adopted in part because of their racially discriminatory effects? 
II. MEMPHIS'S RACIAL CLIMATE AND ELECTORAL LAWS BEFORE 1954
The Memphis version of the widespread southern myth of good race relations is often 
expressed in a particularly cloying manner. Eight years after Brown v. School Board mandated 
integration, Memphis responded to an NAACP lawsuit by allowing thirteen of the 
approximately 44,000 black children in the district to attend previously white schools that were 
closer to their homes than any of the "colored" schools. 5 In an editorial entitled "The Memphis 
Way," the allegedly more liberal of the two local newspapers commended the city for obeying 
court orders without violence. "Memphis has again proved, as city schools opened, that it is a 
community of responsible citizens. Further change was made necessary by court orders. Three 
3Senate Report No. 97-417, 97 Cong., 2d Sess. ( 1 982), pp. 29-30.
4See J. Morgan Kousser, "How to Determine Intent: L�ssons from LA," Journal of Law and 
Politics, 7 ( 1991 ), pp. 59 1 -732.
5Northcross v. Board of Education of Memphis. Tennessee. 302 F. 2d 8 1 8  ( !962), p. 820.
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more previously all-white schools have admitted negro [sic] students. This change was accepted 
by the public. Everyone kept their heads. This is the only right way."6
In fact, Memphis's history of legal and extra-legal racial discrimination and polarization 
reflects more closely its informal designation as "the largest city in Mississippi" than its claim to 
be a progressive Border South metropolis. Its history before the doubly significant date of 1954 
is relevant not only because it demonstrates how electoral rules were employed to discriminate 
against Memphis blacks, but also because the values of those who made and ratified the 
decisions of the 1950s, 60s, and 70s were shaped in part by the climate of racial opinion in 
preceding years. 
II.A. BLACK POLITICAL POWER AND ELECTION LAWS
IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
Under pressure from national Republicans and fearing overthrow by ex-Confederate 
Democrats, the Republican-dominated Tennessee legislature enfranchised black Tennesseans in 
February, 1 867.7 In 1 868, long before the famous yellow fever epidemic of 1 878-80, a group
of wealthy Memphians asked the state legislature to replace the system of ward elections that 
the city had used to choose its alderman since 1 850 with a gubernatorially-appointed five-man 
commission. 8 The legislature refused, and several blacks served on the Memphis city council
during the 1 870s. In 1 874, a coalition of Irish-, Italian-, and African-Americans swept native­
born whites from office. Despite numerous controversial calls from black leaders for school 
integration, blacks also served on the school board. Alfred Froman and Fred Savage, for 
instance, were elected in 1 878.9 Under the district system, blacks, as well as lower-status
whites used their votes to obtain jobs as teachers, policemen, firemen, and other appointive city 
6Memphis Press-Scimitar (hereinafter PS), Sept. 5, 1962, p. 4. The fact that the PS continued 
to use "negro" uncapitalized long after other big city southern newspapers had adopted "Negro" 
capitalized is a sign of its continued and self-conscious racial conservatism. To avoid excessive 
pedantry, I will not insert "sic" after every use of "Negro" uncapitalized. To preserve the racial 
insensitivity of the usage, I will, however, print the word just as the PS did. 
7Joseph H. Cartwright, The Triumph of Jim Crow: Tennessee Race Relations in the 1880s
(Knoxville: University of Tenn. Press, 1976), p. 1 1 .  
8Lynette B. Wrenn, "Commission Government in the Gilded Age: The Memphis Plan,"
Tennessee Historical Quarterly, 47 ( 1 988), p. 218 .  
9Walter J. Fraser, Jr., "Black Reconstructionists in Tennessee," Tennessee Historical Quarterly, 
34 ( 1 975), pp. 362-82; David M. Tucker, "Black Politics in Memphis, 1 865- 1 875," The West 
Tennessee Historical Society's Papers, 26 ( 1972), pp. 13-19 .  
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officers, as well as a government that was willing to spend money on schools and charity 
services for the less advantaged. 
The policies and personnel of the city government--particularly black officials and pro­
black programs--led to moves by Memphis businessmen to abolish it. "We have in our midst a 
large and controlling voting element which has but little at stake in the welfare of our city," 
declared an 1875 report calling for abolition of the current city government.10 As intended, 
the "tax district" Memphis government, established in 1 879 and elected at large, rather than by 
wards, curtailed the city's redistributive policies and changed the color and character of its 
elected officials. Between 1 860 and 1879, only 1 1% of the elected officials of the city 
government held property assessed at $50,000 or more, while 44% held less than $10,000. 
From 1 879 to 1 898, 63% held $50,000 (a very sizable fortune in those days), and only 
1 2.50/o held less than $ 10,000.11 Because blacks, who made up 56% of the 
population when the census takers canvassed the plague-emptied city in 1 879, could still vote 
freely, one African-American, Lymus Wallace, a drayman, was put on a nonpartisan, ethnically 
balanced slate that won election in 1 882. Apparently added to the slate to counter the 
candidacy of Robert R .  Church, Sr., who had the endorsement of black Republican leaders, 
Wallace, in the judgment of a recent historian, "had little influence" as one of five unsalaried 
supervisors of public works.12 The at-large feature of the tax district provoked frequent 
charges "that [the government] did not represent all groups and sections of Memphis. . . . This 
left numbers of black and Irish residents without effective representation . .is The government's 
first budget allocated 500/o of its funds to streets and lighting, 20% to fire and police, and only 
1 00/o to schools. It was often remarked at the time that the Tax District government "left the 
10Joseph H. Cartwright, The Triumph of Jim Crow: Tennessee Race Relations in the 1880s
(Knoxville: Univ. of Tenn. Press, 1976), p. 1 39, quoting Memphis Appeal, Jan. 12 ,  1 875. 
nwrenn, "Commission Government," p. 224.
12/bid. ,  p. 223. Lynette Boney Wrenn, "The Taxing District of Shelby County, A Political and 
Administrative History of Memphis, Tennessee, 1879-1 893," (Unpub. Ph.D. thesis: Memphis 
State Univ., 1983), pp. 1 10- 1 1 . 
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poor folks out in the cold."14 When the tax district government was replaced in 1893, the at­
large feature was retained. From 1879 to 1966, there were no district elections for the Memphis 
city council. 
Before 1883, the school board in Memphis was composed of two members from each of the 
eleven wards in the city. When a bill establishing a five-member board, to be elected at large, 
was presented to the school board for its approval in 1882, the board split, rejecting the bill, 
eight to seven, with Irishmen, small businessmen, and the board's one black opposing the 
change, while members employed by large and medium-sized firms and professional men 
favored the smaller board. The Democratic legislature ignored the local body's sentiments and 
instituted the change. One black, Alfred Froman, was initially appointed, and another, Fred 
Savage, subsequently elected to the school board, but a violently racist campaign defeated 
Savage in 1886.16 In subsequent governmental reorganizations, the school board continued to be 
elected at large. It was 83 years before another black served on the Board of Education. 
The period of unfettered black voting in Memphis came to an end in 1889-90, when the 
state legislature adopted measures requiring registration, a secret ballot (a de facto literacy test), 
and the payment of a poll tax as suffrage prerequisites.16 All of these acts, the major students 
of these events agree, were aimed primarily at disfranchising blacks, virtually all of whom were 
Republicans, and secondarily at disfranchising poor whites, and they had dramatic effects. In 
Memphis and Shelby County, the Republican vote dropped by over 90% from 1888 to 
14Wrenn, "Taxing District," pp. 30, 108, quoting Memphis Daily Avalanche [hereinafter referred 
to as AV], Nov. 18, 188 1 .  It also repudiated the debts owed to out of state bondholders, as it 
was meant to do. See AV, "The City Debt," Jan. I, 1879, p. I ,  c. 3-4; "The City's Business," 
ibid., Jan. 14, 1879, p. I ,  c. 3; "Almost Gone," ibid., Jan. 30, 1879, p. 4, c. 3; L.D. Bejach, "The 
Taxing District of Shelby County," West Tennessee Historical Society Papers, ( 1950), pp. 5-27;
Henry Clifton Davis, "Some Aspects of the Formation, Operation and Termination of the Taxing 
District of Shelby County, Tennessee," (Unpub. M.A. thesis, Memphis State Univ., 1964).
15Lynette B. Wrenn, "School Board Reorganization in Memphis, 1883," Tennessee Historical 
Quarterly, 45 ( 1986), pp. 329-41;  Wrenn, "Taxing District," pp. 273-76.
16 Although statewide estimates of black voting in Tennessee are very small from 1896 through
at least 1 9 10, locally, various factions of Memphis politicians, including E.H. Crump, appear to 
have allowed blacks whose votes they could control to register to vote in the early twentieth 
century. Kousser, Shaping of Southern Politics, p. 120; William D. Miller, Mr. Crump of
Memphis (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1964), pp. 56, 74, 1 02-03. The most detailed work on race 
relations in the city during this period is Joel Roitman, "Race Relations in Memphis, Tennessee, 
1880- 1 905," (Unpub. M.A. thesis, Memphis State Univ., 1964).
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1890. Democrats swept black wards that the Republicans had carried for a generation.17 Even 
the policies of the dominant David P. Hadden faction in the Tax District government were too 
liberal for those who proclaimed that they wished a "more vigorous, progressive leadership." 
The Hadden faction, said the Memphis Avalanche, "considered it necessary to pander to the 
sentiment of the Negro party." In the 1889 municipal election, the paper believed, "there are no 
politics in it. . . . It is a question of race." Race won and Hadden's ticket, which contained a 
token black, lost.18 
In the nineteenth century, threats of black political power were put down by changes in 
electoral laws. 
H.B. CRUMPDOM 
Edward Hull Crump did not merely reflect or help to shape public opinion or governmental 
policy in Memphis from 1905 to his death in 1954. In large part, he was public opinion and 
government. In the four mayoral elections from 1931 to 1943, Crump-backed candidates polled 
almost 99% of the votes.19 In the twenty years before 1948, only two precincts in Shelby 
County cast majorities for candidates whom Crump opposed. The precincts were abolished 
shortly after the election in which they blasphemed.20 When Crump endorsed Gordon 
Browning for Governor ten days before the 1936 primary, Browning polled better than 98% of 
the Shelby County vote, even though his opponent had the support of the powerful native 
Memphian, Senator Kenneth D. McKellar. 21 If a labor organizer agitated at the Ford plant, or 
a local reporter such as Turner Catledge, later managing editor of the New York Times, got too 
17Cartwright, Triumph of Jim Crow, pp. 223-53; Kousser, "Post-Reconstruction Suffrage 
Restrictions in Tennessee: A New Look at the V.O. Key Thesis," Political Science Quarterly, 88
(1973), pp. 655-83, and The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restriction and the
Establishment of the One-Party South, 1880-1910 (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1974), pp. 
104-23. 
18Wrenn, "Taxing District," pp. 138-52.
19Gerald M. Capers, "Memphis: Satrapy of a Benevolent Despot," in Robert S. Allen, ed., Our 
Fair City (New York: Vanguard Press, 1947), p. 221.
20Harry Holloway, The Politics of the Southern Negro: From Exclusion to Big City 
Organization (New York: Random House, 1969), p. 278.
21V.O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York: Vintage Books, 1949), p. 63.
Browning broke with Crump before the 1938 election. He had received 59,874 votes in Shelby 
County in 1936. He got only 9,315 in 1938. Ibid., p. 62.
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nosy, Crump or his minions had the man beaten up, often savagely.22 When a nationally 
known black political leader, Robert R. Church, Jr., became too independent, the Crump 
machine had his property confiscated for unpaid taxes. When one of Church's successors, the 
pharmacist J.B. Martin, proved difficult to control, the city stationed policemen outside his 
store, stopping and questioning every customer. Both leaders fled town, financially ruined.23 
A black Baptist minister, G.A. Long, was beaten and his church effectively confiscated for 
inviting a black "radical" to speak at his church in 1944.24 Edward Ward Carmack, a senatorial 
candidate who opposed Crump's ally McKellar in 1934, had his car wrecked, back damaged, 
jaw broken, and teeth knocked out by unknown assailants during the campaign. He was in bed 
and a wheelchair for four years. 25 
Through 1927, the black community retained some independent political power. Having 
backed Rowlett Paine for mayor in 1923, only to see him turn against them, Bob Church and 
Lt. George W. Lee organized a black voter registration campaign to support Watkins Overton, 
whom Crump also endorsed, in 1 927. Although Paine's virulent race-baiting allowed Overton to 
obtain most black votes without meeting their requests for such luxuries as paved streets and 
streetlights in black sections of the city, Lee's "Lincoln League" could at least obtain the 
satisfaction of revenge on a turncoat, as Paine's loss was at least partially attributable to black 
votes. 26 Criticized for supporting Overton, one black Memphian, Merah S. Stuart, reflected on
the race's limited power in defending the leadership's actions: "We do not divide, in general, on 
22David M. Tucker, Memphis Since Crump: Bossism, Blacks, and Civic Reformers, 1948-1968
(Knoxville: Univ. of Tennessee Press, 1980), p. 28; Turner Catledge, My Life and THE TIMES 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1971),  pp. 45-46; Ralph J. Bunche, The Political Status of the
Negro in the Age of FDR (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1 973), pp. 493-502; George B. 
Tindall, The Emergence of the New South, 1913-1945 (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1967), pp. 527-
28. 
23Roger Biles, "Robert R. Church, Jr. of Memphis: Black Republican Leader in the Age of 
Democratic Ascendancy, 1928-1940," Tennessee Historical Quarterly, 42 ( 1 983), pp. 362-82;
David M. Tucker, Lieutenant Lee of Beale Street (Nashville: Vanderbilt Univ. Press, 1971) ,  pp. 
1 26-30. 
24Tucker, Lieutenant Lee, pp. 142-43; Gloria Brown Melton, "Blacks in Memphis, Tennessee, 
1 920- 1 955: A Historical Study," (unpub. Ph.D. diss., Washington State Univ., 1982), pp. 212-
221 .  
25Kousser, "Tennessee Politics and the Negro, 1948-1964," (Unpub. Senior Thesis: Princeton 
Univ., 1965), p. 20.
26Walter P. Adkins, "Beale Street Goes to the Polls," (Unpub. M.A. Thesis: Ohio State Univ.,
1935), pp. 42-44; David M. Tucker, Lieutenant Lee of Beale Street (Nashville: Vanderbilt 
Univ. Press, 1 9 7 1 ), pp. 9 1 -95.
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most occasions . . .  because the white people do not divide with reference to us. Usually it is 
all one side abusing and criticizing us, and whenever we can find any group of white men that 
will even refrain from abuse of us, certainly we feel that these are the men to be aligned 
with."27 
As Table 1 demonstrates, 1927 was the height of black voter registration in Memphis until 
August, 1 95 1 .  After 1932, when the Republicans lost the presidency, and therefore, federal 
patronage, Crump's control over the city was sufficient that he could bar the vast majority of 
blacks from registering, while simply counting the ballots of a controllable few. Whether 
Crump's dictatorship was benevolent or malevolent, honest or corrupt, "progressive" or crassly 
self-interested, its character was not determined by any influence of black voters or leaders.28 
(Table 1 about here) 
Crump was no racial liberal. Although his need for their votes early in his career had 
forced him to give blacks control over gambling and prostitution on Beale Street, by the 1930s, 
the organization was secure enough to hand the rackets over to whites, even in the black 
community. As Ralph Bunche summed up conditions in Memphis in his classic 1935 study of 
black politics, "Negroes now give their votes and receive nothing in return."29 Even in his 
earlier days as mayor, before he perfected his absolute control over the city, Crump issued a 
police order "to run every Negro man or woman who cannot give a good account of himself or 
herself out of town." For a black to state that he was as good as a white man was to hazard 
arrest by Crump's police.3° Crump never slated a black for political office, he kept the police 
and fire departments lily white--the only offices blacks could hold in city government were 
janitor and garbage man--and he was a stalwart Dixiecrat in 1948, vowing that he would stay in 
jail for the rest of his life rather than see blacks enjoy civil rights.31 No doubt with Crump's 
approval, the Dixiecrats carried Shelby County for their presidential and vice presidential 
27Quoted in Gloria Brown Melton, "Blacks in Memphis, Tennessee, 1920-1955: A Historical 
Study," (unpub. Ph.D. diss, Washington State Univ., 1982), p. 106. 
28For different judgments of Crump, see William D. Miller, Memphis During the Progressive 
Era (Memphis: Memphis State University Press, 1957) and Mr. Crump of Memphis (Baton 
Rouge: LSU Press, 1964); and Tucker, Memphis Since Crump. Tucker's antagonistic picture is 
much better substantiated. 
290n the reality of black politics in Memphis during the 1930s, see Bunche, Poli1ical Status,
pp. 493-502. 
30David M. Tucker, Lieutenant Lee of Beale Street (Na;hville: Vanderbilt Univ. Press, 1971), 
p. 19. 
31Tucker � ."Jeni phis Since Crump, pp. 17-18, 57. 
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candidates, Strom Thurmond and Fielding Wright.s2 When a "freedom train" containing copies
of the Constitution and Declaration of Independence scheduled visits throughout the nation in 
1948, Memphis officials refused to let the train stop in Mr. Crump's town because officials of 
the sponsoring American Heritage Foundation required that the exhibition be open to all, 
regardless of race. Some Memphis blacks had to go to the more liberal town of Jackson, 
Mississippi to view the parchment proof that their nation, if not yet their city, was committed 
to freedom. ss
Approached to buy an advertisement in a rather timid local black newspaper, Crump 
exploded: "I wouldn't put an ad in that paper--you have a bunch of niggers teaching social 
equality, stirring up social hatred. I am not going to stand for it. I've dealt with niggers all my 
life and I know how to treat them. That darn paper is using communistic propaganda--we are 
not going to put up with Pittsburgh stuff here. This is Memphis. We will deal with them in no 
uncertain terms and it won't be in the dark--it will be in broad daylight. You be sure to tell 
them I said so."34 
Although Crump's choices for local offices ran virtually unopposed for a generation--a 
record of one-man control unmatched in any large city in American history--Crump 
underestimated his statewide opponents, Gordon Browning and Estes Kefauver; in 1948. In a 
characteristic attack, Crump denounced Kefauver as a supporter of unionization, Communism, 
and equal employment opportunity for blacks. But his bitter attack gave the relatively unknown 
Kefauver free publicity, and Crump's derogation of the reticent Yale Law graduate as a "pet 
coon" also backfired. Kefauver donned a coonskin cap, a symbol of the independent 
frontiersman, and attracted the support of a small, but influential section of the Memphis elite, 
headed by businessman Edmund Orgill, lawyer Lucius Burch, and Press-Scimitar editor Edward 
Meeman--men too influential to attack physically and too stubborn to frighten off.35 Kefauver 
won with a plurality when Crump refused to endorse incumbent Tom Stewart. Had there been 
32Harry Holloway, The Politics of the Southern Negro: From Exclusion to Big City
Organization (New York: Random House, 1969), p. 277.
33Melton, "Blacks in Memphis," pp. 254-56.
34James C. Dickerson.-10 Edwin Meeman, Oct. 30, 1940, in Meeman Papers, Mississippi Valley 
Collection, Old Brister Library, Memphis State University, Box 6, Folder 1 6. The "Pittsburgh" 
phrase is apparently a reference to the Pittsburgh Courier, a militant black newspaper that 
circulated nationally. 
35Kousser, "Tennessee Politics and the Negro," pp. 21-28; Tucker, Memphis Since Crump, pp. 
42-57; Charles L. Fontenay, Estes Kefauver. A Biography (Knoxville: Univ. of Tenn. Press, 
1980), pp. 137-52.
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a runoff requirement, the future Democratic Vice-Presidential nominee might well have been 
beaten. The loss of state and federal patronage probably hurt Crump less than that of his 
reputation for invulnerability. 
Symptomatic of Crump's diminished power was the campaign of Dr. Joseph Edison Walker, 
a black insurance company president, for the school board in 1 95 1 .  Early in that year, fewer 
blacks were registered in Memphis than there had been in 1 9 1 4  (see Table I ) .  In percentage 
terms, about 46% of the potentially eligible black population managed to register to vote 
in 1 9 1 4, compared to only about 7% in 1 95 1 --another evidence of how malevolent 
Crump's rule had been for blacks. Aimed less at winning than at spurring black registration 
and organizing the black community politically, Walker's campaign was the first serious attempt 
of an African-American to run for local office in Memphis in 7 1  years. When Walker began, 
only 7000 blacks were registered to vote. By the time the campaign ended, I 9 ,608 ( 1 8 .  7% 
of the electorate and about 20% of the eligible black population) were.36 Walker's 
campaign literature invited blacks to vote for him alone, while the Crump organization 
distributed two different brochures: in white areas, the campaign literature contained pictures of 
all the candidates, with Walker portrayed as unmistakably dark; in black areas, the literature did 
not display any photographs. 87 Nonetheless, Walker's candidacy was a landmark in Memphis's 
history. When even blacks, always fair game for violence at the hands of Crump's police88 
dared to challenge the Mississippi-born Crump, an era was beginning to wane. 
In 1954, Mister Crump died and the Supreme Court gave its blessing to integration. 
III. DESIGNATED POSTS AND THE GENESIS OF THE RUNOFF
Under the Commission form of government set up in Memphis in 1 909, Commissioners 
were elected at large, but without running for specific offices.89 The four highest vote getters 
86William E. Wright, Memphis Politics: A Study in Racial Bloc Voting (New Brunswick, N.J.:
Rutgers Univ. Press, 1 962), p. 6; Thomas B. Ripy Jr., "Changes in the Formal Structure of 
Municipal Government and Their Effect on Selected Aspects of the Legislative Process: A Case 
Study of Memphis, Tennessee" (Unpub. Ph.D. thesis: Univ. of Kentucky, 1 973), p. 99; 
Holloway, Politics of the Southern Negro, p. 279. 
37Melton, "Blacks in Memphis," pp. 3 16- 19. 
38See Bunche, Political Status, pp. 493-502. 
390ften the candidates apparently ran without having decided which posts they wished to fill. 
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of an undifferentiated group simply became the four commissioners, and they divided the 
administrative tasks between them after assuming office. Likewise, the four leaders in the 
school board contest comprised that board's members. Only the mayor was elected for a 
specific office, and he named the President of the Board of Education, giving each board five 
members. Everyone except a few Kefauverites who fancied a council-manager form of 
government was perfectly satisfied with this setup until the 1955 school board election. 
III.A. POLITICS AND THE CLIMATE OF RACIAL OPINION
IN MEMPHIS IN THE 1950s 
Black registration in Memphis rose to 38,847 in 1955, an increase of over 500% since 
the beginning of 1 95 1 .  White registration grew, as well, as Crump's death promised meaningful 
politics. Blacks now comprised 24.4% of an electorate which had grown overall by more 
than 50% in only four years. And those who registered, voted. The number of voters in the 
1955 elections more than tripled that in 1 95 1 .40 
Sixteen candidates ran for the four elective school board spots in 1 955, fifteen whites and 
black Baptist minister Roy Love. Instead of "single-shotting," however, blacks supported both 
Love and a sympathetic white candidate, Mrs. Frances Coe. Although Coe was successful, Love 
came in fifth, 5784 votes behind the fourth-place finisher in an election in which 260,368 votes 
were cast. 41 The campaign, as one student noted, "marked the beginning of white leaders' 
concern about the Negro vote."42 "The strong finish by the Reverend Love," the black Memphis 
World predicted, "will undoubtedly encourage other Negroes to seek office."43 To the "liberal" 
Press-Scimitar, Love's showing was less encouraging, and the paper's editorialist was fully 
aware of the blacks' tactics: "'Single-shotting' in the school board race--voting for Love and no 
other candidates--made Love come as close to victory as he did."44 
4°Capp, Nov. 5, 1 955, p. I ,  c. 3; Ripy, "Changes in the Formal Structure of Municipal 
Government," p. 99. 
41CApp, Nov. 15 ,  1955, p. I ,  c. I .  Each voter could cast up to four votes in the school board 
contest. The total number of those who voted was 86,370. Ibid., Nov. 1 5, 1955, p. 19, c. 8.
42Wright, Memphis Politics, p. 6.
48Memphis World, Nov. 1 8, 1955, p. I ,  c. I .
44PS, Nov. 1 ! ,  1 955, p. 8 ,  c. 1 -5. 
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In other contests, a coalition of Kefauver Democrats and Eisenhower Republicans (both 
factions had disliked Crump) elected Edmund Orgill mayor. Heir to a wholesale hardware 
company that had been established in 1867, Orgill had married a Mississippi cotton planter's 
daughter and served as President of the Memphis Chamber of Commerce. A civic-spirited man 
of good will, Orgill was hardly a radical. He had been attracted to Kefauver because of the 
Congressman's internationalist foreign policy stance, and in spite of, rather than because of 
Kefauver's liberal domestic views.45 When Orgill endorsed Dr. J.E. Walker for the school board 
in 1951 ,  he did so, he said in a public statement, because "This might lessen to some extent 
their [i.e., blacks'] insistence upon their children attending the same schools as white 
children."46 In 1955, about two-thirds of the blacks supported Orgill, as well as Henry Loeb 
and Stanley Dillard, both of whom won, and both of whom turned strongly segregationist 
shortly thereafter. Black Republican leaders Lt. George W. Lee and attorneys Benjamin L. 
Hooks and J.F. Estes endorsed former Crump ally Watkins Overton, who, along with ex-Crump 
men Joe Boyle and Oscar Williams, lost races for mayor and commissioners.47 The era when 
the Organization could control everything, and when blacks had no choice but to accept 
thankless subordination, was at an end. 
Tennessee's nationally ambitious political leaders, Gov. Frank G. Clement and Senators 
Estes Kefauver and Albert Gore, Sr., rejected the extreme reaction to Brown and the subsequent 
attacks on the Constitution that politicians in most other southern states, sometimes cynically, 
put forth. By 1957-58, however, white public opinion had forced the Tennessee legislature to 
45Tucker, Memphis Since Crump, pp. 44-48.
46Tucker, Memphis Since Crump, p. 65.
47Ripy, "Changes in the Formal Structure of Municipal Government," pp. 74, 80; James B. 
Jalenak, "Beale Street Politics: A Study of Negro Political Activity in Memphis, Tennessee" 
(Unpub. Senior Honors Thesis: Yale Univ., 1 96 1 ), pp. 1 3, 6 1 ,  126; Tucker, Memphis Since
Crump, pp. 42-46, 74-76, 8 1 -82. Dillard was a former Crump ally, but he would not have been 
elected without black support. The Memphis World estimated that Orgill received about 15,000
of about 22,000 black votes cast in the contest. World, Nov. 18, 1955, p. 1 ,  c. I .  Since Orgill's 
margin over Overton was 19, 1 16, blacks were unnecessary to his victory. On the split in the 
black leadership, see Memphis Tri-State Defender, Nov. 5, 1955, p. 1 ,  c. 5.
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adopt pupil placement and "parents' preference" laws and to issue a fruitless "manifesto of 
protest" against desegregation. 48 
In Memphis, there was no need for a reaction, for, as a historian of race relations during 
the first three decades of the century noted, "Memphis was almost totally lacking in white 
liberalism."49 By the 1950s, the statement was still largely true. Commenting on a 1 955 U.S. 
Supreme Court decision that mandated the integration of public parks, golf courses, 
playgrounds, and swimming pools, for instance, the Commercial Appeal denounced the 
decision's "complete lack of realism." To require public nondiscrimination by law was "of 
course, preposterous" to the paper's editorial writer.50 A white college professor who 
campaigned for the school board on an integrationist platform in 1 955 was treated as a mere 
curiosity, finishing fifteenth of sixteen candidates.51 In 1956, the old Crump group, ironically 
calling itself "Citizens for Progress," adopted the slogan "Keep Memphis and Shelby County 
Down in Dixie," a barely veiled reference to segregation.52 
When Mayor Orgill nominated the unimpeachably respectable Dr. J.E. Walker to the board 
of a municipal hospital which served an overwhelmingly black clientele, not a single one of the 
other four commissioners supported the move. The white public responded by flooding Orgill's 
office with adverse telegrams and sending police and fire trucks to answer false alarms at his 
house in the middle of the night.53 Although Orgill told Prof. David Tucker of Memphis State 
in 1973 that he had favored desegregating Memphis buses after the federal district court's 
opinion in the Montgomery bus case of 1956, he made no move to do so at the time, the city 
staunchly and successfully fought bus desegregation until it lost a court decision in 1 96 1 ,  and 
48Earl Black, Southern Governors and Civil Rights: Racial Segregation as A Campaign Issue in 
the Second Reconstruction (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1 976), pp. 1 18-23; Hugh 
Davis Graham, Crisis in Print: Desegregation and the Press in Tennessee (Nashville: Vanderbilt 
Univ. Press, 1967), pp. 68-72, 84-89, 1 1 8-23, 269-74; Numan V. Bartley, The Rise of Massive 
Resistance: Race and Politics in the South During the 1950s (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1969), 
pp. 275-76. 
49Lester C. Lamon, Black Tennesseans. 1900-1930 (Knoxville: Univ. of Tenn. Press, 1977), p. 
223. 
soCApp, Nov. 9, 1955, p. 6, c. I .  
51CApp, Nov. 1 1 , 1955, p. I ,  c. I .  
52Tucker, Memphis Since Crump, pp. 86-87; Wright, Memphis Politics, p. 8. 
53Stephen M. Findlay, "The Role of Bi-Racial Organizations in the Integration of Public 
Facilities in Memphis, Tennessee, 1954- 1 964," (unpub. paper, Dec. 3, 1 975, in Memphis Room, 
Memphis Public Library). citing PS, Feb. 27-28, 1 956. 
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Orgill publicly stated in 1957 that "I have never advocated or desired integration."54 In fact, 
the city's bus desegregation suit started in 1956, at the same time as Montgomery's, only to be 
delayed on technicalities by arguments of the city's lawyers, to which district j udges, but not 
the U.S. Supreme Court, responded favorably.55 The city also contested and delayed suits 
aimed at desegregating public libraries (filed in 1958), the zoo and other parks ( 1 959), and 
schools ( 1 960). As Orgill said at the time, "We will use all legal means to preserve segregation 
as it now exists. We have hired the best lawyers in the business in the bus and library 
integration cases. We'll continue that policy."56 It took eighteen months of sit-ins, perhaps the 
most extensive of any southern city, and a black boycott of downtown businesses to desegregate 
major restaurants, and these businesses held out until 1962, long after Nashville and other 
Tennessee cities had begun serving anyone with ready cash.57 
Orgill ran for governor in the 1958 Democratic primary, finishing a close third to two even 
more strongly segregationist candidates, Buford Ellington and Andrew "Tip" Taylor. Forced to 
defend earlier statements recommending support for the law of the land, Orgill declared in his 
opening campaign speech that "I have never advocated integration of our public schools and as 
governor I shall never do so."58 Local school boards, he stressed, "would rule on racial matters 
and no federal troops would march in Tennessee."59 Nonetheless, an unsigned anti-Orgill 
handbill, distributed widely in West Tennessee just before the primary vote, purported to tell 
the truth about "The NAACP, Orgill, and Segregation," and featured a picture of Orgill shaking 
hands with blacks at what the handbill said was "an organizational meeting of the NAACP in 
Memphis." Actually, it was a Commercial Appeal photograph of a meeting of the "Good Local 
54Tucker, Memphis Since Crump, pp. 83-85.
55"Retrial in Bus Suit Begins Here Today," CApp, June 27, 1 960; Fred Chisenhall, "Judges 
Again Hear Bus Suit," PS, June 27, 1960.
56Clark Porteous, "Orgill to Appoint Aide for Industry," PS, June 6, 1959, p. I ,  c. 2-3.
57Tucker, Memphis Since Crump, pp. 1 1 8-2!, 1 33-36; Harry Holloway, The Politics of the
Southern Negro: From Exclusion to Big City Organization (New York: Random House, 1 969),
pp. 28 ! ,  286-87; "New Suit Filed by NAACP Man," PS, Jan. 5, 1 959, p. I ,  c. l ;  "30 Eating 
Places Are Integrated - Quiet Desegregation by JO Firms in Memphis Brings Praise," CApp, Feb. 
6, 1 962, p. 17, c. I .  By integrating the city's lunch counters, Chamber of Commerce President 
Edward B. LeMaster emphasized, Memphis was merely "following the precedent already 
established in most of the larger Southern cities . . .  ." Among the black activists arrested for 
sitting in at lunchcounters was Mrs. Marian Sugarmon, wife of Russell Sugarmon, Jr. "Wife of 
Sugarmon Arrested In Sit-In," CApp, Aug. 2, 1961 ,  p. J3, c. 4-5.
58Quoted in Graham, Crisis in Print, p. 276.
59Claude F. Graves, "Orgill Victory Train Really Ftolling," PS, Aug. 1 ,  1958; p. 6; c. 1.
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Government League."60 In a speech at the Fairgrounds at Memphis, Tip Taylor equated a vote 
for Orgill with a vote for the NAACP.61 The racial climate of West Tennessee was so torrid 
during the late 1 950s that any suggestion of softness on segregation, any hint of sympathy for 
black rights was considered devastating to a politician. Taylor carried Shelby County against 
favorite son Orgill. 
"Single shot" voting by Memphis blacks in Shepperson A. Wilbun's unsuccessful campaign 
for state representative in the 1 958 primary election also revived fears that had been raised in 
1 955 and led to calls for a designated post system to counteract potential black political 
power.62 Willis Ayres, Jr., chairman of the Memphis chapter of the staunchly segregationist 
Tennessee Federation for Constitutional Government, pressed the city commission to eliminate 
single-shot voting "before it provokes racial bitterness in elections." "If this single shot voting 
continues among this race," Ayres remarked, "it will mean that the white voters will no longer 
be able to split their votes trying to pick the best qualified people to serve the city. To protect 
themselves from minority rule, they will have to single shot their candidates . . . .  "63 In order to 
"prevent negroes from being elected," Ayres, in his own words, "proceeded to quietly work with 
our legislative delegation to see if we could copy Mississippi's anti-single shot law."64
Likewise, Shelby County Sheriff M.A. Hinds warned a Mississippi Delta audience that "Negro 
voters in Memphis may soon be able to elect a Negro as city commissioner through 'single shot' 
60Nashville Tennessean, Aug. 9, 1 958, p. 3.  
61PS, Aug. 5,  1 958, p. 1 1 ,  c. 4-6.
62To insure that whites did not vote for Wilbun by mistake, the Press-Scimitar wrote "(negro, 
independent candidate)" beside Wilbun's name on its sample ballot. The paper printed nothing 
beside the names of any of the other ten candidates. "Here's How They'll Line up on August 7 
Voting Machines," PS, Aug. 6, 1 958. Wilbun finished tenth of eleven candidates, with the top 
eight--there were eight seats to fill--running safely ahead of the last three in the Democratic 
primary. Ibid., Aug. I I, 1 958, p. 1 8-Y, c. 5-7. 
63Robert Gray, "Bi-Racial Study of Voting Urged," CApp, Sept. 1 7, 1 958, p. 3,  c. 1 -2; "Should 
Election Laws Rule Out 'Single Shots'?", PS, Sept. 1 7, 1958, p. 23-Y, c. 4. A fifth-generation 
Memphian, Ayres ran for mayor in 1 959 after Orgill dropped out. Prominent features of Ayres' 
1 959 campaign were his endorsement of a runoff and his criticism of Partee Fleming, another 
mayoral candidate, because Fleming had been backed by the black Tri-State Defender, which 
Ayres referred to as "the voice of integration." For himself, Fleming declared that "The white 
people oLMemphis ar.e unanimous .in their heartfelt conv.iction that .present segregation customs 
are necessary . . .  ." Clark Porteous, "Politics Back in High Gear After Week-End Break," PS,
July 1 3, 1 959, p. 9, c. 3-6; Porteous, "Willis Ayres Outlines His Platform," ibid., July 20, 1 959, 
p. 1 ,  c. 5-6; "Ayres Speaks of 'Political Chaos,'" ibid., Aug. 1 2, 1 959, p. 8, c. I; "Ayres Promises
Leadership," ibid., p. 2 1 ,  c. 3-4; "Fleming, Mayor Candidate, Answers 9 Civic Question," ibid.,
July 1 6, 1 959, p. 3 1 .  
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voting."65 During the 1958 general election, Raymond Briggs, a Republican candidate for the 
state legislature from Memphis, remarked that "It is my belief that if a Jaw is passed prohibiting 
single-shotting, it might curb for the time being the growing power of our colored citizens at 
the polls." Nonetheless, Briggs opposed such a law, he said, because it would lead to more 
concentration in campaigns on personalities and Jess on issues.66 Whatever Briggs's reasons, his 
statement again reflects the widespread understanding of the connection between race and 
single-shotting. 67 
III.B. DESIGNATED POSTS
This explicit white fear of black single-shot voting, as well as Memphis's unbending white 
racism during the late 1950s, forms the context for the passage by the Tennessee state 
legislature in March, 1959 of four private acts, introduced with the unanimous backing of the 
Shelby County delegation, which substituted designated posts for the free-for-all method of 
electing the Memphis City Commission, the school board, the Shelby County Democratic 
Executive Committee, and the legislative delegation. Commissioner "Buddy" Dwyer no doubt 
spoke for the entire Commission, whose members unanimously endorsed the bill, when he said 
that he favored elimination of single shot voting because, "Through the practice, a minority 
group could get control of the government."68 State Representative William Van Hersh was 
only a little less explicit. "One advantage of the arrangement," the legislator noted, "would be to 
65"Says Memphis May Have Negro Elected as Commissioner," Delta Democrat-Times, Sept. 28, 
1 958. 
66"Makes Challenge On Single-Shot Voting Issue," PS, Oct. 3 1 ,  1 958, p. 26, c. 3 .  In a post­
election hearing on what it should do during the 1959 session, the newly-elected Shelby 
legislative delegation heard retired businessman and Chamber of Commerce leader June Rudisill 
call for reinstatement of the poll tax, a return to a non-permanent voting registration law, and a 
"full-slate" law requiring voters to cast as many votes as there are offices to be filled in 
multimember contests. John Spence, "Facilities For Shelby Forest Are Asked," PS, Nov. 1 4, 
1958, p. I ,  c. I .  
67In 1962, Briggs was the candidate of Lt. Georne W .  Lee's "Old Guard" faction for the 
Republican nomination for Congress, unsuccessfully opposing the much more racially 
conservative "New Guard" candidate, Robert James. "Negro Bloc Vote Fails To Appear," CApp,
Aug. 3, 1 962, p. 1 9. 
68"0thers Critical of 'Single Shot'", CApp, Sept. 18,  1958, p. 42, c. I ;  "City Exploring Hope of 
Runoff," Ibid, June J O, 1959, p. 1 5; "Shelby to Have Democratic Committee," PS, March 20, 
1 0 .i::::o ..... .., ,.. 1 J. 7J 7 ,  ..,. , ,  ..... J. ,
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overcome inequities of 'single shot' voting, a technique in which a group votes for one 
candidate instead of eight."69 
The racial purpose of the bills was openly and unmistakably noted at the time by other 
people than the former Crump stalwart Dwyer. Most striking is a story on the legislation by the 
Press-Scimitar's chief political reporter, Clark Porteous, that had the instructive title "How 
Anti-Single Shot Bill Would Work in Shelby - It has Racial Purpose." "The lower house bill," 
Porteous announced, "is frankly designed to keep minority groups--such as negroes or 
labor--from electing a man to the House. A Shelby delegation spokesman in Nashville admitted 
this. Negro leaders are aware of this threat to negroes being elected, and say it will at least 
postpone the day when a negro legislator or city commissioner is elected." Leaving nothing to 
his readers' imagination, Porteous explained that currently, the top eight candidates of an 
unlimited field were elected to the legislature, and the top four to the City Commission. •As it 
is now, a negro candidate, running along with a number of other candidates, could get in the 
top eight if enough negroes voted only for one candidate. The new law would make it pointless 
for negroes, labor or any other minority group to concentrate on one candidate." The 
conventional legislative courtesy on local bills, Porteous predicted, insured their passage: "Both 
the lower house and the City Commission bills are local bills and will pass unless some member 
of the Shelby delegation blocks them."70 No veto was likely from the all-white Shelby 
delegation, which during the same month unanimously endorsed a resolution requesting the 
state's congressional delegation to back Senator Herman Talmadge's proposed anti-Brown 
constitutional amendment that would have vested exclusive control of public school affairs--i.e., 
integration--in the hands of state and local governments.71 The legislature passed that "massive 
resistance" bill.72 
The Commercial Appeal's reports on the bills were only slightly less explicit. •As to 
numbered positions, those members of the [school] board who support this act do so upon the 
basis that it would eliminate or at least curtail certain undesirable features of so-called 'single 
69"Election Board Gets Proposals," CApp, Dec. 1 6, 1958, p. 2 1 ,  c. 8; "Van Hersh Suggests Two 
Election Law Changes I .  House Candidates to Run in Districts - 2. Commissioners to Run for 
Specific Job," PS, Dec. 17,  1958, p. 1 3, c. 1 -2. 
7°Clark Porteous, "How Anti-Single Shot Bill Would Work in Shelby - It Has Racial Purpose," 
PS, Feb. 19, 1 959, p. 4, c. 1 -3. 
71"Ellington Money Bill O.K.'d by 27-0 Vote," PS, Feb. I I ,  1 959, p. 3, c. I .
72"Talmadge Amendment Bill to Ellington," PS, March 1 8, 1 959, p. 26. 
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shot' voting."73 Stories on the bill providing for numbered posts for legislative positions were 
titled "Shelby Bill Hits Single-Shot Vote" and "Curb On One-Shot Due Before Senate," and they 
went on to explain that "The present system makes it possible for a group to single shot--that 
is, vote for one candidate and ignore the others. By this means, the group is likely to insure 
the election of its candidate while votes for the other candidates will be scattered among the 
remaining contestants."74 
Scholars and black activists also recognized the goal of the designated post system in 
Memphis. "This move," William E. Wright flatly asserted, "was intended to prevent Memphis 
Negroes from employing the voting technique of 'single shotting'; i.e., of voting for only one 
candidate in a contest in which several candidates are to be elected. White political leaders 
were afraid that the Negroes would vote for a Negro candidate for the city commission or 
school board and withhold their votes from white candidates in the same race. In this manner 
Memphis Negroes would not add to the total vote of the white candidates and the Negro 
candidate might thereby receive enough votes to finish in the top four and be elected."76 Or,
as Jesse H. Turner, then President of the Memphis NAACP, testified at a hearing of the U.S. 
Commission on Civil Rights in 1962, "After 1955, when a Negro ran for the board of education 
and with Negro bloc voting the possibility came that a Negro could be elected, our officials 
changed the law. In 1955, of course, the four people receiving the highest--the four top votes 
were the ones that were selected for members of the board; but after 1955 they changed it so 
that the persons had to run for designated slots, which, of course, precluded Negroes from bloc 
voting, and, of course, this, we think, was designed for no other reason than to see to it that 
Negroes did not get in the administrative position of the educational system of our city here."76 
Other actions of the 1 959 state legislature in general and the Shelby delegation in particular 
further buttress the hypothesis that the designated post bills had a racial purpose. People's 
motives in one series of actions cast light on their motives in other activities. The House, by a 
73- 1 5  margin, passed a bill exempting children from the compulsory attendance law if their 
schools were integrated. As finally enacted, the law delegated enforcement of compulsory 
attendance to local school boards. State Senators Lawrence Hughes and William Cobb of Shelby 
introduced a bill to provide tuition grants to children who were withdrawn from integrated 
73"Proposals Ok'd By School Board," CApp, March 17, 1959, p. 1 5, c. 7. 
74CApp, Feb. 17, 1 959, p. I, c. 4; ibid., Feb. 18, 1 959, p. 5. 
75Wright, Memphis Politics, p. 3. 
16Hearings of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights _ _ _  Memphis; pp. 1 24-25. 
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schools. Another bill introduced by the Shelby delegation and referred to as "a segregation bill" 
by the delegation's members, allowed counties to make contracts with private schools for 
teaching elementary as well as high schools."77 In the House, Herbert Moriarty, Jr. of Shelby 
introduced a copy of the Alabama pupil placement law, which the "liberal" Press-Scimitar 
endorsed because the bill allowed gender segregation. If the schools were desegregated, the 
paper's editorialist declared in a reflection of the oldest European racist fear, the Moriarty bill 
would at least keep males and females of the two races apart. 78 
That the free-for-all system had existed since 1 879 in Memphis, only to be replaced after 
the first election in 65 years to be closely contested by a black, supports the "smoking gun" 
statements in the newspapers, the Wright and Turner assertions, and the corroborative evidence 
concerning the racial purposes of other actions by the same decisionmakers. Moreover, city 
government functions did not suddenly become more specialized, necessitating choices by the 
electorate of specific persons for specific positions. And the functions of school board 
members, of course, were never formally specialized. Again, this fact was openly noted in the 
press at the time: "None of the School Board members has any specific duties not shared with 
the other three elected members," Press-Scimitar reporter John Spence noted, "but the law was 
passed as an effort to stop 'single-shot' voting."79 Indeed, it is difficult to think of any other 
possible reason for switching to designated posts at this time. 
The sequence of events, logic, the many explicit statements by people at the time, and other 
actions taken earlier or simultaneously by the decisionmakers point unmistakably to the 
conclusion that the change to designated posts in 1959 was motivated by a racially 
discriminatory purpose. 
77"Rash of Race Bills Covers Assembly," PS, March 3, 1959, p. I ,  c. 2; "Move to Bring Race 
Bill Back," ibid., March 6, 1959, p. 4, c. 2; Russ Daley, "Segregation Bill Passes House," ibid.,
March I I ,  1959, p. 27, c. 5; "Bills Pour From Legislature As Wind-Up Nears," ibid., March 6, 
1 959, p. 9, c.  I .  
78Edward L. Topp, Jr., "Segregation Bill Passes, Placement Bill Offered," PS, March 17 ,  1 959, 
p. 1 6, c. 1 -2; "A Sane Proposal on School Segregation," ibid., March 18,  1959, p. 6, c. I .  In
1 958, the paper had endorsed public payments for tuition to private schools to avoid integration. 
"Payments to Parents of Private School Pupils," ibid., Oct. 6, 1958, p. 6, c. 2-3. 
79John Spence, "Election Date: August 20," PS, March 23, 1 959, p. I ,  c. I .
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IIJ.C. THE "VOLUNTEER TICKET'' AND THE WHITE BANDWAGON 
The drafters of the designated post bill, however, had lacked the foresight to include a 
provision for runoffs in the bill. "No one ever brought up the matter of including a runoff 
requirement in the other election bills," according to City Commissioner Henry Loeb, the 
leading segregationist on the Commission. "If I had thought of it, I certainly would have 
recommended such a provision."80 Once again, Press-Scimitar reporter Clark Porteous spelled 
out the racial purposes behind the rules explicitly. A black candidate "is considered to have a 
chance of election because of the very law sponsored by the Shelby delegation in the 1 959 
legislature, aimed at preventing the election of a negro. The new law, aimed at stopping 
'single-shot' voting, changed the city election procedure. Instead of the top four candidates 
being elected city commissioners, each of four city commission races, like the mayor's race, is 
separate. Henry Loeb, Commissioner of Public Works, has switched to the mayor's race against 
Mayor Edmund Orgill, leaving his position open. Thus far, six white men have entered the 
Public Works race, with [African-American Russell] Sugarmon the number seven candidate. 
Thus if the six white men remain in the race and divide the white vote, Sugarmon, by getting a 
majority of negro votes and possibly some white votes, could be elected."81 Because by the 
time of the 1959 elections, an intensive black registration campaign had brought their 
proportion of the electorate up to 30.5%, the number of white candidates did not have to be 
nearly as large as six to threaten white control.82 
Although black Republicans had long ago formed the "Lincoln League" in Memphis and 
maintained membership on the state party executive committee, even in the face of numerous 
attempts by "lily white" factions to exclude them from the party,83 African-American 
Democrats were only loosely organized until 1958, when Russell Sugarman, Jr., A.W. Willis, Jr., 
80"City Exploring Hope Of Runoff," CApp, June ! O, 1959, p. 1 5; Wright, Memphis Politics, p. 
4. During his 1959 campaign, Loeb promised to "exhaust all legal means to prevent
desegregation." "Loeb Outlines His Position on 9 Questions Confronting Memphis," PS, July 1 4, 
1 959, p. 7, c. 1 -7. 
81Clark Porteous, "Negro in Race for Commissioner," PS, June 5, 1959, p. 5, c. 1 -2. A story in 
the Commercial Appeal was nearly as explicit. "Attention has been focused recently on the 
runoff requirement by the entry of a Negro candidate, Russell Sugarman Jr., in the seven-man 
race for public works commissioner. He stands the chance of being elected by a solid Negro 
vote, while the other candidates are splitting the white vote." "City Exploring Hope of Runoff," 
CA pp, June 1 0, 1959, p. 1 5. 
82Ripy, "Changes in the Formal Structure of Municipal Government," p. 99.
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and others formed the Shelby County Democratic Club (SCDC) to support S.A. Wilbun's 
legislative campaign.B4 To assure the support of black Republicans and the often independent 
black ministers in his race for Loeb's Public Works Commission post, Sugarman and his group 
endorsed the Republican Rev. Benjamin Hooks (later executive secretary of the national 
NAACP) for juvenile court judge, and Reverends Roy Love and Henry Bunton for separate 
positions on the Board of Education.BS 
For blacks, this was a crusade, part civil rights movement, part political campaign. $20,000
was raised from within the black community to support the "Volunteer Ticket," and, by election 
day, 1 ,200 precinct workers had thoroughly canvassed every black precinct in the markedly 
segregated city. During the last month before the August election, Martin Luther King, Jr. 
came to Memphis to address 5,000 blacks in the Masonic Temple on behalf of the campaign.BS 
"We're going to pull Memphis out of the South and let segregation run down the drain," 
Sugarman told the crowd at the Temple. B7 Even the normally apolitical black Memphis 
newspaper the Tri-State Defender enthused: "If ever time has been pregnant with possibilities 
for the Negro Memphian in politics, that time is now.·BB 
Black leaders were surprised at the intensity of the adverse white reaction.89 After all, 
Sugarmon was the articulate and attractive son of an old Memphis family, a graduate of Rutgers 
and Harvard Law School, an ambitious attorney who had proved that he could make his way in 
84Wright, Memphis Politics, p. 7. Sugarmon was Wilbun's campaign manager. Holloway, 
Politics of the Southern Negro, p. 28 1 .
85Wright, Memphis Politics, pp. 9- 1 4; Richard T. Allen, "Integration Aim of Two Negroes," 
Jackson Mississippi Clarion-Ledger, July 23, 1959.
B6Wright, Memphis Politics, pp. 24-25
B7Paul Vanderwood, "Negroes Promise Big Vote August 20," PS, Aug. I ,  1959, p. 10, c. 1 -2.
BBDefender, July 25, 1959, p. I ,  quoted in James B. Jalenak, "Beale Street Politics: A Study of 
Negro Political Activity in Memphis, Tennessee," (Unpub. Senior Honors Thesis: Yale Univ., 
1961), p. 62.
89As old-line-1eader..LLGeorge W •. Lee put .it, �Nowhere .w.as"the.hand of fellowship extended 
to the negro population of Memphis, inviting them to participate in our minicipal election. 
Everywhere there was shock at the idea of a negro candidate. The negroes themselves had no 
desire to offer a list of negro candidates. They would have much preferred a ticket composed 
of whites and negroes. Under those circumstances they would have not asked for over much. 
Their leadership understands that time is the important factor and several years must elapse 
before the negro will be invited to share equally with the whites in the responsibility of the 
community life." "Lt. Lee 'Deplores' Bloc Balloting," PS, .4 .. ug. 22, 1959, p. 2, c. 5-6.
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white society.90 Like many Memphis politicians, he had been an athlete--an All-Memphis 
football center and a four-year letterman as a linebacker at Rutgers. Unlike most, he had a 
reputation, according to the Press-Scimitar, for reading "mostly deep stuff dealing with history, 
principles of democracy, sociology or economics"--not an advantage in campaigning, but usually 
not a disqualification for office, either.91 Hooks's competence is evident in his subsequent 
national position, and Love and Bunton appeared at least as well qualified for the Board of 
Education as the white businessmen, attorneys, and civicly conscious women who typically 
served.92 In Nashville, which had a city council elected by districts, two black members had 
served for a decade without undermining the foundations of city hall.93 The white panic at the 
prospect of Sugarmon's election, and, to a lesser extent, at the possibility of the election of 
other members of the Volunteer Ticket, is the strongest indication of the white racism that 
pervaded Memphis in the 1 950s and 60s and conditioned nearly every public action, particularly 
every effort to change electoral laws. The campaign also served as a glaring example for both 
blacks and whites of the importance of electoral arrangements. If electoral laws are ever 
changed unselfconsciously, Memphis after the 1 959 campaign Was the least likely place in which 
this could occur. 
Since Love and Bunton each faced only one major white candidate, the predictable racially 
polarized voting could be expected to defeat them. The Juvenile Court office to which Hooks 
aspired was sufficiently minor that a relatively small amount of public and private pressure 
forced out all but one prominent white candidate.94 The real problem for the white leadership 
was how to concentrate the vote on one of the four major candidates running against Sugarman. 
90wright, Memphis Politics, pp. 7, 3 1 .
91Paul Vanderwood, "'Only Beginning,' Says Sugarman," PS, Aug. 2 1 ,  1 959, p .  5 ,  c .  1 -
2.  
92For biographical sketches of  school board members, see CApp, Nov. 6,  1 955, section 1 ,  p.  6, 
c. 2-3; and of Bunton, PS, Jan. 22, 1 959, p. 5, c. 1 -2.
93Preston Valien, "Expansion of Negro Suffrage in Tennessee," Journal of Negro Education 26
( 1 957), p. 367.
94When Hooks first announced for office, PS reporter Clark Porteous announced that "The 
situation [in the Municipal Judgeship contest] is similar to the Public Works Commission race, 
which has six white entries and one negro entry. Negro voters could elect a negro, if the white 
votes split evenly enough." Porteous, "Hooks Runs For Juvenile Court Judgeship," PS, June 17 ,
1 959, p .  1 9, c. I .  Slowly, whites dropped out. When Robert V.  Bickers withdrew, he advised 
another white candidate to follow the same course "in order that we might have a white judge 
the next four years." "Bickers Out of Court Race," 4DS, July 25, 1959, p. 1 ,  c. 6=7. 
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The first move was to remedy the oversight in the law and require a runoff. Loeb 
supporter Jay Biggert repeatedly called for the passage of a runoff law at Loeb-for-mayor 
rallies to "eliminate . . .  the possibility of R.B. Sugarmon Jr., negro, getting elected Public 
Works Commissioner."95 Loeb himself asked City Attorney Frank Gianotti to study the 
possibility of holding a runoff election. "My interest in bringing this matter up," stated Loeb, 
"is to try to see that an office-holder in Memphis is elected by the majority and not by any 
single-shotting. I am sick and tired of politicians the country over currying favor of minority 
groups."96 Loeb's reference to majority rule is important, because that was to become a
codeword for white control in Memphis throughout the 1 960s. Other statements by Loeb during 
this campaign render his meaning unmistakably clear: "I feel everything possible should be 
done to assure that the will of the majority rules in all contests." (July 30) He would endorse a 
candidate for Public Works Commissioner "if necessary to prevent the election of a Negro." 
(Aug. 2)97 After a meeting called "to reduce the chance of a negro candidate winning," Loeb 
and Commissioner Claude Armour issued a statement saying they favored election by "a 
majority vote," and that they wanted to "work out a solution which would make certain the 
winner is determined by a majority vote."98 Others used the concept in the same way. 
Arguing near the end of the campaign that one of the white candidates should withdraw, the 
Commercial Appeal said that was the only way to prevent "30% of the votes [a reference to the 
fact that 300/o of the registered voters were black] from electing a candidate that 700/o don't 
95Clark Porteous, "Negro's Bid For Election Causes Stir - White Candidates Are Concerned," 
PS, June 6, 1959, p. l ,  c. l ;  "Candidate Loeb Planning Three Branch Headquarters," ibid., June 
6, 1 959, p. 1 1 ,  c. 6.
96James H. White, "Studying City Vote Run-Off, PS, June 9, 1959, p. l ,  c. 4. White went on 
to relate the barely-veiled codewords to the political crisis then facing white Memphis: "The 
last Legislature, in an attempt to prevent the possibility of a candidate being elected by single­
shotting (i.e., voting for only one candidate, ignoring all the others), passed a local bill for 
Memphis and Shelby County providing that candidates must run for specific offices, as for a 
certain position on the City Commission, and not just for City Commissioner. 
"This law, coupled with the fact that only a plurality of votes is needed (meaning an edge over 
the next highest candidate's vote), has disturbed some by its possible results in the race for 
Commissioner of Public Works, where six white candidates are opposed by one negro candidate. 
If the six white candidates split the vote in anything approximating equality, the negro 
candidate might win." 
97Quoted in Jalenak, "Beale Street Politics," pp. 66, 69.
98James H. White, "None Gets Out of Race--Another Meeting Today," PS, Aug. 1 3, 1959, p. I ,  
c .  1 -4. 
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like."99 Likewise, the Press-Scimitar spoke of the pressure on white candidates to withdraw to 
prevent Sugarmon, "strong negro candidate, from winning on a plurality, with white candidates 
splitting the majority vote."100 
Since, after examining case law, Gianotti concluded that a runoff could not be mandated 
without another private act of the Tennessee legislature, and since the legislature was not 
scheduled to meet again until January, 1 96 1 ,  Loeb on June 1 6  asked Gov. Ellington to call a 
special session of the legislature purely to pass a runoff law for Memphis elections. News 
stories on the Loeb request could hardly have been more explicit about the aims of the runoff. 
The act, the Commercial Appeal said, "would be aimed primarily at Negro candidates who enter 
contests where there is a large number of candidates and could win by obtaining the highest 
individual vote, or a simple majority. . . . Attention was directed to a runoff when Russell 
Sugarmon, Jr., Negro attorney, announced as a candidate for public works commissioner. There 
are six white candidates in the same contest."101 Loeb pressed for a runoff law, the Press­
Scimitar remarked, "after the announcement that Russell Sugarmon Jr., negro attorney, would 
oppose the six already announced white candidates for the post of commissioner of public 
works. There has been wide discussion to the effect that Sugarmon's chances of winning are 
excellent if as many as three or more candidates do not withdraw, inasmuch as Sugarmon could 
be expected to draw a heavy bloc of votes from the more than 50,000 registered voters . . . . 
The situation which exists arose when the Shelby delegation put through a local bill designed to 
stop the chances of a candidate being elected by so-called single-shot voting. The bill required 
that candidates for City Commission and other posts must run for a specific position. However, 
the bill as passed has had the opposite effect from what was intended, because of the absence of 
a runoff provision."102 
99Quoted in Jelenak, "Beale Street Politics," p. 69. 
100·wm Fowler to Drop Out of Public Works Race," PS, Aug. 1 5 ,  1 959, p. 1 ,  c. 3-8.
101"Special Session Sought By Loeb - He'll Sound Out Ellington On Runoff Legislation," CApp,
June 1 7 ,  1 959, p. 2 1 .  
102James H. White, "Special Session 'Not Indicated': Ellington," PS, June 1 8, 1959, p. 1 2, c. I .  
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Perhaps mindful of the fact that he himself had been elected governor by little more than 
30% of the vote, Ellington refused to call a special session.103 Loeb was disappointed. "I still 
feel strongly we should try to assure that candidates elected to the City Commission or as Mayor 
should have the majority vote," the Commissioner commented. "I intend to search for another 
legal method."104 White political leaders then floated the notion of holding a voluntary pre­
primary for the Public Works position, to be financed by the city and binding by "gentleman's 
agreement." Only the top two candidates in this throwback to the days of the white primary 
would be listed on the August 20 ballot. As the Commercial Appeal noted in its news story on 
the subject, the "Primary purpose of such an unofficial competition would be to remove the 
possibility of a Negro candidate winning the race as the result of a Negro bloc vote, over six or 
more white candidates." The Press-Scimitar was just as clear about the purpose of the 
unofficial white primary: "Reasoning is that if the white candidates split on a reasonably close 
vote, the negro candidates could get a winning vote." Three of the four leading candidates for 
the public works job immediately endorsed the idea. Gianotti, however, doubted whether the 
city could legally allocate the $40,000 needed to run this unofficial election.105 Any contention
that the ultimate adoption of a runoff or majority vote requirement in Memphis in 1 966 did not 
have a racially discriminatory purpose must somehow explain away these patently clear events 
of 1 959.106 
103Ellington may also have opposed runoffs in general because plurality elections favored the 
Clement-Ellington administration forces that held the governorship from 1 952 through 1970. In 
1 958, the first plank in the platform of former governor Jim McCord, who received 32.4% of 
the vote as an independent against Democratic nominee Ellington, was the adoption of a 
statewide runoff law. "With the vote so split and without a run-off provision," McCord 
contended, "the incumbent state administration will almost always be able to name its successor, 
leading to a political totalitarianism and a political tyranny in Tennessee." Clark Porteous, 
"McCord Promises: 'I Will Get Run-Off Law Passed'", PS, Oct. I I , 1958, p. 1 1 , c. 2-4;
"Ellington Won By 1 12,475 Votes," ibid., Nov. 20, 1 958, p. 7-Y, c. 5. To foster a local runoff 
while opposing a statewide runoff would have been embarassing for Ellington. 
104James H. White, "Special Session 'Not Indicated': Ellington," PS, June 1 8 ,  1 959, p. 1 2, c. I .  
105"Voluntary Race May Be Sought," CApp, June 1 8 ,  1 959, p. 1 2; "In Public Works Race, One 
Way To Cut.fleld:-.Simple: . .If Someone .Would Withdraw,''. .PS, June .I 9, .1959, p. 7, c .  1 ;  Wright, 
Memphis Politics, p. 1 4 .  
106When he dropped out of the contest for Public Works Commissioner in order to prevent the 
election of "the negro candidate" by a "minority bloc of votes," A.W. "Ott" Anderson decried the 
lack of a runoff law. "If Memphis had such a law--and I earnestly hope we will have next 
election--this decision would not have been forced upon me." James H. White, "Ott Anderson 
Bows Out As Candidate," 1.ns, July 23, 1959, p. 1 ,  c. 4.
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Without a white primary or runoff, the only option for white leaders was to force one or 
more of the major white candidates to withdraw, and/or to organize a bandwagon for one 
candidate. Three facets of this process are worth emphasizing: First, private agreements proved 
difficult to reach and enforce, because even with the overwhelming consensus among the white 
political elite against the election of an African-American candidate, individual ambitions 
inclined each candidate to try to get others to withdraw.107 The implication of the 1 959
campaign was that a legally mandated runoff requirement was necessary, because voluntary 
agreements were almost unworkable. Second, all factions and every major white institution 
agreed on the strategy. Whatever the differences between shades of segregationist opinion, 
attitudes toward Crump or "reform," or allegiances in state politics, every group in Memphis's 
white political Establishment agreed that the election of a Harvard Law graduate who happened 
to be black would be an unmitigated disaster for the Memphis city government.108 Third, 
although it was orchestrated privately, the bandwagon strategy was very openly discussed in the 
newspapers (and, no doubt, in private conversations). These discussions reflect on the motives 
of those who, then and later, favored at-large elections with majority vote requirements. 
"Any number of responsible citizens," the Commercial Appeal noted in a June 28 editorial, 
"are now saying openly that, while having a favorite, they would willingly switch to the 
candidate who apparently is out front. . . . The bandwagon development could result from 
several sources: Newspaper endorsement, word-of-mouth advertising, backing by influential 
groups, one candidate withdrawing in favor of another.•109 
107 At the outset of the campaign, Public Works Commission candidate Ott Anderson's challenge 
to "the other five white candidates for public works to a meeting this week to decide who will 
run against the one negro candidate August 20" finally fell flat after much discussion. See 
James H. White, "6 Candidates May Meet to Consider Withdrawls," PS, June 22, 1 959, p. 1 ,  c. 
6-8; James H. White, "4 White Candidates Will Meet--But Not Fowler," ibid., June 23, 1959, p. 
I ,  c. 3-4; ibid, "Meeting to Narrow Field In Race Is Postponed," ibid., p. 1 3, c. 3-4. Anderson 
himself was a staunch segregationist. "As I announced in my platform, 90% of the negroes of 
Memphis do not care to mix with whites, and if they are given certain facilities such as 
playgrounds, swimming pools and schools they will be satisfied." Ibid., July 18 ,  1959, p. 3, c. 
1 -2. 
108one letter writer appealed to the then-conventional racist version of southern Reconstruction 
history: "It is obvious to even a casual observer [that] if they [the white candidates for Public 
Works Commissioner] refuse to abide by a fair process of elimination, .they will do irreparable 
harm to Memphis and the South. The sacrifice they are called upon to make is small in 
comparison with those made by our forefathers when Carpetbaggers and Northern radicals 
disfranchised the white voters of the South and placed .unqualified negroes in public office." 
Warren S. Webb, "4 White Candidates Must Be Willing for Sacrifice," PS, Aug. 5, 1959, p. 6, c. 
1 -2. 
109 r Jf n n  T11n,,. ., R  ,I Q_°'Q, o . •  T�J: •. -��yy, .. ... ..... ...... , - - - ...-
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Significantly, the first group of influentials to act was the "Dedicated Citizens Committee" 
(DCC), the outgrowth of a planned Orgill reelection committee. When a partially blocked 
carotid artery made it impossible for Orgill to run for mayor again, the head of the DCC, 
chemical corporation head Dr. Stanley Buckman, turned the committee to other purposes, calling 
for the establishment of a commission to rewrite the city's charter and adopt metropolitan 
government, and vowing to maintain segregation.110 On July 22, Buckman's group endorsed 
William Farris for the Public Works post, along with former Crump cronies Claude Armour and 
"Buddy" Dwyer, as well as Henry Loeb, whom the DCC had originally been formed to 
combat!111 "Dedicated to what?" Russell Sugarmon asked.112 The fact that his maiden effort 
in politics was to give the first nudge to the white bandwagon against Sugarmon throws an 
interesting light on Buckman's key role in the drive for metropolitan government in 1962.
Two days later, the "Council of Civic Clubs" also endorsed Farris, as did a "Veterans for 
Better Government" committee. Charles Cuneo, the President of the Council, hoped "that this 
group's action last night will encourage some white candidates to withdraw, thus lessening the 
chance of a Negro being elected to office," according to the Press-Scimitar.113 In the next 
week, both white daily newspapers backed Farris, the Commercial Appeal announcing 
110"0rgill Retires From Mayor's Race After Physical Trouble," PS, July 4, 1 959, p. ! ,  c. ! -8;
"Loeb Likely to Face Strong Opponent," ibid., July 6, 1959, p. I ,  c. 4. Every member of the 
DCC had to pledge to "maintain community patterns of segregation by all legal means." 
"Membership Pledge Drawn By Dedicated Citizens," ibid., Aug. 8, 1959, p. 1 1 , c. 4-6.
111Wright, Memphis Politics, p. 18 .  Like nearly every other prominent white candidate, Farris 
had pledged support to the DCC platform plank in favor of segregation. Most used the same 
formula as Farris, who endorsed "the maintenance of segregation of the races by all legal 
means." Their positions reinforce the picture of a solid racist consensus among the white 
political elite in Memphis at the time, which reflects on the motives of those who framed 
election laws during the period. For the pledges, see James H. White, "Farris' Idea: Make 
LG&W 'Authority,'" PS, July 14,  1959, p. 12,  c. 2-8; "Loeb Outlines His Position on 9 Questions 
Confronting Memphis," ibid., July 14, 1 959, p. 7, c. 1 - 7; "Fowler for Little Hatch Act, Adjacent 
Area Annexation," ibid., July 1 5 ,  1 959, p. 4, c. 1 -3; Clark Porteous, "Candidate Slaps at 
'Working Majority,"' ibid., July 1 6, 1959, p. 4, c. 1 -4; "Fleming, Mayor Candidate, Answers 9
Civic Questions," ibid., July 16,  1959, p. 3 1 ;  ibid.,  July 18,  1959, p. 3, c. 1 -2; "Armour Favors 
Government Study - His Nine Answers," ibid., July 20, 1959, p. 7, c. 1 -3; "Better Relations 
Between City-County: Moore's Aim," ibid., July 2 1 ,  1 959, p. 1 5 ,  c. 2-4; "Let's Study 
Governments - Find Best for Memphis," ibid., July 22, 1959, p. 32; "Dwyer is Against Changing 
City's Form of Government," ibid., July 24, 1959, p. 7, c. 1-3 .
112Paul Vanderwood, "Negro Candidate Says He'll End Segregation If Elected," PS, July 29,
1 959, p. 1 5 ,  c. 1 -3.
113"Clubs Council to Campaign Against Negro Candidates," PS, July 25, 1 959, p. 1 1 , c. 2-4.
The Council had to meet as a committee of the whole to evade its own by-law restriction 
against endorsing candidates. It endorsed (white) candidates in only those contests featuring 
blacks. 
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patronizingly that the blacks' campaign "can become an agency for progress rather than the 
calamity which it is regarded as by many. . . . At this juncture it would not be well for the 
Negro citizens or for community tranquility to elect a Negro public works commissioner or 
judge of the juvenile court. Whether a successful Negro commissioner would upset the 
department with wholesale replacements [which Sugarman had specifically pledged not to do) or 
a Negro judge exercise close supervisory powers over broken white families [the other way 
around, of course, was fine) becomes a real fear in the hearts of many in the white community." 
Insultingly, the paper proposed openly to buy off the blacks with minor, segregated offices: 
"Why couldn't the city hall provide for an assistant city attorney, for example, or the municipal 
or juvenile courts set up a division for Negro problems with members of that race administering 
the offices?"114 After the campaign, Sugarmon and Hooks reported that such offers had 
actually been made, and that they had turned them down.115 
In a series of editorial statements, the Press-Scimitar was just as patronizing and even more 
forthright: "Since there is no run-off, without some concerted effort the election of a negro to 
an administrative position is possible and the majority of the people do not think that would 
make for good race relations or promote the progress of our negro citizens, not even their 
political progress.''116 "Most Memphians, including many thoughtful negro citizens, realize that 
harmony and progress would be hard to achieve if negroes win election August 20."117 "R.B. 
Sugarmon Jr. is an able man, but surely no one can seriously believe that it would be good for 
either the negro or the white citizens of Memphis to elect a negro to that position."118 
The bandwagon proved difficult to organize. On July 25, three days after the 
Buckman/DCC endorsement, Farris finished fifth in a Commercial Appeal poll. Longtime civil 
servant Will Fowler led.119 By August 9th, Farris had climbed to second behind John Ford 
Canale, who had long been associated with the Crump faction. Fowler was third and Sugarmon 
114CApp, "City Election Recommendations," Aug. 2, 1 959, p. I-6; "Steps to Comply With 
Supreme Court Decision Pledged by 2 Candidates," PS, July 24, 1 959, p. 23, c. 2-5 for 
Sugarmon's pledge. 
115Wright, Memphis Politics, p. 2 1 .  
116"Citizens Offer Unity Ticket," PS, July 24, 1 959, p. 6, c. 2 -3.  
117"Let us all unite on the Unity Ticket," PS, July 29, 1 959, p. 6, c. 2-3. 
118"For Commissioner of Public Works," PS, July 3 1 ,  1959, p. 6, c. I .  
119Like every other candidate for the position, Fowler promised the DCC that he was "heartily 
in favor of segregation. I think our negro population is now being treated fairly . . .  " "Fowler 
for Little Hatch Act, Adjacent Aiea Annexation," ,0S, July 1 5 ,  1 959, p. 4, c. 1 =3 .  
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fourth. A week later, Farris finally nudged into first place, followed by Sugarmon, Canale, 
Fowler, and Sam Chambers, a labor candidate. Among whites, Sugarmon received less than 1 % 
in the poll. In the last week before the election, Commissioners Claude Armour and Henry 
Loeb met with the leading white candidates and proposed that the "'weaker' candidates . . .  get 
out of the race and let the strongest candidate face the Negro candidate . . .  ."126 Armour told
the four: "I think if this race goes to the polls as it is set up now, a minority candidate will 
win. I plead with you, in fact I beg you, to do something" to thin the field.121 Finally, Fowler 
dropped out, as one newspaper put it, "to lessen the vote split and the possibility of Sugarmon's 
election. Appeals for still others to drop out went unheeded."122 The day before the election, 
the campaign managers of Loeb and Armour endorsed Farris, an action that was treated as an 
endorsement by the principals themselves.123 Still, many white insiders were worried. "With 
the white candidates dividing up the white vote," Null Adams of the Press-Scimitar announced 
two days before the election, "many think a negro block [sic] of votes would elect 
Sugarmon."124 
"If the white citizens vote in high enough numbers," Press-Scimitar reporter Clark Porteous 
wrote in a front page, election eve "news" story, "there will be no negro candidates elected."125 
In the largest turnout in Memphis's municipal history up to that time, five times as large as that 
in the 1951  local elections, the white bloc vote beat the black bloc vote. "The intense interest 
stirred up by the serious threat of Sugarmon and other negro candidates," Porteous reported the 
120Jackson Mississippi Clarion-Ledger, "Whites Nervously Eye Negro Effort," Aug. 1 4, 1 959.
121James H. White, "None Gets Out of Race--Another Meeting Today," PS, Aug. 1 3 ,  1 959, p. 
1, c. 1 -4. 
122Jackson Mississippi Clarion Ledger, "Memphis Negro May Win Office," Aug. 20, 1959.
123Wright, Memphis Politics, p. 23. According to the PS, Loeb was under great pressure to 
endorse one candidate from those whites who claimed that Loeb had "a moral obligation to see 
that a negro is not elected . . . .  " "Loeb's Predicament: What Should He Do?" PS Aug. 6, 1959,
p. l ,  c. 4-7.
124Null Adams, "City Election Spotlight On 5 Negroes," PS, Aug. 18,  1 959, p. 1 ,  c. 4.
125Clark Porteous. "42 Candidates And All Say They'll Win," PS, Aug. 19, 1959, p. 1 ,  c. 8. The 
effort to induce white unity and a large turnout was not confined to the evening paper or to the 
last days before the election. As the Commercial Appeal noted in "Race Competition at Polls 
Puts Real Stress on Voters," June 28, 1959, p. I-4, "Out of the widespread concern about racial 
competition in the Aug. 20 municipal election has come a new line of thinking in regard to 
protection against a minority candidate becoming the winner. Succinctly put, this reasoning is 
that every eligible citizen should register to vote, then go the the polls in August and know the 
entry [Le.� the race of the candidate] for whom he votes."
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day after the election, "brought out the whopping vote, even on a hot, humid day. There was 
no rain, and that helped."126 In precincts that were 95% or more black, Sugarmon received 
94% of the votes; in precincts that were 95% or more white, 2%. In the most heavily black 
precincts, 64% of those registered voted; in the most heavily white, 73%. Sugarmon's vote total 
of 35,268 and Hooks's of over 32,000 would have elected them in any previous city contest.127 
All the other black candidates also finished second in similarly polarized elections.128 
In an interview the morning after the election, a white reporter asked Sugarmon "Was this 
the last chance for a negro candidate in Memphis? Will not the Legislature adopt a run-off 
law, thereby assuring defeat of negroes in future elections?" Desperately seeking a silver lining, 
Sugarmon responded: "I think the Legislature probably will adopt such a law--but it will make 
the negroes stronger. Not in the ·Sense of being able to elect a negro to office. But the negro 
voting bloc will be just that much more important--actually deciding--in a run-off."129 
III.D. THE LESSONS OF 1959: BLACK INDEPENDENCE AND THE NECESSITY OF A
RUNOFF PRIMARY 
Black leaders learned two lessons from the 1 959 election: A void high visibility campaigns, 
and don't trust white "liberal" politicians.130 In the view of the black leadership, white liberals 
expected to receive their votes as a matter of course, even though they would not support black 
candidates or publicly renounce segregation, in return. "We had worked with the so-called 
liberals," Lt. George W. Lee remarked, "but they never got anything done. They sold the 
126Clark Porteous, "Next Jan. I ,  Two New City Commissioners," PS, Aug. 2 1 ,  1 959, p. I ,  c. 1 -
2. 
127Wright, Memphis Politics, pp. 28-30; Clark Porteous, "Next Jan. I ,  Two New City 
Commissioners," PS, Aug. 2 1 ,  1959, p. I .  
128Louis Silver, "Negro Efforts To Put Candidates in Office Fail, But Try Is Good," CApp,
Aug. 23, I 959. 
129Paul Vanderwood, "'Only Beginning,' Says Sugarman," PS, Alig. 2 1 ,  1959, p. 5, c. 1 -2. The 
fact that Sugarman staunchly opposed runoffs as a member of the Program of Progress 
committee in I 966 shows that he did not really believe that that electoral provision would 
increase black political influence. For other predictions that the legislature wol!ld be pushed to 
adopt a rl!n-off, see "Memphis Negro May Win Office," Jackson Mississippi Clarion-Ledger,
Aug. 20, 1959; Wright, Memphis Politics, pp. 3 1 -32. 
130Holloway, Politics of the Southern Negro, pp. 282-84. 
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Negro up the river."131 To prove their independence from white liberals and their electoral 
power, to obtain some jobs for blacks, to make it impossible for white "conservatives" to say in 
the future that only white moderates bargained for black votes, and perhaps to gain policy 
concessions, the Shelby County Democratic Club endorsed candidates favored by the rural 
segregationist leader of the County Court, Paul Barret, in 1960 and 1962.132 In 1960, 
Sugarmon's law partner A. W. Willis ran for that Court (in reality, an administrative body 
covering the city, as well as rural and suburban areas) in a campaign so quiet that it hardly 
stirred white fears. It did not stimulate black turnout, either. Willis lost.133 
White leaders learned a different lesson. One spelled out the racial purpose of a runoff law 
in graphic terms in a letter to the editor of the Press-Scimitar. "The only way to assure that 
public officers are elected by a majority of all votes cast is by the run-off election method . . . .
Should there be a negro candidate and several white candidates running for the same public 
office in the first election its [the runoff law's] result would be to put in opposition, in the 
second election, the two candidates obtaining the highest and next highest number of votes in 
the first election unless one of all candidates received a majority of all votes cast in the first 
election and be elected then. Even a solid negro bloc which should be expected for any negro 
candidates in such first election could not elect the negro candidate then because the entire 
negro vote in Memphis would not constitute a majority of all Memphis votes--the entire negro 
vote being only about a third, or so, of all. Therefore, even if the negro candidate received 
either the highest or second highest number of votes at the first election, nevertheless, one of 
the white candidates for the office would also be in the second election, the run-off election, 
with the entire white vote of about two-thirds of all the votes in Memphis available to elect 
him and thus assure the election of the white candidate over the negro candidate. The run-off 
election method at Memphis is mandatory to preserve democracy and Southern beliefs."134 
The day after the election, the Press-Scimitar repeated the analysis and the advice. The 
DCC Unity Ticket, the paper announced in an editorial, was needed "because since Memphis 
has no run-off election at this time, there was danger that a negro candidate would be elected 
131Quoted in Jalenak, "Beale Street Politics," p. 92. 
132Wright, Memphis Politics, pp. 34-35; Box I ,  Folder 3, Shelby County Democratic Club 
sample ballot for August 2, 1 962 elections, Russell Sugarmon Papers, Mississippi Valley 
Collection, Old Brister Library, Memphis State University. 
133Jalenak, "Beale Street Politics," p. 76. 
134Marvin Brooks Norfleet, "Memphis Must Have Run-Off Elections," PS, Aug. 1 2, 1959, p. 6, 
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by a minority vote. The overwhelming sentiment of the white citizens--in which they were 
joined by some negroes--was that no matter how much one might favor negro progress and 
negro participation in the government, election of a negro at this time by a minority vote' would 
not be good for race relations in Memphis or for this city's relations with surrounding 
communities. . . . Negro citizens 'segregated' themselves by choosing a ticket of their own, but 
you can hardly blame them for wanting to take advantage of the absence of a run-off to show 
their political strength, and they can hardly blame the white community for its determination to 
see that they would not succeed in electing their candidates."135 
In an analytical news story the same day, the paper pointed out how important a runoff law 
was to whites in Memphis and why the election of even one black to the state legislative 
delegation would threaten the whole racial order. "Negro candidates, though defeated yesterday, 
stand a strong chance of being elected next year unless a special session of the Tennessee 
Legislature is called to enact a run-off law for Shelby County. Reason is that a run-off law, 
though certain to be requested by local officials, could not normally be enacted until 1961 when 
the next Legislature convenes. . . . Once negroes are able to elect a candidate to a legislative 
slot, that negro delegate could wreck any attempt to get a private bill providing for a local run­
off. This is because local bills, by custom which is not recalled to have been violated, must 
have unanimous approval of the local delegation first. However, it is not impossible that the 
Legislature might throw aside custom in such an instance. . . . The only alternative for getting 
a runoff law would be in the form of a public (state-wide) bill. Such a bill would be subject to 
the actual approval of the Legislature as a whole, and has been violently opposed in previous 
attempts by representatives of sections where it might not be desirable."136 
Although no special session was called, the city commission proposed that the Shelby 
County delegation to the state legislature in 1961 push a private act providing for a runoff 
election in the city. Its purpose, said the Commercial Appeal, was "to minimize the effect of 
bloc voting," a well-recognized codeword for organized black voting.137 For reasons that are 
iss"Unity Won in the Election--Unity Will Bring Progress for Memphis," PS, Aug. 2 1 ,  1 959, p.
6, c. 2-3. 
iss"Negroes Get New Chance Next Year - No Run-Off, Without Special Session," PS, Aug. 2 1 ,
1959, p. 19-Y, c. 5. The paper implicitly assumed that.all Shelby County state legislators would 
favor a runoff, and that blacks would be unable to barter their support for one or more whites 
in the Shelby delegation in return for a pledge to veto a runoff bill. 
137CApp, Dec. 26, 1 960, ":r-y1emphis Bills } .. 1ay Face Trouble." 
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presently unclear, State Senator William S. Cobb, chairman of the Shelby delegation, seems to 
have opposed the runoff, and no such bill passed in 1 96 1 .138 
Undismayed, the City Commission prepared to ask the Shelby delegation to the 1963 
legislature to work for a local runoff bill. As the Commercial Appeal's story put it, in even 
more unmistakably racial terms, "The City Commission yesterday [Aug. 3 1 ,  1962] discussed two 
legislative proposals that could cut heavily into Negro bloc voting. The Mayor and four 
commissioners agreed unanimously to ask the Shelby County delegation--which will be elected 
November 6--to work for a runoff law for primaries and general elections. . . . This would 
probably reduce the effectiveness of bloc voting and assure majority-vote winners . . .  _.i39 
Again, the effort failed. 
IV. METRO MEMPHIS, 1962
As early as 1953, a debate on the various forms of local government drew an audience of 
2500 to Memphis State to hear attorney Lucius Burch, Edmund Orgill, and other members of 
the Kefauver group call for replacement of the city commission by a councit-·manager 
government. With Orgill's election in 1955, however, the fervor to reform yielded to the 
necessity to administer. It was not "good government" activists, but Chamber of Commerce 
businessmen who initiated the movement to restructure Memphis's local government. Or, as the 
Press-Scimitar put it in an editorial that revealed as much about the editor's values as it did 
about historical fact, "The very heart of the drive for a new government comes from the men 
who mean the most to Memphis and Shelby County: its business leaders."140 
138"Memphis Bills May Face Trouble," CApp, Dec. 26, 1960. 
139"Runoff is Seen As Bloc Blow," CApp, Sept. I ,  1962, p. 1 3 .  The other proposal would have 
eliminated the numbering of candidate names on the often long and complex Memphis ballot, a 
move that would obviously have made it difficult for the less literate black population to vote 
for every office as they wished. 
140Jack H. Morris, "Chronology of A Charter," p. 1 ,  unpublished manuscript in folder 1 12, 
Program of Progress (hereinafter POP) Papers, Mississippi Valley Collection, Old Brister 
Library, ?--... 1emphis State University; PS, Nov. 5, !962, p. ! .
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IV.A. THE CHAMBER PLAN
In the Spring of 1 96 1 ,  Memphis Chamber President Edward B. LeMaster appointed an 
eleven-man committee, chaired by Russel Wilkinson, an industrial real estate broker, and 
including former mayor Edmund Orgill and State Senator Albert C. Rickey, to study the 
organization of local government.141 Two hundred miles northeast, Nashvillians had defeated a 
move to consolidate city and county governments into one metropolitan entity in a 1 958 
referendum, but after the Nashville city administration embarked on a series of controversial 
annexations of unincorporated suburbia, sentiment for "metro" was rekindled, and Nashville and 
Davidson County were preparing to vote on the issue again. After a nine-month study, the 
Wilkinson Committee proposed the "Shelby Unity Plan," consolidating the city and county 
governments and governed by a mayor and a 1 5-person council, with five elected by districts 
from the city, five by districts from the area outside the city, and five at large from the county 
as a whole.142 District maps were painstakingly drawn.143 Patterned largely after the 1 962 
Nashville metro charter, the Memphis plan as originally drafted had a much smaller number of 
districts (IO, to Nashville's 35), and a much higher proportion of at-large seats (5 of 1 5 ,  
compared to 5 o f  4 0  in Nashville ).144 Explaining the proposal to a black meeting a t  the 
Centenary Methodist Church in the middle of April, former Mayor Orgill "said at least two of 
the city districts would be predominantly Negro, which would assure the election of two 
Negroes to the Council."145 
141Memphis Business (an official publication of the Memphis Chamber of Commerce) May, 
1 96 1 ,  in POP papers, folder 58. 
142Memphis Business, Oct., 1 96 1  and March, 1 962, in POP papers, folder 58. 
143"Backdrop - Pre-Named Council Proves Jolt," CApp, June 3, 1 962, p. 8. 
144Memphis Business, Nov., 1 962, in POP papers, Folder 58; Morris, "Chronology of A 
Charter," p. I ,  in POP papers, Folder 1 12. Black representation was a major issue in Nashville 
in 1 962, also. To assure black support for the 1 962 metro charter, the Nashville Metro Charter 
Commission very carefully drew six safe black districts. Davidson County's population in 1960 
was 1 9  percent black. Assuming that blacks could not carry any at-large seats, the six district 
positions gave them 1 5  percent of the council. See Don H. Doyle, Nashville Since the 1920s
(Knoxville: Univ. of Tenn. Press, 1 985), pp. 207- 1 0. 
145li1emphis World, "Key Posts for !'-Jegroes Under Consolidation," April 14, 
34 
1 0.C::") ..... 1 J. -'v""' Y• J. ,  
Under the state's 1953 constitutional amendments, any new consolidation charter had to be 
drafted formally by a joint city-county charter commission.146 Mayor Henry Loeb simply
appointed five members of the Chamber Local Government Organization Committee: 
Wilkinson, Senator Rickey, attorney Walter P. Armstrong, Jr., Southern Central President J. 
Thurston Roach, and former "Dedicated Citizens' Committee" head Stanley Buckman.147 The 
Mayor pointedly ignored his rival Orgill. The county governing body, antagonistic to the notion 
of being swallowed up by the city, named five members who were less enthusiastic about civic 
"reform." Although the Chamber committee had apparently not consulted with blacks while 
drafting its plans, 148 and the city members of the charter commission were all white, the 
county court's nominees included Lt. George W. Lee, the longtime black Republican leader. 
Other county members were Lake Hays, Ellen Davies Rodgers, "Old Guard" Republican David 
Hanover, 149 and Holiday Inn Board Chairman Kemmons Wilson. The supposedly more 
conservative county government leadership was obviously more willing to deal and work with 
African-Americans than the Chamber of Commerce and city politicians were.150
IV.B. DISTRICTS VS. AT LARGE
Sometime during the ten private meetings of the Charter Commission from March 1 2  to 
May 1 7 , 1962, the city members repudiated their earlier mixed district/at-large plan, which 
they had applied to the Board of Education, as well as the Legislative Council, and committed 
146Lee S. Greene, David H. Grubbs, and Victor C. Hobday, Governmelll in Tennessee, 3rd ed.
(Knoxville: Univ. of Tenn. Press, 1975), pp. 28-30. 
147Morris, "Chronology of A Charter," p. 2, in POP papers, folder 1 12. 
148Jonathan I. Wax, "Program of Progress: The Recent Change in the Form of Government of 
Memphis," The West Tennessee Historical Society's Papers, 23 (1969), pp. 86-87. 
149Hanover appeared prominently at a testimonial dinner for Lt. Lee in June, 1962, an odd 
action for a white Republican at a time when the Bob James-led "New Guard" faction of the 
GOP was trying to exclude Lee from any leadership role in the party. PS, June 4, 1 962, p. A-
1 0, "Tributes Paid to Lt. Lee by Throng." 
15°County Court leaders David Harsh and Rudolph Jones lost to the Press-Scimitar and 
Commercial Appeal candidates, led by cotton broker Jack Ramsay, in the August, 1962 
elections, but Harsh & Co. were still in control earlier in the year, and they named the county 
representatives on the charter commission. 
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themselves to an all at-large council.151 By late May, the five city members endorsed a 9-
person council, most probably with three elected at large in the city, three at large in the 
territory outside the city, and three at large from the entire county. County appointees 
Hanover, Lee, Rodgers, and Hays favored a 7-7-7 plan, with the city and rural councilpersons 
elected by districts, while Wilson also preferred a districted proposal, but with only 1 5  
members.162 The Commission deadlocked.
The county members' pro-district position reflected another alliance of convenience 
between blacks and former Crump associates. County Squire Paul Barret, not a member of the 
Charter Commission, but apparently influential with the county members, pushed for an all­
district 2 1 - or 36-member councii.163 As of the 1960 census, Memphis made up 82% of the
population of Shelby County, and burgeoning suburbs such as Whitehaven would predictably 
swamp Shelby's remaining rural areas if the county members were elected at large. The city 
members' plans therefore spelled political death for rural politicians like Barret. As for the 
blacks, the Sugarman and Hooks races in 1959 had proved to them that even the most 
respectable African-Americans had no chance under an at-large scheme. As Lt. Lee noted at a 
meeting of the Charter Commission, "I think districts are necessary to protect the interests of 
the third of the population who are Negroes . .i64
Stanley Buckman then proposed a two-part ploy. First, the council would be expanded to 
1 2  persons--four elected at large from the city, four at large from outside Memphis, and four 
at large from the entire county. Second, the Charter Commission would appoint the initial set 
of twelve, who would be listed by name on the charter referendum ballot, and would serve 
from November, 1962 until the normal municipal election date in August, 1963. The list that 
Buckman drew up, with the advice of Commercial Appeal editor Frank Ahlgren, Press-Scimitar
editor Edward J. Meeman, Chamber of Commerce President Edward Le-Master, County 
Commission candidate Jack Ramsay, and Holiday Inn chairman Kemmons Wilson, included six 
County Court members, two businessmen, two labor leaders, and two blacks. Notably absent 
151CApp, "Wilkinson Outlines Unity Progress," May 1 8, 1 962, p.5; ibid., "Backdrop - Pre­
Named Council Proves Jolt," June 3 ,  1962, p. 8. When they switched and who influenced them 
is presently unclear. 
152Thomas Michael, "Charter Unit Head Favors 9-Member Shelby Council," CApp, May 1 8, 
1 962, p. I ;  ibid., "Dr. Buckman Will Support 9-Man Council," May 19,  1 962, p. 1 9; ibid.,
"Charter Commission Delays Council-Strength Decision," May 22, 1 962, p. I .  
153Charles Edmundson, "Merger Issues Almost Settled," CApp, June I ,  1962, p. 25. 
154Charles Edmundson, "Legislative Council Splits Charter Unit," CApp, May 29, 1 962, p. 1 7. 
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were Mayor Loeb and, initially, County Commission Chairman David Harsh. Instead, Buckman 
proposed to name State Senator Rickey, a member of the Charter Commission, as mayor, and 
Charles Baker, a member of the County Court, as vice-mayor. All the current City 
Commissioners would be appointed administrative directors of the departments that they 
currently headed.155 Anointing enough key politicians and representatives of enough potent 
political groups, Buckman and his coterie obviously felt, would put together majorities on the 
Charter Commission and in the electorate. 
It was difficult to determine who was more critical of the proposition--those who were on 
the list or those who were off of it. Charles Baker, Russell Sugarman, and A.W. Willis, all 
among the chosen, immediately repudiated the offers, saying that it was up to the voters to 
decide who would be on the council.156 Mayor Loeb doubted that the Charter Commission was 
legally empowered to name officials, and, like those whose names had been included, professed 
a principled devotion to voter choice.157 The attempt to split Harsh and Barret from Baker, 
and Loeb from the other City Commissioners, was as clumsy as it was transparent. 
Most of all, the sophomorically clever strategem demonstrates how little sympathy or 
understanding the Chamber and the newspaper editors had for African-Americans. Evidently, 
Buckman's clique had no idea how insultingly patronizing such appointments would appear, or 
how impossible, in the civil rights era, it would be for any black to agree to serve under these 
conditions. For generations, Memphis black leaders such as Bob Church, Lt. Lee, and Blair T. 
Hunt had had to shuffle and scratch before Mr. Crump and his subordinates in order to retain 
their positions, and even to avoid financial and physical assaults.158 In this historical context, 
any black who accepted such a job would immediately be labeled an "Uncle Tom," and any 
155Charles Edmundson, "Legislative Council Splits Charter Unit," CApp, May 29, 1962, p. 1 7;
Bob Marks, "Charter Commission Studies Proposed Unity Appointees," ibid., May 3 1 ,  1962, p. I ;  
Charles Edmundson, "Merger Issues Almost Settled," ibid., June I ,  1962, p .  25; John Spence, 
"Albert Rickey Proposed as the Mayor," PS, May 3 1 ,  1962, p. ! ;  "Buckman Letter to [sic - on] 
Proposed Legislative Council," ibid., June 4, 1962, p. A-10.  
156"Backdrop - Pre-Named Council Proves Jolt," CApp, June 3, 1962, p. 8; Charles Edmundson,
"Negro Leaders Favor Election Under Charter," ibid., June 2, 1 962, p. 13 .  
157Richard T.  Allen, "Appointing Mayor Raises Legal Point," CApp, June 2, 1962, p.  1 3; Clark 
Porteous, "Loeb Wants .the Voters to Pick Top Officials," PS, May 3 1 ,  1 962, p. 1 .  
158Tucker's Lieutenall/ Lee is a veritable catalogue of such humiliations. Even Miller's rosy 
picture of Crump's planter benevolence toward favored and compliant blacks recognizes that 
those who won Crump's favor were--the phrase is Miller's--"Uncle Toms." See Mr. Crump of 
Memphis, p. 206. In 1940, for instance Hunt, principal of Booker T. Washington high school 
and a minister, lauded Crump as "a human idol" to Memphis blacks. Quoted in Melton, "Blacks 
in Memphis," p. !92. 
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aspirations for higher office would certainly be scotched. Buckman appears to have thought 
that he was doing blacks a favor, 159 perhaps making up for his launching of the steamroller 
against Sugarman three years earlier. To NAACP President Jesse Turner, on the contrary, the 
proposal guaranteed that whites would choose blacks' leaders for them: "Since everybody is 
running at large, the negro doesn't have much of a chance unless he's one that the whites will 
accept."160 Or as Lt. Lee put it, the only black who could be elected in an at-large system
would be "a hand picked Negro by the white group. . . . The time has not come in Memphis 
when white people in sufficient numbers will vote to elect a Negro. The Negro must depend 
upon his number if he wins membership or representation, otherwise he will be at the 
sufferance of the strong white majority."161 
Repudiated all around, the appointment idea died without a roll call vote, and the five city 
members, joined by Kemmons Wilson, jammed through the all at-large plan.162 With 
staggered, four-year terms, only two positions in the city, two outside the city, and two in the 
county as a whole, would be elected at one time, and all would be voted on separately, so there 
was little possibility for a single-shotting strategy to 
endanger white contro!.163 Having switched to at large for the Council, the Charter 
Commission later shifted to at large for the Board of Education. 164 
The debate over the issue of whether officials should be elected at large or by districts 
was subtle, but illuminating. No one captured the essence of the Chamber of Commerce 
position better than Buckman. The at-large plan, he admitted, "is based on the principle that 
well-qualified professional and businessmen can serve on a part-time basis and still practice 
159John Spence, "Albert Rickey Proposed as the Mayor," PS, May 3 1 ,  1 962, p. I .  
160c1ark Porteous, "Proposed Merger Charter Opposed by Negro Group," PS, Sept. 6, 1962, p. 
3. 
161Lee to Sheriff M.A. Hinds (public letter), Sept. 27, 1 962, in M.A. Hinds Papers, Box 19, 
folder 685, Mississippi Valley Collection, Old Brister Library, Memphis State Univ. 
162Charles Edmundson, "Charter Commission OK's Elected Legislative Council By Close Two­
Vote Margin," CApp, June 3, 1962, p. I; John Spence, "Charter Commission Votes for a 1 2-
Member Council," PS, June 2, 1962, p. I .  
163"Charter Commission Votes For a 12-Member Council," PS, June 2, 1 962, p. I .  Although
the Charter Commission did not include a runoff provision, Mayor Loeb and the Commissioners 
sought to get the legislature to pass one. "Runoff is Seen As Bloc Blow," CApp, Sept. 1 ,  1 962, 
p. 1 3 .
164"School Merger Will Be Studied," CApp, June 4, 1 962, p. 1 5; Charles Edmundson, "Pensions
Draft Brings Recess," ibid., June 6, 1962, p. 1 0; John Spence, "7-Member School Board 
Proposal," PS, June 5, 1 962, p. 1 2. 
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their professions and maintain their businesses."165 That was precisely the point, opponents 
agreed. Only a president of his own company, such as Buckman, could blithely ignore the fact 
that few whites and almost no blacks could afford to take large amounts of poorly remunerated 
time from their everyday jobs. An at-large council, charged the Shelby County Democratic 
Club, would be "a rich man's council." "The cost of campaigning through the whole city, the 
whole county, or the county outside the city," added Charter Commission member David 
Hanover, "would be so great as to make it difficult or impossible for a man of small means to 
run."166 
Seemingly oblivious to Sugarmon's defeat in 1959, and appearing to have temporarily 
suppressed memories of their own roles in plotting to preserve an all-white city government, the 
Press-Scimitar and Commercial Appeal accused black leaders, all of whom endorsed districts, of 
favoring "segregation." "To settle for a legalized segregation of voters!" the Press-Scimitar
apostrophised. "To stamp the most sacred democratic privilege--the privilege of voting--as 
black votes and white votes! Perhaps Lt. Lee and Memphis negroes could have 'negro districts.' 
But that is not good enough. Who will be the proud negro in the councils of Memphis 
government of the future? The negro elected from a 'negro district,' or the negro elected at 
large, by all the people of Memphis?..i67 It was true, the Press-Scimitar admitted, that only in 
black-majority districts would blacks "be certain to elect members of the Legislative Council." 
But "negroes do not need the district set-up in order to gain representation in government," the 
newspaper asserted reassuringly. And it added, almost on the eve of the expulsion of blacks 
from any share in Republican leadership in Memphis, "No political group could have any lasting 
success in Memphis if it excluded negroes from its ticket."168 
Demanding that blacks put the editorialist's conception of the "public interest" before their 
own interests, the afternoon daily read African-American leaders a civics lecture and claimed 
165John Spence, "Albert Rickey Proposed as the Mayor," PS, May 3 1 ,  1962, p. I .  
166Clark Porteous, "Proposed Merger Charter Opposed by Negro Group," PS, Sept. 6, 1 962, p.
3; Charles Edmundson, "Charter Commission OK's Elected Legislative Council By Close Two­
Vote Margin," CApp, June 3, 1 962, p. I .  
167"Bold Leaders Must Not Turn Cautious Now," PS, May 30, 1 962, p. 6. 
168"It's Odd--Negro Leaders Favor New Segregation," PS, June I ,  1962, p. 6. Similarly, see
"They Want Segregation," CApp, Sept. 1 6, 1962, p. 6. Lt. George Lee, who had held a seat on 
the Republican State Executive Committee for twenty years, lost that position in August, 1962. 
The highly publicized refusal of the Goldwater-dominated Republican National Convention of 
1 964 to seat Lee was the most potent symbol of the southern "New Guard's" break with the 
party's devotion to southern black rights. See Tucker, Lieutenant Lee, pp. 1 79-99. 
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that those leaders misrepresented their followers, whose views only the editorialist truly 
understood. "Negroes Shouldn't Ask for What's Not Good for All," the Press began. 
"[C]ouncilmen elected from small districts would owe their election to only a small percentage of 
the voters. They would feel responsible only to please the voters of their own district, not to 
accomplish the common good of all the people of Shelby County, white and negro alike. At 
best it would be unsatisfactory; at worst it would lead to log-rolling and corruption. Only by 
electing councilmen at large, beholden to all, can you get the outstanding men, white and negro 
that we need--men who will feel they must work only for what is good for all. . . . We do not 
believe that the majority of our negro citizens want what is not good for the community as a 
whole, and we do not believe that the negro politicians who ask for it [i.e., for districts] truly 
represent their sentiments."169 A district plan would lead to "minority rule."170 "Surely there
are thinking negroes who see this as clearly as we do," the paper asserted. "We would like to 
hear from them."111 No one answered the invitation.
1v;c. THE SHELBY"DISUNITY PLAN172 
Despite the Chamber of Commerce's optimism, the new charter, 1 10 pages long and issued 
in a formidable 1 76-page pamphlet, included something to frighten nearly everybody.173 City 
teachers worried that their salaries, benefits, and working conditions would be reduced to the 
level of rural areas.174 Old county politicians such as Paul Barret and Sheriff M.A. Hinds 
calculated that their bastions would be destroyed in a government of, by, and for downtown 
169"Negroes Shouldn't Ask for What's Not Good for All," PS, May 3 1 ,  1 962, p. 6.
170"Charter Commission Votes for Progress," PS, June 4, 1962, p. A-6.
171"It's Odd--Negro Leaders Favor New Segregation," PS, June I ,  1962, p. 6. 
172The Chamber of Commerce termed its original proposal "The Shelby Unity Plan." 
173Memphis and Shelby County Charter Commission, "Charter of the Consolidated Government
of Memphis and Shelby County," (Aug., 1 962), pamphlet in POP papers, folder 123. 
174Wax, "Program of Progress," pp.86-87; "Education Group Opposes Charter," and "Orgill 
Backs Unity in Labor !i-.1eeting," Cf4pp, Oct. 30, 1962, p. 4. 
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businessmen.175 Suburbanites were haunted by the specter of higher taxes.176 Labor 
unionists, never powerful in Memphis, foresaw what influence they had ebbing away in a 
businessman-dominated government. Most of all, every black organization in town, from the 
NAACP to the Bluff City Council of Civic Clubs to the Shelby County Democratic Club to 
whatever Republican group Lt. Lee could muster virulently opposed the Charter because, as 
Rev. Alexander Gladney put it, "it would be impossible for Negroes to be elected to the 
Legislative Council." Or as Lt. Lee remarked, "A Charter such as is being proposed will nullify 
the Negroes' voting strength."177 
At a press conference at which he condemned the NAACP for pressing to expand the city's 
token school desegregation plan and praised Mississippi Gov. Ross Barnett's "courage" in defying 
a federal court order to admit James Meredith to Ole Miss, Mayor Loeb strongly backed the 
metro charter.178 He was not, however, in charge of the pro-metro campaign, which was run
by the Citizens Association (the renamed "Dedicated Citizens Committee" of 1 959) and the 
Chamber of Commerce. Insular and overconfident, the principal metro backers waited until too 
close to election day in November to unveil their radio, television, and newspaper ads.179 
In a turnout that exceeded that in the Bob James-Clifford Davis race, the most closely 
contested congressional election in Memphis since 1 888, voters solidly rejected metro. Thurston 
Roach, a city appointee to the Charter Commission and president of the Citizens Association, 
"attributed the charter's defeat to a failure to provide election of Legislative Council members 
175A PS photo, Nov. 7, 1 962, shows the leaders of the white anti-metro forces, nearly all of 
whom had been associated with the old Crump organization: City Commissioner "Buddy" 
Dwyer, attorney David Hanover, businessman Drew Canale, County Trustee Riley Garner, and 
Sheriff M.A. Hinds. 
176This, at least, was the chief theme of the extensive anti-metro publicity material in M.A. 
Hinds Papers, Box 1 8 ,  Folder 605, Mississippi Valley Collection, Old Brister Library, Memphis 
State University. The same theme was stressed in opposition statements by the Council of Civic 
Clubs. See Paul Vanderwood, "Civic Clubs Council Will 'Actively Oppose' Merger," PS, Sept. 
1 2, 1962, p. A - 1 0. 
177Louis Silver, "Buckman Raps Unity Fighters at Their Rally," CApp, Oct. 27, 1962, p. 1 9; Lee 
to Hinds, Sept. 27, 1 962, in Hinds Papers, Box 1 9, Folder 685, in M.A. Hinds Papers, 
Mississippi Valley Collection, Old Brister Library, Memphis State University. 
178Charles Edmundson, "Loeb Stresses Local Control," CApp, Sept 1 7 ,  1 962, p. 1 7.
179Edward B. LeMaster to "Members" [of the Chamber of Commerce], Oct. 12 ,  1 962, in POP 
Papers, folder 1 20; Edward J. Meeman, "Citizens Won a Victory August 2 - Clinch It Tuesday, 
November 6," PS, Oct. 30, 1 962, p. 6; K.W. Cook, "Consolidation Issue Is Soundly Beaten," 
CApp, Nov. 8, 1 962, p. I .  
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by districts instead of at large."180 In heavily black precincts, the charter lost by votes such as 
4 1 6-38 and 4 1 3-61 ,  or overall margins, according to the Commercial Appeal, of eighty to ninety 
percent. Moreover, a much higher percentage of blacks marked their ballots in the charter 
referendum than in the simultaneous James-Davis contest.181 No civicly-conscious Memphian 
after 1962 could be ignorant of the racial implications of the choice between district and at­
large elections. 
V. INTERLUDE: 1963-65 
The crusades of 1959 and 1962 had successively exhausted the blacks and the government 
reformers, and the 1963 election was to retire M.A. Hinds, one of the most successful survivors 
of the Crump years. Two other important forces, however, emerged between 1 962 and 
1 966--William Ingram and the "New Guard" Republicans. By the time the next major effort 
was made to restructure the Memphis government, they would join the Chamber of Commerce, 
the newspapers, the original Kefauverites, labor union leaders, and the NAACP-SCDC crowd as 
key players. 
V.A. HOME RULE, A WHITE PRIMARY, AND A "POPULIST" COALITION 
The same 1953 Tennessee State Constitutional Convention that had authorized metropolitan 
governments had allowed cities to adopt "home rule" by referendum.182 Under this provision, 
once a majority voted for home rule, the electorate could change the city charter in further 
referenda without going to the legislature for a "private act." Since a private act could be, in 
effect, vetoed by any member of a county's legislative delegation, as runoff acts had apparently 
been in the 1961 and 1963 legislatures, a city without home rule might be hamstrung. The City 
Commission therefore put a home rule amendment on the November, 1963 ballot. While labor 
and black groups generally opposed home rule in Memphis, fearing that they would be less 
easily able to protect their interests than they could if all they had to do was to convince one 
180"GOP Chairman Sees New Hope," CApp, Nov. 7, ! 962, p, 1 7; "After the Election," ibid.,
Nov. 8, 1962; K.W. Cook, "Consolidation Issue is Soundly Beaten," ibid., p. I .  
181Clark Porteous, "Reporter Awoke Cliff: First Certain News He Had Won," PS, Nov. 7, 
1962, p. I ;  "Negroes Give Key Support to Cliff Davis," CApp, Nov. 7, 1962, p. 2 1 .  
182Greene et al.; Governrnent in Tennessee'; pp. 28-30. 
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legislator to veto a bill, their opposition was poorly organized, and their constituencies did not 
rally spiritedly to this rather abstract and hypothetical cause.183 Home rule did not embody 
any specific scheme of government. Who knew, exactly, what it would bring? 
Despairing of electing a candidate in an at-large race for the highly visible posts of mayor 
or commissioner, blacks ran no one in 1 963. Had Loeb, an outspoken segregationist who had 
repeatedly angered blacks during his term, run for reelection, African-Americans would have 
eagerly supported any opponent, as they had the hopeless Partee Fleming against Loeb in 
1 959.184 Instead, most of the black leadership, along with both newspapers and much of the 
Memphis establishment, endorsed Bill Farris, the white hope of 1 959, but also an original 
Kefauverite, in his three-way contest for mayor with 62-year old Sheriff M.A. Hinds and City 
Judge William Ingram.185 Hinds received some support from minor black groups for having 
been the first police executive in Memphis's recent history to hire black deputies and for having 
opposed metro in 1 962, but Willis haughtily dismissed him for having served, under the Crump 
regime, as the "head of the Gestapo to keep the negroes in their place."186 
Ingram, a city court judge whom the black Volunteer Ticket had endorsed in 1 959, was 
divisive and irresponsible, 187 but he had a shrewd instinct for politics, a genius for publicity, 
and sufficient egotism to persevere when others would long since have given up. Since his 
election in 1 959, he had been carrying on a highly-publicized feud with the police department 
that had endeared him to many ordinary people, black and white, at the same time that it 
outraged their leaders. In a speech explaining why the black Volunteer Citizens Association was 
endorsing Farris, for instance, lawyer A.W. Willis said of Ingram that "I've seen him turn loose 
183"Vote the Volunteer Citizens' Ticket," Memphis Tri-State Defender, Nov. 2, 1 963, p. 5; 
"Without a Real Issue," ibid., Nov. 2, 1963, p. 6; John W. Spence, "Home Rule: Know What It 
IS Before Voting November 7," PS, Oct. 29, 1 963, p. 4.
184Mike Laurence, "Hundreds Hear Negro Candidates, Sing Promises of a 'Great Day,'" PS, 
Aug. 1 8, 1 959, p. 2 1 ,  c. 1 -3; Clark Porteous, "Heavy Voting May Set Record," ibid, Aug. 20, 
1 959, p. I; "Without a Real Issue," Memphis Tri-State Defender, Nov. 2, 1 963, p. 6. 
185Edward J. Meeman, "Five Who Will Work Together as City Commissioners," PS, Oct. 2 1 ,  
1963, p .  6; "Vote The Volunteer Citizens' Ticket," Memphis Tri-State Defender, Nov. 2 ,  1 963, p. 
5. Prominent black organizations had endorsed Ingram's successful candidacy for a judgeship in
1 959. Mike Laurence, "Hundreds Hear Negro candidates, Sing Promises of a 'Great Day,'" PS, 
Aug. 1 8, 1 959, p. 2 1 ,  c. 1 -3. 
186" 1 000 Negroes Rally Behind Candidates," PS, Oct. 1 8 ,  1 963, p. 28; Clark Porteous, "Negroes 
Choosing Sides in Mayoralty Campaign," ibid., Oct. 1 6, 1 963, p. 3; John Spence, "Farris 
Endorsed by Negro Group," ibid., Oct. 1 2, 1 963, p. 1 2; "2000 Negroes Hear Bishop's Choices," 
ibid., Nov. 4, 1 963, p. 2 1 .  
187"Is This The Man YOU Want For Mayor?", PS, Nov. 6, 1 963, p. 20. 
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negroes who ought to have been fined, because they were guilty. And he knew it, and I knew 
it."188 Attracting few contributions or prestigious endorsements and virtually shut out of the 
print media, Ingram was forced to speak in parking lots with a bullhorn, and on election day, 
he put together a bizarre coalition of some blacks, middle class whites who were worried about 
higher taxes, and followers of the White Citizens' Council. Few gave him a chance to win until 
Hinds faded late in the campaign.189 The final totals showed Ingram with 48%, Farris 
with 4 1  %, and Hinds with 1 1  %.190 
When Ingram's run for higher office left his court without an incumbent, eight whites 
qualified, and blacks took a shot at an at-large race, running Benjamin Hooks. "With negro 
groups solid[ly) behind Hooks," warned the Press-Scimitar, "he is considered to have an 
excellent chance to be elected because the white vote will be divided among eight 
candidates."191 Again, panicky whites, caught without a runoff law, tried to organize an 
informal white primary, but this time, because of the legal nature of the post, they succeeded. 
They simply had the members of the bar association vote, weekly, on official voting machines, 
until one candidate received a majority.192 The others were expected to drop out, and although 
three did not, the winnowing process proceeded far enough that Hooks finished second to Ray 
W. Churchill by 1 261  votes out of more than 100,000 cast.193 Again, what the newspapers 
termed a "runoff" primary had been used to mass the white vote against a black challenger. 
Surely the lesson was clear to the densest political observer: the purpose of a majority vote 
requirement was to keep minorities--i.e., blacks--from winning. 
188John Spence, "Farris Endorsed by Negro Group," PS, Oct. 1 2, 1 963, p. 1 2.
189"Post-Election Analysis of Press-Scimitar's Polls," PS, Nov. 9, 1 963, p. 6; Thaddeus T. 
Stokes, "Notwithstanding," Memphis Tri-State Defender, Nov. 9, 1 963, p. 6; Tucker, Memphis 
Since Crump, pp. 1 1 1 - 12. 
190"Final Vote," Memphis Tri-State Defender, Nov. 1 6, 1 963, p. l .  
191"Lawyers Voting in Judge Race," PS, Oct. 12, 1 963, p. 1 2. 
192"2 Qualify for Bar Primary," PS, Oct. 1 0, 1963, p. 23; "Runoff Today in Bar Vote," ibid.,
Oct. 1 5 ,  1 963, p. 4; "Churchill Gets Bar Approval," ibid., Oct. 1 8 ,  1 963, p. 1 2. This was not the 
first time that the Memphis bar had voted on judgeship nominees. Null Adams, "Here Are the 
Candidates for Mayor and Their Backgrounds," ibid., Sept. 30, 1 967, pp. A-24, 25. The point 
here is that the use of this device as a substitute for a runoff or white primary was highly 
publicized, and therefore must be assumed to have affei:ted citizens' understanding of the 
political consequences of adopting a majority vote provision. 
193"Here Are Returns," PS, Nov. 8, 1 963, p. I .  Churchill ended up getting 37.1 percent of the 
vote, Hooks; 36 percent� and all others; 27 percent. 
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The 1963 elections reinforced another lesson, as well. It was not possible to elect a 
black--any black--in an at-large election in Memphis at this time. In a somewhat daring 
departure, the Press-Scimitar for the first time endorsed an African-American candidate for a 
citywide office, one of the three blacks then running for different places on the Board of 
Education.194 Dr. Hollis Price, president of LeMoyne College since 1943, was the most bland, 
respectable black that could be found in Memphis. A graduate of Williston Academy and 
Amherst College in Massachusetts, Price held an M.A. in Economics from Columbia University. 
Active in the Congregational Church and the Urban League (not the more desegregationist 
NAACP), Price had been the sole well-known African-American to endorse the metro charter 
(without mentioning the districting issue) in 1962.195 He was the only Press-Scimitar-endorsed 
school board candidate to lose, garnering less than 40% of the vote in a two-candidate race 
against a young, recently appointed white businessman.196 
V.B. 1964-65 
Because three white candidates split the white vote in the Democratic primary in 1964, 
A.W. Willis, with 36.9% of the vote, won an at-large nomination for the state House of 
Representatives from Shelby County. Immediately after the primary, there was a movement to 
qualify a white independent. Insurance man Jack W. Gillespie, who had lost a close race for 
another numbered position for the State House in the primary, was reportedly approached to 
run against Willis. "I believe a citizen should run as an independent candidate for Position 1 ,  
House o f  Representatives, who represents and is respected by a majority of the people living 
here, as opposed to one who represents a minority interest," Gillespie said.197 Even though 
subsequently no white independent ran, Willis was opposed by Garvin Crawford, a union 
member and worker at the International Harvester Company plant, whose political 
advertisements referred to him as the "Republican Position 1 Candidate vs. NAACP 
194The other two were Rev. E.W. Williamson and Dr. Vasco A. Smith, Jr., longtime NAACP 
and political activist. John Spence, "Farris Endorsed by Negro Group," PS, Oct. 1 2, 1963, p. 
12 .  
195Minutes of the Board of Education cif the Memphis City Schools, Dec. 18 ,  1969, p. B 3556;
"Dr. Price Speaks for Consolidation," CApp, Oct. 27, 1 962. 
196"Here Are Returns," PS, Nov. 8, 1963, p. l ;  "New School Board Member," PS, May 30,
1963, p. 6. 
197"Willis May Get New Opposition; CApp, Aug. 9, 1 964. 
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Candidates."198 In the ensuing November general election, Willis survived with a bare 50.7% of 
the vote, to become the first black state legislator in Tennessee since the 1 880s. The other 
Democratic legislative candidates received from 56 to 58.5% of the vote. A massive black 
turnout for Lyndon Johnson and a cohesive drive to get voters to simplify a long and complex 
ballot by pulling a single party lever for all candidates apparently salvaged Willis's close 
victory .199 
In his first term in the legislature, Willis strongly supported successful bills to divide 
Shelby, as well as the state's other three large urban counties into districts for election to both 
houses of the state legislature, as well as to divide Shelby among three congressional districts. 
After the U.S. Supreme Court decided the reapportionment case of Baker v. Carr, the 1 963 
legislature had given Shelby and other urban counties too few additional seats to satisfy a 
federal district court. Instead of five senators and thirteen representatives, population equality 
required Shelby to have six senators and sixteen representatives.200 Since the one-county 
Ninth Congressional district had the seventh highest population of any of the 43S districts in the 
country, the county had to be divided between at least two congressional districts, as well.201 
Willing to deal with rural legislators who wanted to limit the increase of Shelby's overall power, 
the astute Willis took advantage of the necessity to redistrict to attack the at-large system and to 
draw a 48% black congressional district that would give members of his race a chance to elect a 
candidate of their choice, he asserted, by about 1970.202 Few other members of the Shelby 
delegation supported the move against at-large elections, and only one supported drawing 
198"Election of Willis Urged by Mitchell," CApp, Nov. I ,  1964, sec. II, p. 2. 
199Holloway, Politics of the Southern Negro, pp. 294-298. "One Lever - Democratic," CApp,
Nov. I ,  1964; "Everybody's Going To Win If You Listen To Both Sides," ibid., Nov. 3,  1 964, p. 
26; Thomas BeVier, "Shelby History In Making As Victory Goes To Negro," ibid., Nov. 4, 1 964, 
p. I ;  William Thomas, "Civil Rights Does It For Democrats As Negro Bloc Buries GOP Hopes,"
ibid., Nov. 4, 1 964, p. 23; Angus McEachran, "GOP Assesses New Negro Role," ibid., Nov. S,  
1 964, p. 1 4; "Record Shelby County Vote Indicated By Election Tally," ibid., Nov. 5,  1 964, p. 
1 4. 
200Edward L. Topp, "Chandler Optimistic About Reseating," PS, Feb. IO, 1 96S, p. 28, c. 3-4. 
201Mike Miller, "Oversized District List: Shelby No. 7," PS, Feb. 9, 1 96S, p. I S ,  c. 1 -2. 
202"Proposal Would Divide Shelby," PS, Feb. 1 0, 1 965, p. IS, c. 1 -4; William Bennett, "Willis 
Redistricting Plan Would Boost Negro Voting Power," C.4pp, Feb. !7 ,  1 965� p. 17 .  
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congressional lines as Willis suggested.203 The Press-Scimitar was horrified that Willis favored 
districts instead of at-large election for the legislature "in the hope it will make easier the 
election of several Negro legislators in Shelby."204 
VI. THE "PROGRAM OF PROGRESS" AND THE RUNOFF
The passage of the home rule amendment in 1 963 made abolition of the city commission 
easier. Subsequently, instead of having to cooperate with the county government, consolidate 
every function, and raise fears of higher taxes to provide urban services to new areas, 
governmental reformers could entirely ignore the unannexed areas of Shelby County outside the 
city. If the number and scope of the changes in the metro charter--that book-length 
pamphlet--had allowed opponents to excite apprehensions about obscure provisions and the very 
complexity of the new arrangement, now, under home rule, reformers could draft short and 
simple amendments. Finally, they could apply the major lesson of the metro fight by making 
enough concessions to get the backing of every numerous group, particularly blacks, whose 
opposition was widely credited with dooming metro. 205 
But many "reformers," while desiring black support, wanted to preserve all at-large 
elections, some wished to use the opportunity of rewriting the charter to enact a runoff law, 
and a few were initially even unwilling to meet with African-Americans in public.206 So, 
while in some ways, the governmental restructuring efforts of 1 965-66 reflected lessons learned 
in the metro struggle, in other ways, the conflict over the "Program of Progress" was a reprise 
203J.Z. Howard and Edward L. Topp, "Shelby Legislators' Big Job Begins on Monday: 
Reapportionment for Congress, Legislature," PS, May 5, 1 965, p. 8, c. 3-5; Topp, "First 
Legislative Redistricting Bill Gives Shelby 6 Senators," ibid., May I I ,  1 965, p. I ,  c. 5-7; 
'"Outfoxed'? - No, Outvoted", ibid, May 24, 1 965, p. 6, c. 1 -2; "Battle of Negro Candidates in 
Three Districts Mirrors Change, Growth," CApp, July 2 1 ,  1 966, p. 49. 
204"Prevent This Gerrymandering," PS, May 1 1 , 1965, p. 6, c. I .  Similarly, see "Two Issues for 
Shelby Legislators," ibid., May 6, 1 965, p. 8, c. 1 -2. 
205Jack H. Morris, "Chronology of a Charter," in POP Papers, Folder 1 12, p. 4. 
206/bid. 
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of earlier fights over district vs. at-large elections, and over runoffs. Always, the underlying 
issue was raciaI.207 
The major questions about the final product of the deliberations are: first, whether it 
indicates the political strength of blacks or their weakness, and, second, whether it reveals the 
willingness of whites to share power or their desire to maintain as much of it as possible. 
VI.A. THE ELITE CREATES A " POPULAR" ORGANIZATION
Although technically its membership was open to every voter who lived or worked in 
Memphis, 208 the "Program of Progress" was actually instigated by a few men and subsequently 
controlled by a somewhat larger number of other men and women. What made it different was 
that Republican activists and black leaders were, for the first time, included in the final 
negotiations. Only two major forces, Democrats of the old Crump era and members of the 
Ingram administration or his identifiable allies, were frozen out--exclusions that nearly resulted 
in the defeat of the new charter in the referendum. 
As early as February, 1 964, Lucius Burch, the original Memphis Kefauverite and longtime 
critic of the commission form of government, saw the constant bickering in the Ingram 
administration as an opportunity to remake the city charter. Burch followed up his proposal to 
Commercial Appeal editor Frank Ahlgren and Press-Scimitar editor Charles Schneider of the 
formation of a study group of people "truly representative of the power structure of the city" 
with a 1 6-page paper that recommended a council-manager system for Memphis. The paper 
took no stand on the issues of district elections or runoffs. Prodded by Burch, Ahlgren assigned 
Jack H. Morris, a local government reporter for the Commercial Appeal, to write an extensively 
researched ten-part series of articles on the commission and other forms of local government 
then in use across the country. With Morris's help, Burch then brought together eight 
community leaders, including representatives of labor unions and blacks, to orchestrate large 
public meetings at which a citizen charter reform group would be given legitimacy. A slate was 
prepared, carefully balancing representatives of various constituencies, and in January, 1 966, the 
24-man and one woman "Program of Progress" or "POP" committee was christened, the daily 
207The main theme of the only book-length study of Memphis politics during this period, 
which emphasizes governmental restructuring and is extremely sympathetic to the "reformers," is 
"the central role of race." Tucker, Memphis Since Crump, p. ix. 
20811City Government Is Topic Tonight;" PS� Jan. 24. 1966, p. 10.
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newspapers serving as proud godparents.209 The 25 included seven prominent Republicans, and 
perhaps four others who were less open in their party persuasion, but at least moving in a 
Republican direction; six Chamber of Commerce leaders (some Republican); six blacks, notably, 
Willis, Sugarmon, and Jesse Turner; two labor leaders; two Protestant clergymen and a rabbi; 
and one political scientist.210 As a student of the POP, Jonathan Wax, put it, "The leaders 
made every effort to keep the new movement reputable."211 
VI.B. DISTRICTS AND THE RUNOFF - AGAIN
The two key issues in the deliberations of the POP committee, according to an unpublished 
insider account by Jack Morris, and certainly the two that took up the most time and generated 
the most published comments, were the district vs. at-large question and the runoff.212 
According to Jonathan Wax, at-large was "the issue that several of the directors feared would 
destroy POP. . . . The minority groups, particularly the Negroes, favored districts in order to 
gain representation in the new government."213 Sugarmori;-Turner, and Willis held out, at least 
partly for tactical reasons, for an all-district council, while the businessmen and clergy on the 
committee, loudly seconded by the newspapers, pumped for an all at-large scheme.214 After a 
series of votes in which the blacks proposed 10-3 (ten elected by districts and three at-large), 
9-4, and 8-5 schemes, the directors settled on a 7-6 lineup, and detailed the drawing of district 
lines largely to Sugarmon, Lewis Donelson Ill, a prominent Republican POP member, and Cliff 
Tuck, the white president of the Young Democrats.215 Five of the six blacks voted against the 
209Tucker, Memphis Since Crump, pp. 1 1:2- 1 5; Morris, "Chronology of a Charter," pp. 3-9. 
210Jack H. Morris, "Citizens Choose Leaders for Change," CApp, Dec. 1 7 ,  1965, p. I ;  "New 
Citizen Leaders--How They Look--Who They Are," PS, Dec. 17,  1965; "POP Proposal - Mayor 
and a Council of 1 3  Members," ibid., Feb. 25, 1966. 
211 Jonathan I. Wax, "Program of Progress, A Step into the Present; Change in the form of 
government of Memphis, Tennessee," (Unpub. Senior Thesis, Princeton Univ., 1968), p, 48. 
212Morris, "Chronology of a Charter," pp. 1 1 - 12; Tucker, Memphis Since Crump, pp. 1 1 3 - 1 5; 
Wax, "Program of Progress," pp. 1 06-07; "I I -Man City Council Gains Citizens' Preference," PS, 
Feb. 1 5, 1 966, p. 1 1 . 
213Wax, "Program of Progress," pp. 63-64. 
214Wax, "Program of Progress," pp. 106-07. 
215Jack H. Morris, "Directors of Progress Agree on Districting To Elect Councilmen," CApp,
April 8 ,  1 966, p. I .  
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7-6 plan.216 In the wake of the vote, Willis threatened that black leaders might oppose the 
adoption of the charter. 217 
Although the home rule amendment allowed the POP directors to scrap the designated post 
system, they decided to maintain that rule, apparently without taking a record vote on the 
matter. The reasons, according to Jack Morris, remained the same as in 1959: "This method is 
thought to sharpen issues between candidates and eliminate the possibility of 'single-shot' 
voting--voting for fewer candidates than seats being filled."218 
Several Republicans, as well as all of the blacks, favored districts, the former because they 
were not sure that they could win in at-large elections, the latter because they were certain that 
they could not.219 Republican Lewis Donelson turned the usual Chamber of Commerce 
argument on its head by contending that district, not at-large elections would entice the "best 
possible type of citizen to run for the council." Why? Because it would take the backing of a 
considerable political organization to run in an at-large contest. Dr. Vasco Smith put the black 
view most bluntly: "We don't stand a ghost of a chance in this town running at-large . . . .
Officials elected at-large tend to think of what's good for all the people or what's best for 
Memphis as being what's best for only 61 per cent of the people. They forget about the 39 per 
cent who are Negro."220 
By this point, many whites openly admitted the black contention. Hunter Lane, Jr., a 
reformist city commissioner and a key behind-the-scenes player in POP, agreed that "There's no 
doubt that Negroes generally favor election of councilmen from districts; they want a better 
guarantee of direct representation in city government than has proved possible with at-large 
elections, and I think that with over one-third of the population of the city colored this is a 
216POP Minutes, Feb. 10-28, 1966, in POP papers, Folders 69-73. 
217Charles A. Brown, "7 Districts Proposed for City Council," PS, March 1 ,  1 966, p. 2. 
218"POP Proposal - Mayor and a Council of 1 3  Members," PS, Feb. 25, 1 966, p. 6, c. l ;  Jack H. 
Morris, "Mayor-Council Vote Took Research, Meshing of Views," CApp, Feb. 27, 1 966, section 
2, p. 5. 
219Jack H. Morris, "Drive for New City Charter Has Made Strides in Month," CApp, no date 
(Jan., 1966), in POP papers. Republicans' chances in state House of Representatives' contests 
that year were thought to have improved because the legislature had adopted sub-county 
districts in 1965 in the most urban counties. "Is It GOP Year in Shelby? . . .  Party Hopeful," 
PS, Feb. 1 9, 1966, p. 4, c. 5. 
220" I I -Man City Council Gains Citizens' Preference," PS, Feb. 1 5, 1966, p. 1 l; "POP Drives 
First Nail in Platform," ibid., Feb. 18,  1966, p. 3; Jack H. Morris, "Proposed Draft of New 
Charter Hits Stalemate," CApp, Feb. 18, 1966, p. 2 1 .  Similarly, see Lawrence Wade, quoted in 
"4 Give Views For Progress;" ibid.; Feb. 9; 1966; p. 8. 
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perfectly understandable desire. . . . Past experience indicates the practical difficulties of 
electing a Negro to a major office in the city-wide election."221 POP director Rabbi James A. 
Wax explained, when asked why he switched from supporting an all at-large council, "I learned 
that districts present the only way that a minority in the city can receive justice at the polls and 
representation on the council."222 Although understandably very sympathetic to the POP 
reformers in his I 968 Princeton senior thesis, Jonathan Wax, the Rabbi's son, understood the 
issue just as his father did: "Five commissioners elected at-large made it impossible for 
minority groups to win representation; the Negro community, which had developed sophisticated 
political machinery, felt this limitation particularly keenly."223 
The Press-Scimitar denounced the compromise, underlining the racial nature of the issue 
and more or less openly admitting the obvious fact that no black could be elected in Memphis 
at that time under an at-large system: "We urge the POP directors not to succumb to 
opportunism--not, for the sake of assuring election of representatives of minority segments at 
the start, to sacrifice the Jong-range welfare of the community. It is understandable that 
minorities who are newly feeling their oats want to get quick representation on the council. . . .  
Let the minorities produce and put forward candidates of such quality that they can win in 
city-wide voting."224 Knowing as he had to have that every black candidate who had run for 
local office at large in Memphis had been beaten, and that several were at least as well qualified 
221"Commissioner Lane Disagrees With Us on Council Members," PS, March 8, 1 966, p. 4. 
Similarly, see Bill Farris, quoted in "Farris Decries Reverse Hitch," CApp, Feb. 8 ,  1966, p. 17; 
Michael Cody, quoted in "Political Viewpoints Blend As Compromise Has Value," ibid., Feb. 2, 
1966, p. 19; Cliff Tuck, quoted in " !  I-Man City Council Gains Citizens' Preference," PS, Feb. 
1 5, I 966, p. 1 1; Lucius Burch, quoted in "New Government Plan Needs Added Safeguards, 
Burch Says," PS, April 14,  1966, p. 8. 
222Jack H. Morris, "Mayor-Council Vote Took Research, Meshing of Views," CApp, Feb. 27, 
I 966, section 2, p. 5. 
223Wax, "Program of Progress," p.2 1 .  The access to papers and participants that Wax gained 
through his father is at least balanced by the insider's bias that that he naturally acquired. 
More important flaws in his thesis are his failure to treat the local elections of I 955, 1 958, and 
I 959 and the struggles over numbered posts and the runoff, and his superficial account of the 
1962 Metro Memphis fight. 
224"What Sort of Council for Memphis?" PS, Feb. 28, 1966, p. 6, c. 1 -2. By 1 966, the PS was 
not the liberal newspaper on non-racial matters that it had been during the struggle against 
Crump and for the Kefauver-Orgill group. In I 966, for instance, it endorsed three extreme 
conservatives for the three congressional seats in the Memphis area--two Republicans and one 
Democrat. The black Tennessee Voters' Council, represented locally by the Willis-Sugarman 
Shelby County Democratic Club, in each case endorsed the opponent of the man the PS
endorsed. Naturally, the PS favored the POP and opposed districting the State Senate. "Vote 
'Against' Proposals 3 ,  5," ibid., Oct. 24, 1 966, p. 8,  c. 1 -2; "Vote FOR No. 1 3  . . .  AGAINST 3 
and 5," ibid., Nov. 7, 1 966, p. JO, c. 1 -2. 
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for office as their opponents, the editorialist, to give him every benefit of the doubt, must have 
at least meant that an at-large scheme would put off the election of blacks until some halcyon 
time in the future, and that every at-large seat in a mixed district/at-large system would go to 
a white.225 
The point is worth emphasizing: Whites who explicitly (Rabbi Wax) or implicitly (the 
Press-Scimitar's editorial writer) recognized that it would be difficult, if not impossible to elect 
a black to an at-large post in Memphis, and yet favored the retention of at-large elections for 
some or all of the offices knew that those offices would all go to whites. Although people like 
Wax and Hunter Lane were willing to grant blacks the right to some representation, they were 
unwilling to give them a fair opportunity, through an all-district system, for example, to elect 
candidates of their choice in anything like the blacks' proportion in the population. 
And the other reasons that they offered for maintaining at-large elections were threadbare 
and patently specious. For instance, if the Press-Scimitar conveniently forgot very recent 
history, the Commercial Appeal shamelessly distorted the more distant past. Electing 
councilpersons by district "would restore the ward politics, log rolling, parish rivalry and private 
interest protection of neighborhood aldermen. Most progressive cities had to abolish aldermen 
by area when this century's problems of municipal business appeared. This was the method in 
which there flourished graft, corruption, pockets of privilege and irregular law 
enforcement."226 Mayor E.H. Crump was impeached and removed from office for refusing to 
enforce prohibition laws, and under his aegis, gambling and prostitution flourished.227 Crump 
made millions selling insurance in a city in which it was rumored to be difficult to operate a 
225Testifying at POP hearings, Vanderbilt University political scientist Daniel Grant and two 
civic leaders from other cities, San Antonio mayor W.W. McAllister and Cincinnati patrician 
Charles P. Taft, emphasized that minority candidates might be elected in an at-large system if 
they were put on appropriate slates. Taft admitted, however, that even in Cincinnati, it took 
four attempts before the ruling "Charter Party" was able to elect a black on its slate, and that, 
even though 23% of the population in Cincinnati was black, only one of nine councilmen was of 
that race. Jack Morris, "2-Man Team To Guide City Is Suggested," CApp, Feb. 4, 1 966; Bill 
Evans, "San Antonio Likes Council-Manager Government," PS, Feb. 15 ,  1 966, p. 1 1 ; Bill Evans, 
"Charles Taft Extolls Virtues of Council-Manager Form," ibid., Feb. 19, 1 966, p. 6, c. 4-6; "Taft 
Calls Citizens' Party Key to At-Large Election," CApp, Feb. 19,  1966. (Ethnically discriminatory 
slates in San Antonio were, of course, an issue in White v. Regester, 4 1 2  U.S. 755 ( 1 973).) 
Their testimony serves as a reminder that no white slate in Memphis up to 1966 ever included a 
black for an at-large seat, unless the Press-Scimitar's endorsement of Hollis Price in 1963 
counts. 
226"A Sorry Road," CApp, Feb. 19, 1966, p. 6.
227Even Miller, Mr. Crurnp, more or less admits these facts, pp. 1 1 0= 14. 
52 
business unless one employed the correct insurance broker. 228 Crump's city had one law for 
Crump's friends, another for political opponents or labor organizers, and yet another, a worse 
one, for blacks.229 All of the evils that the Commercial Appeal attributed to district-based 
elections, as the editorialist must have known, were actually concomitants of at-large elections 
in Memphis. 
In case anyone missed the racial and partisan overtones of the district vs. at-large issue 
during ·the POP debate, a state court case argued simultaneously and closely watched in 
Memphis would have reminded them.230 In 1965, the Tennessee state legislature had, for the 
first time, established sub-county districts for the State Senate in the state's four largest coun­
ties, including Shelby. Although a three-judge Federal court had sustained the apportionment, 
including the Senate sub-districting feature, State Chancellor Ned Lentz ruled that the state 
constitution required county-wide districts for the Senate, and the State Supreme Court upheld 
his decision. News stories stressed the effect of districts on the possibility of electing blacks to 
the Senate from the urban counties. Under a banner page I headline, for instance, the Press­
Scimitar announced that "The division of the four big counties would apparently have assured 
Negroes of winning seats in the senate. Republicans also had greater hopes for electing 
senatorial candidates under the districting law ."231 As voters were preparing to vote on the 
POP, as well as on a referendum on changing the state constitution to mandate sub-county 
districts in urban counties, the Press-Scimitar again reminded Memphians of the consequences 
of single-member districts. Noting that representatives to the state House would be elected by 
districts in Shelby for the first time, Null Adams pointed out that "The result is that three 
228For a contrasting view, see Miller, Mr. Crump of Memphis, p, 1 67. 
229Even Miller admits that there was considerable police brutality against blacks in Memphis, 
though he cites one instance in which Crump denounced it. See Mr. Crump of Memphis, p. 205. 
2300ne of the plaintiffs in the case was Memphis State Representative James E. Williams, one 
of whose lawyers was Bill Farris. Edward L. Topp, "Tennessee District Law Ruled Out," PS, 
March 7, 1 966, p. I ,  c. 8. 
231Edward L Topp, �Tennessee District .Law Ruled Out," PS, March 7, .1966, p. I, c. 8; 
William Bennett, "Remap Feature is Key To No Protests," CA pp, Feb. 22, 1966, p. 17, c. I -7; 
"Remap Decision To Be Appealed," ibid., March 8, 1 966, p. I ,  c. I ;  "Appeal To Get Early 
Hearing," ibid., Mar. 9, 1 966, p. 22, c. I ;  "Reapportion Brief Cites: Subdistrict Clause 
'Constitutional,"' PS, Feb. 2 1 ,  1 966, p. 6, c. 2-3; "State Constitution Violated? Attorney's 
Opinion of Sub-Districting," ibid., Feb. 22, 1 966, p. 1 1 ,  c. 4-5. The case eventually turned on 
whether a careless clerk changed a comma into a semicolon. "Senate Candidates Awaiting 
Supreme Court's Decision," PS, April 7, 1 966, p. 1 1 , c. 4-8.
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Negroes will be elected from districts where most voters are Negroes. The Republicans hope to 
win l 0 seats because these districts have voted for GOP candidates in the past."232 Advertising 
in the Press-Scimitar's "Voters' Guide," the Shelby County Democratic Club urged its supporters 
to vote for districting the State Senate because districts "will enable Negroes to be 
represented . . .  ."233 
Having negotiated a compromise of sorts on the district vs. at-large problem, the POP 
directors, after weeks of debate, finessed the runoff issue by suggesting that some other group 
put it on the August ballot separately and delaying the POP charter vote until November.234 
As with the at-large issue, the racial implications of the runoff issue were openly discussed and 
widely agreed upon. At a POP directors' hearing, for instance, Rev. Alexander Gladney, a 
director, declared that a runoff provision "would make it hard for members of my race to ever 
be elected. I think the Negroes would oppose any charter which has a runoff in it." Lucius 
Burch, who was then testifying, "conceded that a runoff law would make it hard for a Negro to 
be elected."235 A news story by Jack Morris casually mentioned what everyone knew to be a 
fact, that "a runoff law has racial overtones--it makes it more difficult for a Negro to be 
elected . . . .  "236 Another Morris story framed the issue and exposed the finesse even more 
openly: "Memphis Negroes are opposed to a runoff because they fear it would limit their 
232Null Adams, "Section S - a Measure Aimed at State's 6 Biggest Counties," PS, Oct. S, 1 966, 
p. 8, c. 6-8. When black representation in the Tennessee State House of Representatives rose
from 1 after the 1 964 elections to 6 after the 1 966 elections, the PS commented: "Reason for 
Republican and Negro gains in the 99-member House was that under a 1 965 law, candidates in 
Shelby and other urban counties were elected by districts." "Shelby GOP Bumps Demos for 6 
House Seats," ibid., Nov. 9, 1 966, section 3, p. 33, c. 1 -5. 
233"Endorsements Made By Shelby County Democratic Club," PS, Nov. 4,  1 966, p. A-IO,  c. 4-
5. Despite the opposition of the newspapers, the districting constitutional amendments carried
both Shelby and the state as a whole. "What Now on State Amendments?" ibid., Nov. J I , 1 966, 
p. 6, c. 1 -2.
234This finesse was quite openly admitted, e.g., by POP chairman Downing Pryor. See Jack H. 
Morris, "Vote Approves Two-Year Terms in Departments," CApp, April 29, 1966, p. 27. The 
POP had originally planned to put the new charter on the August ballot, and finished its work 
in time to do so. Jack H. Morris, "Deadline Is Set To Select Form Of Government," CApp, Jan. 
1 4, 1 966, p. I .  The date change, a political decision, underlines the importance of the runoff 
issue and the fear that blacks, already wary of the new system because it kept nearly half of the 
seats at-large, might vote against the charter, too, if it was on the ballot at the same time as the 
runoff was. 
235Charles A. Brown, "Four Issues Debated by POP," PS, April 1 5, 1966, p. I .  
236Morris, "Charter Would Bar Pressures By Candidates," C.4.pp, .A.pri! 22� ! 966, p. 1 .
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chance to obtain elective office. The possibility that this opposition could be turned against the 
entire effort to change the city government was influential in the POP decision not to include a 
runoff law in its charter."237 In an effort to avoid outright black opposition to the POP 
charter, the directors voted 1 4 - 1  against including a runoff provision. 238 
Predictably, the Press-Scimitar exploded. "Apparently the decision was made in order to 
appease the Negro leaders on the committee, on the basis that Negro citizens would not vote for 
the new charter if it included run-off elections. . . . A great concession has already been made 
to the Negro leaders who are among the members of the 2S-man239 committee. This was the 
provision for a majority of the 1 3-man council to be elected in districts instead of at-large, 
from the whole city--which we think would have assured better government in the long-run. 
Allowing seven of the 1 3  councilmen to be elected by districts virtually assures two or more 
Negro representatives on the council."240 The logic of the paper's position is that of a tightly­
bound syllogism, which was, in effect, repeatedly noted in Memphis during this period. If 
voting is racially polarized and blacks are in a minority, they will almost always lose in a 
runoff. That districting, rather than at-large elections, will allow blacks to elect a certain 
number of candidates is a recognition of racially polarized voting. Therefore, to favor at-large 
elections, especially with runoffs, in those races in which white voters are in the majority is 
virtually to foreclose the possiblity of electing blacks to those seats. 
VI.C. THE REVEALING CAMPAIGN FOR THE CHARTER AND THE RUNOFF
While most of the incumbent city commissioners went along with the POP charter, and the 
rural and suburban elected officials were not affected by it, as they had been by metro in 1962, 
the Ingram administration directed a scattershot attack on POP which nearly succeeded. 
237 Jack H. Morris, "Relieved Progress Leaders Approve Split In Proposals - City Commission 
Will Act to Put Election Runoff On August Ballot With Decision On Charter Revision Slated for 
November," CApp, May 1 3 ,  1 966. 
238Charles A. Brown, "POP Directors Are Against Mayor-Council Runoff Law," PS, April 22, 
1 966, p. I; Jack H. Morris, "Relieved Progress Leaders Approve Split In Proposals - City 
Commission Will Act to Put Election Runoff On August Ballot With Decision On Charter 
Revision Slated For November," CApp, May 1 3 ,  1 966; POP Minutes, April 2 1 ,  1 966, in POP 
Papers, Folder 84; Morris, "Chronology of A Charter," p. 1 2. Lewis Donelson cast the only 
negative vote. 
2390ne of the "men" was female. 
240"Vital Issues Remain in POP Plan--Full Group Should Work," PS, April 2S, 1 966, p. 6, c. 1 -
4. 
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Ingram first threatened to veto the Commission's ordinance placing the runoff on the 
August ballot, not in order to prevent it from being voted on at all, but to cause sufficient 
administrative delay that it would have to be scheduled for November, along with the POP 
charter.241 State Representative Hugh Stanton, Jr. opposed Ingram's maneuver for reasons 
which once again underscore the racial purposes behind adoption of the runoff: "In the 
November election the people will be voting on a change in the form of government. These are 
distinct and different issues and should be voted on in different elections. Both questions on 
the same ballot would confuse some. And the citizens are more apt to approve the change in 
the form of government if the runoff law is already in effect and they are guaranteed that 
majority candidates will win."242 In other words, if whites knew that blacks could not win at­
large or district races with pluralities, they would feel sure that the POP charter would maintain 
white control, and they would therefore accept it. In November, the black Shelby County 
Democratic Club endorsed the Republican opponents of Stanton and State Senator Joe Pipkin 
because of the incumbents' efforts "in securing a runoff law in the City of Memphis . . .  ."243 
Statements during the runoff campaign echoed Stanton's sentiments. Attorney Charles 
Crump told the Press-Scimitar that he was for a majority-vote requirement because under a 
plurality system "any small group in a bloc vote could elect a person without a· majority."244 In 
a letter to the editor, William Johnson told the Press-Scimitar that he opposed the runoff 
because it was "used only in the South, mostly to gang up on minorities, such as Jews, Catholics, 
Negroes and labor and other groups . . . .  "245 Opponents of the runoff, said the Commercial 
Appeal in an election-eve editorial, "contend the runoff weakens the voice of minori-
ties . . . .  "246 "Negro and labor forces," Jack Morris reported, "fear that a run-off law would 
dilute their strength at the polls."247 "Opponents contend the runoff weakens the voice of 
minorities,'' the Commercial Appeal--again--reminded voters on the morning of the 
241"Ingram Holding Runoff Fate," PS, May 30, 1966, p. 2, c. 3. 
242Null Adams, "Minority Mayor May Block Early Vote on Majority Issue--Runoff Petition," 
PS June 1 ,  1 966, p. I ,  c. 1 -8. 
243Null Adams, "Amendment for Runoffs Is Sought," PS, May 1 1 ,  1 966, p. 1 1 , c. I; Adams, 
"Political Notebook," ibid., Nov. I ,  1 966, p. 8, c. 1 -2. 
244"Memphians Tell Why Runoff Election Law is 'Fair Way"', PS, July 1 2, 1 966, p. 1 5 ,  c. 3-7. 
245PS, July 30, 1 966. 
246"Important Questions Await City, County Voters' Big X,'' CApp, Aug. 4, 1 966, p. 59.
247"Referendum Items Await Judgment," C.4.pp, .A..ug. ! ,  1 966, p. 25.
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referendum. 248 With black organizations split in the gubernatorial and senatorial contests, and 
white support for runoffs in local elections overwhelming, the runoff provision passed its 
August test by 35,573 to 8047, a margin of seven to one. Only 1 9.7% of the registered voters, 
however, expressed an opinion on the issue.249
With the runoff secured, the "reform" forces largely relaxed. Jack Morris and 
Commissioner Hunter Lane "became appalled at the lack of campaign spirit coming from POP 
headquarters. No pamphlets had been printed, no copies of the charter distributed, no 
advertising undertaken." Lane raised money and personally staffed the office. Without a "last 
boost" from the Chamber of Commerce in the two weeks before the election, POP chairman 
Downing Pryor was convinced, the POP "would not have succeeded."250
Observers disagreed on whether Ingram's blustering opposition helped more than it hurt the 
POP cause.251 Terming POP the "Program of Plunder," Ingram charged in large newspaper ads, 
paid for by the city, that the new charter would lead to graft, corruption, and higher taxes. 
Attempting to frighten the extreme segregationist part of his constituency, Ingram trumpeted: 
"A Majority of POP Councilmen Will Be Elected by Minority Vote from Districts."252 Some 
former Crump organization men, including ex-mayor Walter Chandler, longtime activist and 
former state legislator Joseph Hanover, and ex-commissioners Buddy Dwyer and Stanley Dillard, 
joined Ingram in opposition, as did the black "Ministers' Independent Council of Political 
248"Important Questions Await City, County Voters' Big X," CApp, Aug. 4, 1966, p. 59, c. 1 -2. 
249"Battle of Negro Candidates in Three Districts Mirrors Change, Growth," CApp, July 2 1 ,
1966, p .  49; William J .  Miles, "Decision is Strong on Four Issues," ibid., Aug. 6 ,  1966, p .  7-B; 
"268 , 1 7 1  Eligible to Vote Aug. 4," PS, July l l ,  1966, p. l .  
250Morris, "Chronology of a Charter," p. 14; Pryor to W. C. Mieher (president of the Chamber 
of Commerce), Nov. IO, 1 966, in POP Papers, Folder 57; Wax, "Program of Progress," pp. 1 1 1 -
12 .  
251Jack H. Morris, "POP Victory To be Factor in '67 Election," CApp, Nov. 1 0, 1 966, p. 67; 
Morris, "Chronology of a Charter," p. 16; Wax .• "Program of Progress." p. 90. 
252"0pen Letter from the Mayor - This is not a Political Advertisement!" CA pp, Oct. 1 7, 1 966; 
"Another Ingram Trick," ibid., Oct. 17 ,  1966, p. 6; Jack H. Morris, "POP Fate Appears to Rest 
on Matter of Pocketbook," ibid., Nov. 5, 1966. Because the electorate had authorized runoffs at 
the August election, Ingram could not have been referring to someone getting elected with a 
minority of the votes. He must have been pointing out that blacks would be elected. In fact, 
four of the seven districts were at least 39 percent black. 
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Leadership."253 In the final analysis, however, the "reformers" had learned their lesson in 1962. 
The POP charter, in the words of Press-Scimitar political writer Null Adams, was "designed in 
part to attract votes and it is doing just that. The election of seven of the thirteen councilmen 
from separate districts--instead of by a citywide vote--will bring Negro and Republican 
support for the proposal on the Nov. 8 ballot."254 The proposal carried, garnering 59.4% of the 
votes.255 
Was the necessity that the white POP directors felt to buy black support with mixed 
district/at-large representation a sign of black strength or weakness? Comments during the 
campaign demonstrate that it was the latter. In a debate with Russell Sugarmon on radio station 
WDIA, Mayor William Ingram warned that "[A]fter they get this thing voted in, your Goldwater 
buddies can redistrict it (the council districts) so you won't have any representation whatever." 
Lamely, Sugarmon replied: "[N]o Southern white man can represent the Negro adequately. For 
ten years, we've been petitioning, with little change. We need people in government to whom 
the individual voter can look." Ingram riposted: "If you (Negro voters) do elect two 
representatives out of thirteen, what's that? One-sixth?" "That's better than none out of five," 
Sugarman responded. "Since this runoff law was passed, our choice is POP or no representation 
at all."256 
As if to prove that for once, Ingram was not merely scare-mongering, Henry Loeb, the 
former and future mayor, told the "Transportation Club" at a Claridge Hotel luncheon that 
although he generally favored the new charter, he opposed electing any councilpersons by 
district. "But," he added significantly, "under Home Rule we can correct these things as we go 
253Null Adams, "Ex-Mayor Is Among Opposition," PS, Oct. 19, 1966, p. I ;  "JC Directors 
Oppose Change," ibid., Oct. 2 1 ,  1 966, p. 2; Null Adams, "Women Launch Anti-POP Drive," 
ibid., Oct. 22, 1966, p. 3; "Ministers' Group Says Vote 'NO,"' ibid., Oct. 22, 1966, p. 3, c. 7-8; 
Wax, "Program of Progress," pp. 9 1 ,  107. 
254Adams, "Objections and Answers: POP, Designed To Get Vote, Picking Up Support," PS,
Oct. 8, 1966, p. 4. 
255Wax, "Program of Progress," pp. 109, 1 1 3-14.  Only 43.5% of the registered voters cast 
ballots on the POP question, even though, on the same ballot, 58% of the registrants voted in 
the Frank Clement-Howard Baker contest for the U.S. Senate. The municipal change was not 
wildly popular. 
256John Means, "POP Debate Aired in Acid Exchange," Ci4pp, Nov. ! ,  !966, p. ! 5.
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along."257 In other words, if Loeb had his way, African-Americans could not even be sure of 
winning any seats in the council at all in the future. 
In Memphis, white "liberals" were those who were willing to give blacks two or three out of 
thirteen seats if such a concession was necessary to obtain the white reformers' goal of replacing 
the city commission by a more "modern" form of government, or, in the case of the 
Republicans, to assure representation for themselves. "Conservatives" like Loeb were those who 
were so strongly against allowing blacks to elect candidates of their choice that they were 
willing to renounce public bargains in order to achieve their goal of an absolutely all-white 
government, rather than one in which blacks had at least token representation. 
Were the voters who passed on the POP charter in the referendum aware of the racial 
consequences of the district vs. at-large issue? Did they know that it was more difficult (if not 
impossible) for African-Americans to win at-large elections in Memphis at the time? For 
anyone who had somehow missed all the major political events of the past decade, the 
Commercial Appeal made sure in its series of questions and answers on the POP charter in the 
days before the election that these effects were understood. "Question: Would the division of 
the city into districts place a Negro in City Hall? A. Yes, two and possibly four districts could 
be expected to elect Negro councilmen. POP directors believe it just to provide representation 
on the city's lawmaking body for a group which includes one-third of the city's population. 
The election of officials from the city at-large, as is done with the commission, makes it harder 
for a Negro to win office."258 
VII. THE 1967 ELECTIONS: RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS
The municipal elections of 1967, the first in Memphis under a mayor-council form of 
government in more than fifty years, might have been designed to prove the accuracy of black 
expectations about at-large elections and fears about the runoff. They also marked a deep split 
among black political leaders and derailed the political careers of three promising politicians, all 
of whom were casualties of Memphis's racially polarized politics and the electoral devices that 
had been designed to insure white control. 
257Null Adams, "Loeb Favors POP Plan," PS Oct. 26, 1 966, p. I I .  
25811Council Would Be Chosen From Districts� A t  Large," C.4.pp, Oct. 23, 1966, section !!, p. 6.
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VII.A. THE MAYORAL RACE
According to the Press-Scimitar and Commercial Appeal, which had always been hostile to 
him, Mayor William B. Ingram had spent four years breaking with erstwhile friends, feuding 
with everyone else, opposing governmental reforms, and generally making people ashamed to 
admit that they were Memphians. 259 Nevertheless, Memphis had attracted job-packed
industries during his term, a growing tax base had allowed him to hold the property tax rate 
constant, and the city had avoided serious race riots. 260 It was no surprise that he declared for 
reelection, or that his controversial record attracted five well-known opponents. 
Former mayor Henry Loeb, who had resigned to tend his family's laundry business shortly 
before the end of the term to which he had been elected in 1959, now wanted to return to 
government. Memphis-born but educated at Brown University, a member of Temple Israel who 
was careful to let it be known that he attended the Episcopal Church with his wife, a World 
War II Navy buddy of John F. Kennedy, the handsome and charming Loeb had seemed a liberal 
when elected to the City Commission in 1955, but had become so identified with the 
segregationist cause that blacks of every faction united in opposing him. 261 
William N. "Bill" Morris, who gained the Commercial Appeal's endorsement, had been 
elected sheriff in 1964 and 1966. Born in Mississippi and educated in Mississippi and Alabama, 
the young Morris, only 34 in 1967, had graduated from Memphis State, served in the I Ol st 
Airborne, and worked as a printer and sales manager for a leasing company before his election. 
His politics were as vague as Ingram's, if probably less volatile. 262 
Hunter Lane was an impeccably designed moderate politician in what was, unfortunately 
for him, an immoderate city. Quarterback of the state championship football team, as well as 
student body president at Memphis Central High, Lane was a magna cum laude graduate of 
Washington and Lee University, from which he also obtained his law degree. Returning to 
Memphis, he practiced law for several years, upset incumbent Buddy Dwyer for the City 
Commission in 1963, and worked behind the scenes for POP and the runoff in 1 966. A director 
259Null Adams, "Lane Throws Support to Henry Loeb," PS, Oct. 20, 1967, p. I ;  "Press-Scimitar 
Recommendations in the Run-Off Election," ibid., Oct. 25, 1967, p. 1 2; "Our Recommendation," 
CApp, Nov. 2 ,  1967, p. 6. 
260Null Adams, "Frayser Hears Loeb-Ingram Word Battle," PS, Oct. 1 1 , 1967. 
261Null Adams, "Here Are the Candidates for Mayor and Their Backgrounds," PS, Sept. 30, 
1967, pp. A-24, 25. 
262 Ibid., "Morris Has the Touch," CApp, Oct. 3, ! 967, p. 6. 
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of the Citizens' Association, vice chairman of the Better Schools Committee, and a scoutmaster, 
Lane was 38, earnest and hard-working, and a favorite of the newspapers, especially the Press­
Scimitar, which endorsed him for mayor in 1 967.263 
Two years older than Lane, City Commissioner Pete Sisson almost matched Lane's resume. 
President of his senior class at South Side High, he was all-Memphis in basketball and 
graduated from Memphis State and the University of Memphis Law School. President of the 
Jaycees and chairman of the March of Dimes, he was active in the Citizens Association and the 
Chamber of Commerce and had been a Merchant Marine in World War II. 264 Lacking 
newspaper and other big-name endorsements, his campaign quickly languished, finishing with a 
mere 2.3% of the primary vote.265 
A. W. Willis, Jr., was the first African-American to run for mayor of Memphis, as he had 
been the state's first black legislator since the 1 880s. Having grown up in Memphis and served 
in the army in Europe from 1 943 to 1946, Willis did not have the option of attending white­
only Memphis State or Washington and Lee, as the other future candidates did. After 
graduating from all-black Talladega College in Alabama, he was one of the first southern blacks 
to get a law degree at the University of Wisconsin. Returning to Memphis, he formed a law 
partnership with Russell Sugarman, and together, they prosecuted most of the city's civil rights 
cases and, along with other leaders of the NAACP, organized the black political campaigns in 
the city in the 1950s and 60s.266 Short and slightly built, Willis was smart and fiery, and he 
convinced himself that he could become the first black mayor of a large Deep South city, if not 
in 1967, then later. 
The strategy of the almost issueless campaign was determined primarily by the existence of 
the runoff. In contrast to 1959, whites did not have to single out a front-runner before the 
election. For even if Willis made the runoff, whites, who comprised nearly two-thirds of the 
registered voters in I 967, could always solidify behind his opponent in the second election. 
Mayor Ingram's tactics in the primary brilliantly built on this fact. With no evidence that 
he was ever willing to make public, Ingram charged that Loeb had paid Willis $35,000 to get 
263"Hunter Lane for Mayor," PS, Sept. 26, 1 967, p. 6; Adams, "Here are the Candidates", ibid.,
Sept. 30, 1967, pp. A-24, 25. 
264Adams, "Here Are the Candidtes," Ibid., Sept. 30, 1 967, pp. A-24, 25.
265"Election at a Glance," PS, Oct. 6, 1967, p. 13 .
266/bid. 
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into the contest in order to take black votes away from Ingram. 267 Despite the implausibility 
of the allegation that Willis, who had devoted long hours and received little compensation 
defending the black community's civil rights, would willingly assist the leading segregationist in 
the mayor's race, the charge stuck, and it undermined Willis's support among blacks. The black 
"Unity League," which endorsed Ingram, distributed a cartoon of Willis sitting on Loeb's lap 
counting $50 bills.268 That it probably hurt Loeb among whites--he had no black support to 
lose--is implied by the vigor with which Loeb denounced the aspersion: "I know it is a lie, you 
know it is a lie, and what's more disgraceful, is the fact that the current mayor knows it is a 
lie." Not just "an unmitigated liar," in Loeb's view, Ingram was also "a master of distortion, 
crafty and evasive" who heaped "abuse and humiliation" on anyone who "dared to disagree with 
him."269 
What gave the rumor credence among African-Americans was their inability to imagine 
Willis beating a white candidate even if he did get into the runoff. Thus the United Baptist 
Churches' Association asked Willis to withdraw from the contest for mayor because "we feel it 
is impossible for you, or any Negro, to become mayor of our city at this time."270 Since he 
could not expect to win in a racially polarized electorate with a majority-vote requirement, why 
was he running, blacks asked themselves. Ingram's unsubstantiated, but constantly repeated 
rumor provided a ready answer. 
The bandwagon effect that had undercut the campaigns of Fowler, Canale, and Chambers 
in 1 959 and Hinds in 1963 also helped sweep Lane, Morris, Sisson, and Willis away in 1967.271 
Lane never made many inroads into the black vote, because, although he proposed concrete 
programs to end racial discrimination in city jobs and build more low-cost housing, 272 he also 
267Edward L. Topp, "Loeb Replies to Criticism of His Last Term in Office," PS, Sept. 9, 1 967; 
"Shelby Demo Club 'Neutral' in Mayor's Race," ibid., Oct. I I , 1 967. 
268"Shelby Demo Club 'Neutral' in Mayor's Race," PS, Oct. 1 1 , 1967. 
269Null Adams, "Political Notebook," PS, Sept. 22, 1967, p. 1 5; Clark Porteous, "Loeb 
Introduces Film Clip on Ingram," ibid., Oct. 28, 1967, p. 2. 
270Null Adams, "Rep. Willis Criticizes Ministers," PS, Oct. 4, 1967, p. 4 1 .  
271Null Adams, "Politics Editor Makes Predictions - In�luding Loeb Victory," PS, Nov. 1 ,  1967, 
p. 10. 
272C!ark Porteous, "3-Way fight Develops For Negro Votes," PS, Sept. 30, 1 967, pp. I ,  3. 
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touted his role in the passage of the runoff in 1966, a position that was anathema to blacks.273 
Willis's great difficulty was not attracting white votes--he never had a chance to do that and 
ended with fewer than a thousand--but convincing blacks that a vote for him was not 
wasted.274 As the Unity League put it: "It's impossible for a Negro to win the mayor's office 
at this time. Why waste your vote on Willis?"275 Willis's overblown prediction at his 
campaign-opening speech that he would win a majority in the primary both showed that he 
recognized the problem and undermined his credibility.276 
Although his promises (for instance, to be "mayor of all the people") were much less 
specific than Lane's or Willis's, and although he refused to back an open housing ordinance or 
to abjure segregation, Mayor Ingram increasingly corralled the majority of black votes by 
repeating his contention that Willis could never win a runoff, and that he was a bribed stalking 
horse for Henry Loeb. 277 As the Commercial Appeal put it, black ministers "in the Ingram 
camp and other Ingram aides hammered away on the theme that Mr. Willis simply could not 
win since Negroes account for only 34 per cent of the city's registered voters. . . . Rumors that 
Mr. Loeb paid Mr. Willis $35,000 to enter the race were spread throughout the Negro 
273Why did this moderate patrician push for the runoff? Three reasons may be suggested, 
although there is little direct evidence on the point. First, he probably shared the view that the 
election of a black as mayor would be bad for Memphis, because more white homeowners and 
businessmen would flee what would be perceived as a black-controlled city. (Although Lane 
and others may not themselves have been hostile to blacks because of their race, by acting on 
the view that many whites were racists, they entangled or infected their motives with racism.) 
Second, as a moderate, Lane could expect to win the black vote in a runoff against Loeb, or 
much of Loeb's following in a runoff against Ingram. See Null Adams, "Lane Pleads for Run­
Off Opportunity," PS, Oct. 2, 1 967, pp. I ,  8. As a relative unknown himself, however, he 
could not reasonably hope to win a plurality against such well-established candidates. Third, 
because of his comparative obscurity, he needed a newspaper endorsement to get voters to take 
him seriously. The Press-Scimitar and, to a lesser extent, the Commercial Appeal, were tireless 
advocates of the runoff, and might look more favorably on a candidate who labored for it. See 
"Hunter Lane for Mayor," PS, Sept. 26, 1 967, p. 6. 
274Null Adams, "Big Mayor Race Question--Will Rep. Willis Get Into Run-Off?" PS, Sept. 1 6, 
1 967, p. 4; Adams, "Political Notebook," ibid., Oct 23, 1 967, p. 17 .  
275Null Adams, "Rep. Willis Criticizes Ministers," PS, Oct. 4,  1 967, p.  4 1 .  
276Clark Porteous, "Willis Opens Campaign, Says He'll Win Easily," PS, Sept. 8, 1 967. 
277"Ingram Woos Negro Voters, Gets Some Aid, Reports Say," PS, Sept. 27, 1 967, pp. I ,  1 2; 
Null Adams, "Mayor's Race Sparked by Charges Political Machines Being Plotted," ibid., Sept. 
28, 1 967, p. I ;  Adams, "Loeb, Ingram Launch New Drives," ibid., Oct. 6, 1 967, p. I; Adams, 
"Separate the School System From Politics, Loeb Insists," ibid., Oct. 1 8 ,  1967, p. 22; Adams, 
"Political Notebook," ibid., Oct. 23, 1 967, p. 1 7; Adams, "Political Notebook," ibid., Oct. 27, 
1 967, p. 1 5 .  
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community."278 Realizing that his base was being looted, Willis flailed helplessly. "Mayor 
Ingram campaigns in total secrecy. . . . Ingram talks like a racist to white voters and another 
way to Negro voters. . . . Ingram is trying to do as he did four years ago - get the segrega­
tionists as well as Negroes to vote for him."279 
On primary day, October 5, Loeb ran first, with 33% of the vote, virtually all of it 
white. 280 Ingram slipped into the runoff with 24.9%, polling an estimated 53% of the black 
vote, but only 1 2% of the white ballots.281 While Morris's respectable 21 .4% showing 
invigorated his future political career, Lane's embarrassing 6. 1 %  virtually killed his. Most 
humiliating of all, Willis finished a poor fourth, with only 1 2.2% of the total vote and an 
estimated 39% of the black electorate.282 Many blacks reportedly abstained, not wanting to 
vote against Willis, but not wanting to help him get into a hopeless runoff, either.283 The
Press-Scimitar, always anxious to point out schisms in the black community,284 crowed that the 
election marked "the destruction of the Negro bloc-voting myth," and that Ingram had broken 
"the back of the Shelby [County] Democratic Club . . . .  "285 Unlike most other black politicians 
and groups, Willis and the SCDC refused to endorse Ingram in the runoff. 286 
The day before the runoff election in November, Press-Scimitar political editor Null 
Adams predicted that Loeb would win because of the "white backlash" against Ingram's success 
278Jimmy Covington, "Negro Clerics Tipped Ingram Scale," CApp, Oct. 7, 1967, p. 1 7 .  
279Ciark Porteous, "3-Way Fight Develops For Negro Votes," PS, Sept. 30, 1967, pp. I ,  3. 
280Null Adams, "Loeb, Ingram Launch New Drives," PS, Oct. 6, 1 967, p. I .  For the returns 
for all candidates, see "Election at a Glance," PS, Oct. 6, 1 967, p. 1 3. 
281Null Adams, "Loeb, Ingram Launch New Drives," PS, Oct. 6, 1967, p. I; Adams, "Political 
Notebook," ibid, Oct. 23, 1967, p. 17 .  
282Null Adams, "Political Notebook," PS, Oct. 23,  1967, p.  1 7. 
283Clark Porteous, "How Many Will Vote Thursday? Candidates Give Views," PS, Oct. 27, 
1967, p. 1 4; Jimmie Covington, "Ingram, Loeb Split Race Vote," CApp, Oct. 6, 1967, p. 27. 
284"Negroes Won't All Vote One Way--That's Good," PS, July 1 7, 1962. 
285"Now to Finish the Job," PS, Oct. 6, 1967, p. 6; Null Adams, "Loeb, Ingram Launch New
Drives," ibid, Oct. 6, 1967, p. I .  
286Null Adams, "Loeb, Ingram Launch New Drives," PS, Oct. 6, 1 967, p. I ;  "Shelby Demo Club
'Neutral' in Mayor's Race," ibid., Oct. 1 1 ,  1 967; "9th District Demo Club Backs Ingram," ibid.,
Oct. 18 ,  1 967; Clark Porteous, "Minister Is District 6 Issue," ibid., Oct. 20, 1 967, p. 2 1 ;  Null 
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in seeking black votes. 287 In the largest total vote in Memphis's history up to that time, Loeb 
proved Adams an acute prognosticator, winning by a 54-46 margin. Essentially ,  Loeb put 
together his and Morris's primary votes, while Ingram added Willis's to his own in the first 
election. In what Adams said was a typical overwhelmingly black precinct, Ingram got 94.6% of 
the vote in the runoff, while in a typical homogeneously white precinct, Loeb received 89. 1%. 
Although he had carried the conservative Frayser area "handsomely" in 1 963, this time, 
identified as the "big Negro choice," Ingram lost it by better than two to one.288 Ingram's 
earlier opposition to the runoff law, which had no doubt appealed to blacks, and which had 
kept his campaign alive through October, once again demonstrated his political sagacity. Any 
person, regardless of race, who was clearly marked as candidate of choice of the black 
community was doomed by the runoff law. 
VII.B. THE COUNCIL AND SCHOOL BOARD RACES
The "most noticeable characteristic about the city-wide council races," Press-Scimitar
reporter Edward L. Topp remarked at the beginning of the primary campaign, "is that there are 
only three Negroes among the 43 candidates" for the six positions.289 If the mayor's race 
proved that an at-large election with a majority vote requirement worked exactly as 
expected--that is, it denied minority voters an opportunity to elect a candidate of their 
choice--the contemporaneous at-large council races demonstrated that political devices may be 
so effective that they discourage anyone from seriously testing them. The view that blacks 
could not win in such a system was so widespread that only minor black candidates ran for the 
at-large council seats, and their success--only one received as much as 1 2% of the 
vote--showed that the view was correct.290 In the runoff, the three white candidates who 
received the most solid black support all lost. 291 
287 Adams, "Politics Editor Makes Predictions - Including Loeb Victory," PS, Nov. 1 ,  1967, p.
10.  
288Null Adams, "Loeb Offers Gianotti City Post," PS, Nov. 3, 1 967, p. I ;  Jimmie Covington, 
"Fall From Frayser Favor Is Fatal Slip For Ingram," CApp, Nov. 3, 1 967, p. I .  
289Edward L. Topp, " 1 2  Seek citywide Position I on Council," PS, probably Sept. 5 ,  1967. 
290"Election at a Glance," PS, Oct. 6, 1967, p. 1 3. 
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Not only were they uniformly white, the at-large winners were also much more likely to be 
of upper status than their district counterparts. Three were major businessmen, and three, 
attorneys, while the district winners included a housewife and a minister. At-large members 
were likely to belong to upper-crust churches, Presbyterian and Episcopalian; whereas district 
representatives were usually drawn from the more declasse Church of Christ or the Baptist 
Church. All the at-large councilmen lived in the relatively prestigious Midtown or East 
Memphis areas, while district councilpersons (one was female) represented working class Frayser 
and black Orange Mound, as well. 292 The Chamber of Commerce and the Citizens' Association 
had known exactly what they would get when they pushed to maintain at-large elections for the 
Memphis city government. 
The district elections basically followed party and racial lines. Lyndon Johnson had carried 
four of the seven districts in the 1964 presidential election, and Democratic candidates for the 
council won four. In the two majority black districts, only three of the fifteen primary 
candidates were white, and they were eliminated in the first round. In the one marginal district 
(47.3% black among registered voters), the runoff pitted a black, Fred L. Davis, who was 
endorsed by the Press-Scimitar, against a white, Elmer B. Vaughn. Shortly before primary day, 
Vaughn's sound truck had toured the district "telling the voters that they had a choice between 
voting for him or having a Negro council representative."293 In a slight upset, Davis, who also 
had the backing of the AFL-CIO and the Citizens' Association and benefited from the Ingram 
organization's intense get-out-the-vote effort in Orange Mound, won the runoff with 53.2% of 
the vote.294 Only one serious black candidate ran in any of the "whiter" districts. In the first 
district, which was 38% black in voter registration, Rev. Alexander Gladney, a POP director, 
finished third in the primary. 295
As a whole, the council almost perfectly reflected the POP designs--indeed, two of the 
most prominent POP directors, Downing Pryor and Lewis Donelson III, were elected to at-large 
seats. Instead of the white Democrats, mostly conservative, who had filled the City 
292Ripy, "Changes in the Formal Structure of Municipal Government," pp. 9 1 -94. 
293Clark Porteous, "One Race: Issues in Doubt--In Other: Race Is Factor," PS, Oct. 19,  1967, 
p. 2 1 .
294"The Press-Scimitar's Recommendations for the New 13-Member City Council," PS, Sept. 
29, 1 967, p. 8; "Election At A Glance," ibid., Nov. 3, 1967. Registration figures are from "Six 
of City's Seven Districts Have Runoff Races on Ballot," ibid., Oct. 28, 1 967, p. A - 1 2; Null 
Adams, "Political Notebook," ibid., Oct. 17 ,  1967, p. J O; Clark Porteous, "One Race: Issues in 
Doubt--In Other: Race Is Factor," ibid., Oct. 1 9, 1967, p. 2 1 .  
295"Election A t  A Glance," PS, Oct. 6, 1 967, p .  13 .
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Commission, the new council consisted of five Republicans, four independents, and only four 
Democrats, of whom three were black.296 The election returns alone should quash any notion 
that the POP directors were service club amateurs, or that they were unsure or unconscious of 
the political implications of any action that they took. 
Two black candidates were among the fourteen for the five at-large school board seats: 
Rev. E. W. Williamson, who had run unsuccessfully in 1 963, and Rev. James M. Lawson, who 
had led the Nashville sit-ins against segregated lunch counters when he was in divinity 
school. 297 Neither got as much as 30% in his three-person contest, and all five of the 
incumbents were reelected without runoffs.298 Although politically a backwater which did not 
attract ambitious would-be mayors, such as Wyeth Chandler, who won an at-large city council 
seat in the 1 967 elections, the school board, elected at-large with numbered posts and a 
majority vote requirement, was still safely in all-white hands. 
VIII. REFORMING THE SCHOOL BOARD
Members of the Memphis Board of Education served long terms. John T. Shea, an 
attorney, was first elected in 1933, and in 1969, he was still on the board. Mrs. Arthur N.  
Seessel was elected in  1951 ,  Mrs. Frances Coe, in  1955.299 By the late 1 960s, only Edgar H. 
Bailey and Hugh Bosworth, an anti-busing leader, were comparative newcomers, both having 
been appointed in 1963.300 All were white. Despite the fact that a majority of the students in 
the public schools were African-Americans, no black had been elected to the school board since 
the 1 880s. 
296"New Council For Memphis Conservative," PS, Nov. 3, 1 967, p. I .
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The Memphis Board's response to Brown v. Board of Topeka had been to dig in its heels. 
Its answer to desegregation suits brought by the NAACP was to litigate, appeal, delay, and set 
up procedures so cumbersome as to insure that any desegregation that did come about would 
involve the least possible number of children, relying on sympathetic federal j udges to protect it 
from having to take effective action to eliminate the dual school system. Crump-era appointee 
Judge Marion Boyd, 301 for instance, upheld the Tennessee Pupil Placement Act in 1 96 1 ,  ruling 
that the Memphis Board's plan, which did not promise to place a single black child in a "white" 
school, was "a sound and complete plan for desegregation." The judge replied unsympathetically 
to the plea of Mrs. G.E. McFerren, a black Memphian whose request to place her child in the 
nearest ("white") school in 1 958 had been turned down at every level of the Memphis public 
school bureaucracy, finally being rejected on the grounds that Memphis did not allow transfers 
merely for "convenience." The superintendent, Boyd declared, "acted properly and in 
accordance with good school administration.•302 Under this decision, the Board initially turned 
down all 53 black students who applied to go to white schools in 196 1 .  Black students appealed 
for reconsideration. Only after an extensive hearing process that included a visit to their homes 
by social workers did the Board admit 1 3  of the original 53.303 The 1 3  constituted less than 
one tenth of I %  of the district's black students. 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned Judge Boyd's decision sustaining the Pupil 
Placement Act, initiating a series of predictably repetitive actions that lasted at least through the 
mid- l 960s: The Board would propose an action that would move ever so gradually toward 
desegregation, such as the grade-a-year plan that it offered in 1 962. The NAACP would 
contest the action in federal district court, calling for slightly less deliberation and slightly more 
301E.H. Crump to Edward J. Meeman, Dec. 1 0, 1943, in Meeman Papers, Mississippi Valley 
Collection, Old Brister Library, Memphis State University, Box 6, Folder 1 7; "Blast Judge 
Boyd!" Memphis World, April 28, 1962, p. L
302Paul Vanderwood, "Judge Denies Plea for Full School Desegregation Now," PS, April 1 5 ,  
1 96 1 ,  p .  3 ;  "As Well As Possible," CApp, April 1 6 ,  1 96 1 ,  p. 6; Northcross v .  Board of Education 
of Memphis, Tennessee, 302 F.2d 8 1 8  ( 1962), p. 820. Boyd repeatedly delayed integration. 
After the state board of education ordered Memphis State integrated, and eight of ten black 
students who took entrance exams passed them, Memphis State University President J. Millard 
Smith asked for a year's delay to avoid violence. Boyd granted his request, refusing even to 
hear the Memphis State case until after the Supreme Court ruled in the Little Rock deseg­
regation case. "Enrollment at MSU for Eight Negroes Denied," PS, Sept. 16,  1958, p. 4, c. 7-8. 
303James Delaney, "Good Faith Plan Sends Negroes to 
.
Four Schools," CApp, Oct. 3, 1 96 1 ,  p. I. 
One of the persistent 1 3  was a child of Russell Sugarman, one of the lawyers for the NAACP in 
the case. It is interesting to imagine how the social worker determined that this offspring of a 
Harvard Law graduate was a fit associate for white first graders. 
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speed in ending segregation, such as desegregation of all grades by 1965, instead of 1974 .304
Judge Boyd would sustain the Board, only to be overturned on appeal, and the cycle would 
begin again.305 A Commercial Appeal headline of 1965 captured the whole process perfectly:
"Board To Fight Racial Change."306 As long as the structure of elections kept blacks off the
School Board, they would have to negotiate, in effect, through the judicial process. 
In the wake of the "root and branch" Green v. New Kent County Supreme Court decision of 
1 968 and the other decisions that followed it, however, the Memphis Board could no longer stall 
indefinitely.307 At the same time, the Memphis sanitation workers' strike, which Mayor Loeb's
intransigence had turned into a crusade, and the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. 
increased the anger and militancy of the city's blacks. 308 To the judicial channel, blacks
seeking to influence the Board of Education now added a boisterous public protest channel. 
Patterning their tactics on the sanitation strike, and cooperating with labor unions which were 
trying to organize workers at St. Joseph's Hospital, the NAACP and other groups called a series 
of "Black Monday" school boycotts that kept as many as 60,000 students away from the public 
schools. 309 
As nearly every racial issue in Memphis eventually turns into a governance issue, and every 
governance issue, into a racial issue, so, too did the boycotts. There had been several past 
attempts to change the school board's makeup or method of election. In 1962, the Chamber 
committee had proposed a seven-member metro school board elected by districts. After the 
Charter Commission switched to at large for the Legislative Council, it proposed to elect two 
members of the school board at large from the city, two from the country, and three at large 
304Jack Morris, "NAACP Files Its School Plan," CApp, Sept. 13,  1962, p. I .  Compliance with
the law of the land eleven years after Brown was hardly a radical demand, except as compared 
to the school board's desire that Brown would become good law only on its twentieth 
anniversary. 
305"Go-Ahead Given School Board on Mixing Plan," CApp, Sept. I ,  1 962, p. I ;  Angus
M'Eachran, "School Opening Is Calm, Quiet - Integration's Second Year Finds 36 Negroes in 
Class," ibid., Sept. 5, 1962, p. l ;  "Police Are On Duty At Affected Schools," PS, Sept. 4, 1962, 
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from all of Shelby county.310 In the Spring of 1966, the POP directors had discussed reshaping 
the school board, but had been advised that they could not rewrite the electoral rules for the 
board, because, under the home rule provisions of the state constitution, it was not a 
"municipality."311 In the 1 967 legislature, the Board itself pressed an act, backed by the state 
and local teachers' associations, to expand its numbers to seven, while keeping at-large elections 
and a numbered post system.312 Apparently either A.W. Willis or Russell Sugarmon, both of 
whom were in the legislature at the time, vetoed the plan under the unanimity rule in county 
legislative delegations.318 
In March, 1 969, racial hard-liner Hugh Bosworth moved that the Board again ask the 
legislature to expand it to seven members, to be elected at-large, with numbered posts and a 
majority vote requirement. That Bosworth's rationale parallels that offered by more supposedly 
"liberal" partisans of these devices reflects on their arguments. "The primary reason for 
districts," Bosworth admitted, "is to guarantee the election of one or more Negro board 
members. . . . It is interesting that some supporters of districting are not really supporters of 
the majority vote at all. Rather they oppose election by position and want election by plurality 
rather than majority. Such a position undermines rather than strengthens our democratic form 
of government. This is minority rather than majority rule. We need to eliminate the possibility 
of a plurality from school board elections rather than to weaken the democratic process further. 
And last but not least the very Negroes [who] would benefit supposedly by districts should, I 
think, consider themselves insulted by the proponents of districting. After all, what are these 
supposedly benevolent people really saying? At best they are saying that no Negro can be 
310"School Merger Will Be Studied," CApp, June 4 ,  1962, p. 1 5; Memphis and Shelby County 
Charter Commission, "Charter of the Consolidated Government of Memphis and Shelby County" 
(August, 1 962), p. 42, pamphlet in POP Papers, Folder 1 23.
311 Jack H. Morris, "Progress Drops Plan to Revamp Education Board," CApp, April 1 5, 1 966. 
312See Mrs. Lawrence Coe to Russell Sugarmon, Dec. 1 7, 1966, and two printed bills, both 
titled "An Act to amend An Act entitled: 'An Act to Charter the Memphis City Schools.' . . .  " 
in Sugarmon Papers, Box 3 ,  Folder 7, in Mississippi Valley Collection, Old Brister Library, 
Memphis State University. Probably the most racially liberal member of the Board, Mrs. Coe 
was optimistic that if several current board members agreed not to stand for reelection, it would 
be possible to elect black replacements for them. A.W. Willis, she noted, did not share her 
optimism and insisted on districts. This letter suggests that it was Willis or Sugarmon or both 
who defeated the proposed bill in 1967. 
313In the same session, the legislature did pass a law setting up an elected school board for the 
areas of Shelby county outside Memphis. In 1968, voters ratified the legislative act, which 
provided for 7 members, elected at-large, in a referendum, but the act was not scheduled to go 
into effect until August, 1970. "Step Toward Schoo! Equity," CApp, Jan. 14, ! 970, p. 6. 
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elected on the basis of merit alone. They are saying that no Negro can run on a non-racial 
basis. They are saying that the white voters will never allow any Negro to be elected. These 
people would deny the Negro an equal opportunity to be elected on an equal basis."314 What 
was at stake in maintaining the at-large, numbered post system, Bosworth announced, was 
nothing less than "American liberty."315 
Although Bosworth's motion was rejected by a 3-2 vote, the autumn turmoil brought a 
return to the issue. In response to a series of questions, and, later, a set of demands from the 
NAACP and the "United Black Coalition," the Board moved to appoint two blacks, Hollis Price 
of LeMoyne-Owen College and George H. Brown, Jr., a 30-year old local attorney, as 
nonvoting "advisers" to the Board, and to work with the legislature to change the method of 
election so that it would be possible to elect some blacks to the body. 316 Bosworth raged: "The 
white majority not only in Memphis but across the nation is getting fed up with the placating, 
milk-sop approach being taken here in Memphis." In the mediation attempts between the school 
board and the black community, "democracy is taking a back seat to expediency."317 Alone,
Bosworth opposed the interim appointments of Price and Brown, and alone, he voted against 
recommending an expansion bill to the legislature. To split off the NAACP from more radical 
314Minutes of the Memphis Board of Education, March 14,  1 969, p. 3206. Bosworth's views on 
the purpose and effect of districts were widely shared. For instance, a Commercial Appeal
story on a school board meeting at the time routinely reported that "The main reason for 
districts is to guarantee the election of one or more Negroes to the board." "Action Deferred On 
School Board," CApp, March 29, 1969, p. 7, c. I .  
315"Vote Issue Held by School Panel," CApp, March 15,  !969, section 2 ,  p. I .
316Board of Education Minutes, July 25, Sept. 26, Oct. 24, Dec. 1 8 ,  1969, pp. 3396, 3517 ,  3556; 
"School Board Gives OK to Proposals Outlined By Mediation Committee," CA pp, Nov. 17 ,  1969, 
pp. l ,  9; David Vincent, "Black School Advisers May Play Maried Roles," ibid., Dec. 19,  1 969, 
p. 1 ,  c. 5-6.
317"New Civic Unit Formed, Bosworth Talks," CApp, Nov. 1 8 ,  1969, p. 1 1 . Note Bosworth's 
unmistakable references to race in using the terms "majority" and "democracy." By some 
standards, of course, Bosworth was a moderate. One school board meeting was addressed by 
Emmett Baker, president of the Memphis and Shelby County Citizens Council, who opposed 
adding blacks as advisers to the school board and contended that "The Negroes have no constitu­
tional right to public education." An unidentified woman informed the board that the black 
coalition was led by "imported Communist rabble rousers." "Biracial School Advisers Promised 
by December 1 In Move To Cool Protests," CApp, Oct. 25, 1 969, p. l ,  c. 1 -5. 
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elements in the black community and end the boycott, 818 as well as to conciliate a group that 
many now agreed deserved a more direct role in setting school policies, the other four members 
of the board, true conservatives, were willing to make the temporary appointments and to add 
at least some district representatives to the Board. But not Hugh Bosworth. Instead, he 
condemned the moves as attempts to "bypass the democratic process."319 
Working with a City Council committee, the School Board also urged the legislature to 
adopt a new electoral structure for the Board. Seven members would come from the same seven 
districts as the city council, and four more would be elected at large by numbered posts, but 
without a majority vote requirement.820 Mayor Henry Loeb and conservative councilman 
Wyeth Chandler led the battle in the City Council to recommend that the legislature adopt a 
runoff amendment to the School Board's plan. Using the same code phrase that he had been 
employing since the 1959 anti-Sugarman campaign, Loeb declared that he was for a runoff "so 
the majority will rule." "The only reason that you had a runoff in the first place," African­
American councilman Fred L. Davis told Chandler, "was to stop black single-shotting."321 Rev. 
James L. Netters, another black councilman, added: "You know a black man will never get 
elected at large with a runoff." Revealingly, Chandler's reply implicitly accepted the blacks' 
assertions, but claimed, in effect, that he knew their interests better than they did themselves: 
"You'll have more influence on the at-large positions with a runoff," Chandler argued, because, 
in the reporter's summary, "blacks would support white liberals." Unless there was a runoff, 
818David Vincent, "New Tactics, Praise Follow Coalition Split," CApp, Nov. 1 5, 1969, pp. J ,4. 
In an editorial, "The Right Kind of Leaders," the Commercial Appeal, Nov. 15, 1 969, p. 6 
praised the "responsible Negro leaders" of the NAACP for opposing "the radical elements" in the 
newly formed United Black Coalition. Authorities added a stick to the carrot, filing a $ 1 0  
million law suit against boycott leaders and indicting 1 9  o f  them. David Vincent, "Black 
Coalition Orders End To School Boycotts After Board Files Suit," ibid., Nov. 22, J 969, pp. I ,  JO; 
Charles Edmundson, "Disorders Result In 19 Indictments of Black Leaders," ibid., Dec. JO, 1969, 
p. I ;  Edmundson, "Inquiry Pushed; 8 Choose Jail," ibid., Dec. 1 1 , 1969.
319Memphis Board of Education Minutes, Jan. 16, 1970, p. B 3590. 
320"Plans Are Elusive For School Board," ibid., Jan. 6, 1970, p. 20; William Bennett, "Legislative 
Split on School Board Spurs New Effort," ibid., Jan. 2 1 ,  1 970, p. I .  
321 As noted earlier, the phrase "single-shotting" here appears to be a reference to organized 
black voting. 
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Chandler asserted, in an unmistakably racially-tinged comment, "I think it's going to give the 
NAACP control of the school board."322 
Everyone understood the racial effects of at-large elections with designated posts. As the 
Commercial Appeal reported again and again in the most matter of fact tone: "The board's five 
members currently are elected at-large by positions. Negro candidates always have had white 
opponents, and therefore have been defeated by the at-large white vote."323 "Negroes in 
Memphis feel they are discriminated against by the at-large elections now held in choosing the 
five-member board. Some sort of revision, including district elections, is needed."324 "Because 
members of the board presently are elected at large, there are no Negroes on the panel."325 A 
"Negro candidate has scant chance to attain a seat on the school board under the present at­
large election process."326 "Numbered posts," Fred Davis told his fellow councilmembers,
"would prevent single-shot voting, which is effective when voters cast ballots for the number to 
be elected and the top vote-getters win. By voting only for one man, bloc groups can enhance 
the chances of the candidate of their choice."327 
The partisan and racial struggle in the legislature over the governance of the Memphis 
school board was long and bitter enough to force the Shelby delegation to abandon its decades­
old rule that allowed one senator or representative to veto a local bi!I.328 The school board's 
322"Sparks Fly Among Councilmen In Reaching School Board Accord," CApp, Jan. 2 1 ,  1 970, p. 
1 5. Actually, the fate of the comparatively liberal Ingram against Loeb in 1 967, as well as that 
of Kenneth Turner against Chandler himself in the 1 97 1  mayoral contest suggests that 
Chandler's position is empirically wrong in Memphis. 
323"School Board Bill Is Awaited," CApp, Jan. 9, 1 970, p. I .
324"School Board Plan Needed," CA pp, Jan. I 0, 1 970, p. 6. 
325William Bennett, "Legislative Split on School Board Spurs New Effort," CApp, Jan. 2 1 ,  1970, 
p. 1 .
326"School Plan Priority," CApp, Jan. 22, 1 970, p. 6.
327"Sparks Fly Among Councilmen In Reaching School Board Accord," CApp, Jan. 2 1 ,  1970, p. 
1 5. 
328"Too .Much .F.ot .AJty,,()ne Man," ,CApp, Nov . .  . 14, ,  1 969, p . .  6; ,,'�uccess.On School Board," ibid., 
Feb. 2 1 ,  1 970, p. 6. Rep. Thomas Avery explained how the rule worked in practice: "The so­
called unit rule for local legislation is a cow made sacred by custom rather than by law. It 
allows for uncomplicated, speedy passage of legislation of particular interest only to the people 
of the affected county. . . . Legislation introduced under those conditions rarely comes to an 
actual vote in the General Assembly. The clerk of the House or Senate pulls a figure out of the 
air and records the measure as passed." "New Approach To Unit Rule," ibid., Jan. 4, 1 970, 
section 6, p. 4. 
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electoral structure, said the Commercial Appeal, was "at the top of the list for Shelby's 
lawmakers," but the paper shared the fears of prominent legislators that there were so many 
proposals and so much animosity that, in the confusion, nothing would be done.329 House 
Republican Thomas Avery proposed a nine-person, all-district board, with three 
overwhelmingly black and six overwhelmingly white districts, while Senate Democrat Bill Farris 
favored an all-district board with either seven or nine members, but did not specify district 
Iines.330 Democrats, apprehensive that the boundaries of Avery's nine districts would shut 
white Democrats off of the board, accused him of rank partisanship and appointed a 
subcommittee to draw up another plan.331 Responding in kind, Avery criticized the I I -person 
school board proposal two grounds. On the one hand, he contended that it contained only two 
black-majority districts; on the other, he charged that it "might lead to busing of school 
children through election of a combination of Negroes and white liberals." Democrat Bob 
Hawks proposed two ·plans: a I O-district, one at-large plan with three black-majority districts, 
and a J O-district, 3 at-large plan. In a rare show of unity between liberals and conservatives, 
black representative Ira Murphy and white Democratic Senator Edgar Gillock favored a seven 
district plan with no at-large seats and no runoff.332 Black representative James L Taylor was 
more concerned with the results than with the method of election. Since a majority of 
Memphis schoolchildren were black, Taylor insisted, the Board ought to have close to a majority 
of black members.333 A three-hour delegation meeting "debated and bickered" and another 
conference the next day "churned about almost aimlessly" and ended in inaction and confusion, 
as a 9-8 majority insisted on adding a runoff provision to the school board's proposaI.334 At 
329"22 Men From Shelby," CA pp, Jan. 1 1 ,  1 970, section 6, p. 4; "School Board's Half-Step," 
ibid., Jan. 19,  1970, p. 6; "Hard Row Seen For School Proposal," ibid., Feb. 2, 1 970, p. 23. 
330"Legislative Plan Unveiled for 9-Member School Board," CApp, Jan. 1 3 ,  1 970, p. I; "Step 
Toward School Equity," ibid., Jan. 14,  1970, p. 6. 
331William Bennett, "Legislative Split on School Board Spurs New Effort," CApp, Jan. 2 1 ,  1970, 
p. I; "Hard Row Seen For School Proposal," ibid., Feb. 2, 1970, p. 23.
332William Bennett, "Legislative Split on School Board Spurs New Effort," CApp, Jan. 2 1 ,  1970, 
p. I; Bennett, "Continued School Proposal Hassle In Dispute With Varied Causes," ibid., Feb. 8,
1970, p.  I ;  "School Board Plan Deadlock Leads To Clash In GOP Ranks," ibid., Feb. 8, 1970, p.  
3. 
333Lloyd Holbeck, "Little Legislative Support Is Found ,For School Board's Revision Plan," 
CApp, Feb. I ,  1970, p. I .  
334William Bennett "Bickering Tangles Move To Reshape Education Board," CApp, Feb. 4,  
1970; Bennett, "Delegates Still stumble On School Bill," ibid., Feb. 5, ! 970, p. ! .  
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this point, Republican leader Rep. William Huettel proposed to give up and submit the whole 
matter to a citywide referendum.335 
Finally, after several weeks of public, often nasty haggling, the school board, the city 
council, and the legislative delegation compromised by limiting the number of at-large seats on 
the Memphis Board of Education to two, but requiring that all nine members be elected by a 
majority vote. 336 The runoff provision, which Republicans and conservative Democrats 
insisted on, claiming that a plurality-win system might lead to "school busing, etc., which will 
cause the ruination and collapse of our education system," was the key to the compromise.337 
Blacks strongly opposed that provision, in the Commercial Appeal's words, "because they feel 
Negro candidates would have little hope of winning an at-large seat in a runoff election.•338 
Ira Murphy put it more bluntly. The majority vote clause, he said, was a "disenfranchisement 
gimmick" that would probably not have been included if black legislators had served on the 
compromise drafting committee.339 As with the POP maintenance of some at-large elections, 
blacks were not, as LeRoy Clark, then president of the Memphis NAACP, commented, 
"completely satisfied." However, he went on, "Some kind of bill was needed to be passed . . .  
because the people of Memphis have made it clear they want Negro representation on the board 
of education." Black City Councilman Fred Davis, who had helped to draw up the provisions of 
an earlier bill which contained no runoffs, remarked that "I want it clearly understood that this 
bill is a compromise. In order to achieve some measure of long-overdue change, those of us 
who made the original recommendation agreed to this compromise."340 The legislature as a 
whole demonstrated its racial temper by passing a bill, sponsored by Sen. Edgar Gillock of 
335William B. Street, "Ballots May Set School Plan," CApp, Feb. 7, 1970, p.  I .  
336William Bennett, "School Board Bill Carries Optimism," CApp, Feb. 1 1 , 1970, p .  I ;  Bennett, 
"House, Senate Approve 9-Member School Board With Runoff Provisions," ibid., Feb. 20, 1970, 
p. I .
337"GOP Returns Canale's Fire In Flareup Of Partisanship," CApp, Feb. 1 3 ,  1 970, p. I ;  David
Vincent, "Legislators Show Disunity At Meeting On School Bill," ibid., Feb. I S ,  1 970, p. I ;  
"Success On School Board," ibid., Feb. 21 ,  1 970, p .  6. 
338"0ptimism Lights Redistricting Plan For School Board," CApp, Feb. 9, 1970, p. I .
339William Bennett, "School Compromise Brightens Outlook," CApp, Feb. 17 ,  1970, p, I ;  "Canale 
Expresses Optimism On School Board Bill Accord," ibid., Feb. 16,  1970, p.  19; "Success On 
School Board," ibid., Feb. 2 1 ,  1 970, p. 6. 
340"Civic Leaders Happy With School Compromise," CApp, Feb. 20, 1 97 1 ,  p. 2 1 .  
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Memphis, that authorized the state to cut off funds from any school district that bused children 
for racial balance.341 
IX. METRO (AGAIN) AND REDISTRICTING, 1971
Because Tennessee's annexation law made it so easy for large cities such as Memphis to 
swallow up unincorporated territory, suburbs outside the city never quite outgrew it. As early 
as 1 930, as Table 2 shows, 85% of the people in Shelby County were within the Memphis city 
limits. Suburbanization, offset by a nearly continuous set of annexations raised the percentage 
to 87 by 1 970. 
(Table 2 about here.) 
Nonetheless, some city fathers still favored a city-county merger to consolidate services and 
capture the other 1 3% of the population. In 1970, a ten-member city-county Charter 
Commission containing many familiar faces was appointed. Albert C. Rickey, from the 1962 
metro commission, chaired the 1 97 1  committee, and he was joined by Lewis Donelson, city 
councilman and POP director, and Bill Farris, erstwhile mayoral and gubernatorial candidate. 
Two blacks, Walter Bailey, an attorney, and Ode! Horton, who had replaced Hollis Price as 
president of LeMoyne-Owen, and five less well-known whites also served. After a year, they 
produced a 68-page revised charter.842 
Under the proposed charter, the Council would have eight district and five at-large 
members, all elected under a majority vote requirement. The eight district seats, the Press­
Scimitar remarked, "make sure that the Negroes can win at least three seats on the council this 
time since three of the eight districts are predominantly Negro."343 The five at-large seats also 
offered blacks possible opportunities, because they would not be selected by numbered posts, 
but in a free-for-all, as the Commission had been before 1 959.344 If blacks voted in a bloc for 
341William Bennett, •Assembly Faces Backlog of Bills," CA pp, Feb. 9, 1 970, p. 1 3; Bennett, 
"Busing Ban Steamrollers Through Senate, 24-2," ibid., Feb. 10,  1 970, p. I .  
342Null Adams, "How City-County Merger Will Work if Citizens Adopt Charter at Polls," PS, 
March 27, 1 97 1 ,  p. 5. 
343"Tomorrow Holds Key to Merger," PS, June 2 1 ,  1 97 1 ,  p. 4. 
344Null Adams, "How City-County Merger Will Work if Citizens Adopt Charter at Polls," PS, 
March 27, 1 97 1 ,  p. 5. 
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fewer than five candidates, and whites split sufficiently, black-favored candidates might be able 
to win a majority of the reduced number of total votes (because blacks did not cast all of 
theirs) in the primary, avoiding hopeless at-large runoffs. 
Nevertheless, the NAACP opposed metro again. "The racial policies of this community," 
the group argued, "aid and encourage whites to vacate the inner city and move to the 
suburbs. . . . [C)onsolidation of city and county government will encourage and permit those 
citizens of Memphis who have fled the city to continue to control the city, politically."345 On 
the other end of the spectrum, some anti-busing activists charged that consolidating the county 
and city schools might lead to more and longer busing for integration purposes.346 As in 1962, 
leaders of the county government, no doubt fearing the loss of their offices, also opposed the 
change. In County Court chairman Charles Baker's home precinct, the charter lost by I 054 to 
1 12. Combined with heavy anti-metro margins in overwhelmingly black precincts and a 
generally light turnout in this special election, in which the consolidation question was the only 
issue on the ballot, metro lost again. Only the middle class area of East Memphis voted 
enthusiastically to back the business leaders' latest proposition.347
After the defeat of the Metro Charter in 1 97 1 ,  the City Council immediately turned to the 
task of redistricting the boundaries for themselves and the school board that had been drawn by 
the POP Charter in 1966. When the POP directors first made public the boundaries of their 
proposed seven districts, some racially concerned whites had protested. Appearing before the 
directors, one Leslie Birchfield presented an eight-member plan with two overwhelmingly black 
districts and six safe white majorities. "Mr. Birchfield said the plan's purpose is to decrease the 
likelihood that a Negro would be elected to serve a district with an equal racial population. The 
plan would reduce the number of registered voters in the seven board-recommended districts 
and create an eighth, the residents of which are predominantly white."348 Having carefully 
crafted lines that blacks would accept, however, the POP directors ignored Birchfield. 
By 197 I ,  blacks safely controlled districts 6 and 7 in central and southern Memphis, and the 
African-American Fred Davis was the incumbent in the racially balanced district 4. In 
345"Consolidation Is Opposed by NAACP," Memphis World, May I ,  1 9 7 1 ,  p. I .  
346"Not Much Excitement Raised By Merger," PS, June 16, 197 1 ,  p. 16; "Busing Group Neutral
on Merger," ibid.,  June 17,  1 9 7 1 ,  p. 8. 
347William B. Street, "County Voter Opposition Provides Stumbli�g Block For Consolidation
Drive," CApp, June 23, 1 97 1 ,  p. I .  
348William J .  Miles, "Attack Expected on Progress Plan," CApp, June 14, 1 966. 
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addition, the black proportion of district 1 ,  centered in Frayser, was approximately 40% and 
rising. Although the redistricters of 197 J appear to have made no public statements like Mr. 
Birchfield's, their actions speak loudly of their motives. Over 8500 registered black voters were 
moved from district l to district 7,  and over 3000 registered whites were shifted from district 7 
to the overwhelmingly white district 5.349 Although the evidence is, at present, rather sparse, 
such "packing" of minorities into a small number of districts and two-stage shifts of population 
have been taken in other instances as evidence of racially discriminatory motives in 
redistricting. 350
X. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS 
Accepting one explanation, even tentatively, logically implies that one rejects other 
explanations. Considering other hypotheses explicitly makes the analyst more self-critical and 
careful, and gives the reader confidence in the author's judgments - or reason for skepticism. 
Although only one scholar seems to have published any explanation of the events considered 
in this paper,351 similar happenings in other places have been studied, and various alternative
explanations have been put forth. The first might be termed the "civic virtue hypothesis": 
Electoral laws are framed by disinterested reformers who merely want to "do good" or achieve 
some abstract ideal, such as a more democratic or efficient polity, or the election of people with 
a "community-wide viewpoint." In this case, newspaper editorialists and such people as Henry 
Loeb and Hugh Bosworth claimed that it was a devotion to "majority rule" that caused them to 
favor at-large elections or runoffs. In a letter of protest against the filing of this case, Jack H. 
Morris, a key participant, as well as a newspaper reporter for the Commercial Appeal during the 
period when the POP Charter was framed, retrospectively, and with this lawsuit pending, saw 
the POP as resulting "from the tireless efforts of a number of good men and women, both black 
and white, to create a fairer and better government."352
349Ripy, "Changes in the Formal Structure of Municipal Government," p. 85. 
350See Kousser, "How To Determine Intent," sections I-III.
351Tucker, Memphis Since Crump, pp. 100- 1 1 7.
352Morris to Attorney General Dick Thornburgh, March 1 7 ,  1 99 1 ,  an attachment to Affidavit
of Jack H. Morris in Muhammad, et al. v. City of Memphis, July ! 8 ,  ! 99 ! .  
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The second, closely related thesis stresses that compromise is necessary in an imperfect 
world, especially a world less enlightened than our own. In 1966, when the runoff and POP 
charter were instituted, for example, was it not a triumph to desegregate Memphis officeholding 
at all, even with two or three members out of thirteen? Jack Morris's 1 99 1  letter also puts 
forward this thesis, which he does not distinguish from the pure civic virtue hypothesis. One 
of the POP Commission's "objectives from the start was to provide a system of government in 
which blacks could hold elective office. . . . It was always recognized, and supported, that 
districts would bring blacks into city government for the first time."353 Again, in 1 970, was it 
not a progressive step to add district seats, a few of which would certainly be filled by blacks, 
to the Board of Education? Could these changes, which allowed blacks to share political power 
for the first time in Memphis, have been motivated by racially discriminatory purposes? 
A third, less starry-eyed explanation admits that self-interest often motivates rule-makers, 
but claims that, at least in particular cases, they wished only to preserve their own political 
careers or to assist those of members of their political party or social class. They were, in this 
view, indifferent to the race of their opponents. 
Another familiar contention is that the effects in question were unforeseen and therefore 
necessarily unintended. Numbered posts might have been adopted for reasons of efficiency, 
for instance, without their framers meaning for blacks to be adversely affected by the change. 
The runoff might have been inspired by William Ingram's 48% margin in J 963 and the 
temporary consternation that more settled souls felt about the disorderly wrangling that marred 
city government during the Ingram administration. 
Let us consider the "do gooder" explanation first. High-flown rhetoric has always been 
used to justify electoral rules, from those establishing monarchies or aristocracies to property 
qualifications to racial disfranchisement. 354 In his opening address to the 1 898 Louisiana
constitutional convention, which had been called to disfranchise as many blacks and white 
Populists as possible, President Ernest Kruitschnitt proclaimed: "My fellow-delegates, let us not 
be misunderstood! Let us say to the large class of the people of Louisiana who will be 
disfranchised under any of the proposed limitations of the suffrage, that what we seek to do is 
undertaken in a spirit, not of hostility to any particular men or set of men, but in the belief 
that the State should see to the protection of the weaker classes; should guard them against the 
machinations �f-these who· would . use them only· to further· their own · base ends; should see to it 
353Ibid.
364See Kousser, "Suffrage," in Jack P. Greene, ed., Encyclopedia of A merican Political History 
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1984), I!!, pp. 1 236-58, especially p .  ! 244. 
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that they are not allowed to harm themselves. We owe it to the ignorant, we owe it to the 
weak, to protect them just as we would protect a little child and prevent it from injuring itself 
with sharp-edged tools placed in its hands."355 Even Kruitschnitt did not engage in the sort of 
crude race-baiting that so often dominated political stump speeches of the era, and he oozed 
paternalistic concern for the less fortunate and devotion to the higher good of the society. Yet 
no one today would doubt, and surely no one in 1 898 doubted, that Kruitschnitt and the rest of 
the members of the Louisiana disfranchising convention were motivated by a racially 
discriminatory purpose when they adopted literacy and property qualifications, a poll tax, and a 
grandfather clause exemption. Patently, Kruitschnitt's language represented a not very subtle 
attempt to prettify racist acts. 
Was the "majority rule" phraseology employed by the proponents of at-large elections and 
runoff requirements in Memphis in the period after 1 955 just a similar example of decorative 
rhetoric? Because it is the one scholarly book to treat Memphis politics during this period, and 
because it is especially sympathetic to the "civic reformers," it is appropriate to devote particular 
attention to David Tucker's Memphis Since Crump. Although Tucker does not examine the 
motives for the adoption of the designated post or majority vote requirement, and does not 
specifically comment on the reasons for the maintenance of at-large elections in the 1 966 POP 
charter or the 1 970 school board law, he does devote a paragraph of his 1 72-page book to the 
decision of the 1 962 Metro Charter Commission to substitute at-large ·elections for the originally 
proposed district elections for the council and school board. While admitting that blacks 
believed that the decision was "anti-Negro," Tucker contends that it "represented the chamber 
[of commerce]'s abstract political theory, shared by reformers such as Lucius Burch, that at­
large elections would avoid corrupt ward politics and insure the election of men who would 
never put the needs of their own district above the welfare of the entire community. To be 
sure, at-large campaigns were expensive and more likely to elect financially able candidates 
from the chamber of commerce, but not all chamber representatives sought to exclude blacks 
from office."856 How strong is Tucker's argument? 
It is important to note, first, what Tucker does not claim. He does not discuss the purposes 
of designated posts or the runoff here or elsewhere in his book, and he might well admit that 
such provisions were racially discriminatory in purpose, even if he thought that the at-large 
355Quoted in Kousser, Shaping of Southern Politics, p. 1 64. Such quotations could be
multiplied easily. 
356Tucker, Memphis Since Crump, p. 108. Italics supplied.
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scheme was not. After all, the principal theme of his book is "the central role of race."357
Moreover, it is difficult to imagine how numbered posts or runoffs would discourage corruption 
or parochialism. Therefore, whether or not avoiding corruption or parochialism were the goals 
of reformers, these objectives can at most explain the maintenance of at-large elections. 
Even more important, Tucker admits indirectly that at least some Charter Commission 
members wanted to exclude blacks from office. Among those who did not, he mentions only 
Stanley Buckman, who proposed that the Charter Commission temporarily appoint acceptable 
blacks to two of the twelve positions on the council.358 Since the vote in the Charter 
Commission to substitute at-large for district elections was 6-4, the switch of one of the 
Chamber appointees would have resulted in a tie vote, and that of two would have resulted in a 
proposal with at least ten districts. Even if racial concerns moved only a few of the Chamber 
members, then, their role was pivotal, tipping the decision toward at-large elections. Under 
commonsensical notions of causation, then, racially discriminatory intentions caused the 
maintenance of at-large elections in this instance, even if Tucker's contention is fully 
accepted. 359 
But the stances of even the most liberal of Memphis's reformers, such as Hunter Lane, 
Stanley Buckman, and Lucius Burch, led inexorably to racially unequal political outcomes, as 
they were fully aware. All three realized, as every political observer in Memphis did at the 
time, that except in the most unusual cases, whites would fill every at-large seat, and that 
majority vote requirements and anti-single shot arrangements disadvantaged black candidates. 
"The Negro electorate is justifiably suspicious and distrustful of the degree to which their 
interest will be protected by the general constituency," Burch told a POP hearing. "In order to 
obtain Negro support, which is absolutely necessary for the approval of the charter, there must 
be some representation by districts. . . . Burch conceded that a runoff law would make it hard 
for a Negro to be elected."360 The reformers knew that few whites in Memphis would vote 
for a black, however well qualified. Indeed, Buckman had taken a leadership role in the stop­
Sugarmon campaign of 1959, and neither Lane nor Burch had spoken out against this effort. 
357/b"d . l ., p. Xl. 
358Supra, section IV.B. 
359For a much more extensive discussion of the logic of such matters, see Kousser, "How To 
Determine Intent," section V.E. 
360Lucius E. Burch, Jr., "New Government Plan Needs Added Safeguards, Burch Says," PS, 
April 1 4, 1966, p. 8; Charles A. Brown, "Four Issues Debated by POP," ibid., April 1 5, 1 966, p. 
I .  
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Even if they acted out of some "abstract idea," then, they were fully mindful of the fact that 
one consequence of that idea was to deny blacks an equal opportunity to elect their most 
preferred candidates. 
But, of course, the "reformers" did not act alone. Indeed, they were not the chief actors. 
Burch, Lane, and Edmund OrgiU never served on a Charter Commission or as POP directors, 
and Burch never held important elective office at all. The major actors were politicians such as 
Henry Loeb, Wyeth Chandler, and Hugh Bosworth, and they were more open about their 
racially discriminatory motives in pushing for numbered posts, the runoff, and the continuation 
of at-large elections. All three built their careers on the "white backlash," and their statements 
make clear that when they spoke of "majority rule," they explicitly meant the white majority.361
Along with the most staunchly segregationist politicians and at least some of the white 
liberals, the Press-Scimitar and Commercial Appeal and their editors avidly participated in the 
campaign against Sugarmon, Hooks, and the other blacks on the "Volunteer Ticket" in 1959, 
and, of course, neither paper endorsed Willis for mayor in 1 967. The Commercial Appeal was 
especially vocal in its support for the school board's foot-dragging on integration. Both papers 
laced their editorials on the subjects of at-large elections, designated posts, and runoffs with 
patronizing lectures to blacks advising them to abandon their insistence on electing candidates 
of their choice for the good of the (white) majority in Memphis. Both explicitly recognized, 
time and time again, that designated posts, at-large elections, and runoffs disadvantaged black 
candidates, and they distorted history or ignored the facts of recent elections, of which they 
must have been keenly aware, in order to reach the predetermined conclusions of their 
editorials. When considered in the context of the elections and other events during the period, 
then, the newspaper editorialists' rhetorical devotion to "majority rule" does not provide 
evidence for the importance of non-racial motives in the adoption or maintenance of the 
electoral devices in question. 
It is for good reasons that historians generally try to place single events in the context of 
their times and that Congress and the Supreme Court have declared that voting rights cases 
should be decided on the basis of "the totality of the circumstances."362 Events in the same
place at roughly the same time are often connected, and the actions of one person or group 
often make more sense when other actions of the same individual or group are considered. Roy 
Love's near, >'ic,t0<y in ,l 955 and S.A. Wilbun's, legislative campaign in 1958 raised expectations 
361See supra, sections !LC. and VIII.
362See White v. Regester, 4 1 2  U.S. 755, at 769 ( 1 973); Senate Report No. 4 1 7, 97th Cong., 2d 
Sess.� 27-31 ( 1 982); Kousser; "How To Determine Intent;11 sections V.C.-V.F. 
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in the black community, which led to the "Volunteer" campaign, and fears in the white 
community, which led to designated posts and attempts to institute runoffs. The 1 959 elections 
reaffirmed the push for runoffs and showed that even outstanding black candidates could expect 
few white votes and little chance in at-large elections. The defeat of metro in 1962 led 
reformers to involve blacks in the POP, to agree to at least some districts, and to disconnect the 
runoff issue from the more general charter change. Blacks opposed maintaining at-large 
elections, as they opposed runoffs, because recent experience and simple political logic taught 
them that these schemes, when employed in a racially polarized electorate such as Memphis's, 
prevented them from electing their candidates. The sanitation strike and school boycott so 
traumatized city leaders, black and white, that whites finally agreed to add districts to the 
school board. Everyone fully realized that blacks could not win even token representation on 
the board as long as all of the seats were elected at-large, and that even the 1970 revisions 
would result in no more than three black seats out of nine. The more general point is that the 
consideration or passage of any of the electoral laws in Memphis during this period must be 
seen in relation to all the other political events of the period. That is the chief failure of 
Tucker's analysis of the 1 962 at-large decision on the Charter Commission and of Jack Morris's 
defense of his own and others' actions 25 years later, and it is the chief reason for interspersing 
analyses of elections with those of election laws in this paper. 
The "compromise" or "progressive step" hypothesis is perfectly compatible with the notion 
that the election laws were changed or maintained for racially discriminatory purposes. First, it 
offers no non-racial justification for designated posts or majority vote requirements, which 
must either be ignored or explained on some other basis if the racial discrimination explanation 
is to be rejected. Second, if the racial opinions of elites or the white public were so 
conservative during the 1 950s and 1 960s in Memphis that only small steps toward racial equality 
could be taken, then the maimenance of at-large elections for six city council and two school 
board seats must logically have been the result of white racial concerns. Even if Mr. Morris 
and the POP Charter group were as perfectly virtuous as he now supposes, if they kept six seats 
at-large knowing the racial consequences of their act, at least partially because of a belief that 
less racially tolerant leaders or members of the public would oppose the POP Charter if it 
allowed blacks "too much" power by adopting a plan with a higher proportion of districts, then 
their actions were. taken .. because of racial.considerations ... . In. fact, there is overwhelming 
evidence from statements of the time from both whites and blacks that at-large elections were 
continued with the expectation that they would be filled exclusively or nearly exclusively by 
whites, and that many white leaders favored them because of that understanding. Proponents of 
this thesis cannot have it both ways: If districts were introduced to allow blacks some 
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representation, then, unless there was some other compelling reason to do so, at-large seats must 
have been maintained to reinforce white control of the vast majority of the seats. 
The individual or group self-interest thesis also admits too much and ignores too much. It 
admits that white political leaders and electoral law reformers wanted to protect their 
individual, partisan, or class interests (Buckman's desire for a part-time council of affluent 
businessmen and professionals), but denies that such protection required discrimination against 
blacks. In a racially polarized polity, however, the careers of individual white politicians might 
be endangered if blacks enjoyed equal political opportunities. Very few blacks met Buckman's 
criterion of affluence and free time, and those who did, especially if they attained their 
positions by being anointed by whites, were hardly likely to be the choices of the black 
community. Most of all, the explanation asks us to overlook the major political, social, and 
economic fault line in the community, to blind ourselves to the fact that racial conflicts 
dominated the politics of the time in Memphis, to believe that politicians who had to be 
precisely attuned to racial nuances to survive in office entirely ignored racial considerations 
when drafting electoral laws. 
The unintended consequences hypothesis is the least plausible alternative. When 
newspapers, black leaders, and other white politicians were constantly stressing the racial 
consequences of changing or maintaining electoral laws, how could the framers of those laws 
(who were usually politicians themselves) have been ignorant of these implications? Indeed, the 
number of "smoking gun" statements connecting electoral laws to racial motives and 
consequences is larger in this case than in any other voting rights case with which I am familiar. 
At best, the politicians could have considered those consequences and decided to go ahead for 
other reasons. But, as shown above in the discussion of the civic virtue hypothesis, every other 
reason that the framers may have had for acting included racial considerations on the part of 
crucial decision-makers. 
None of the four alternative hypotheses about changes in or maintenance of electoral laws 
in Memphis during the years from 1959 through 1970 accords nearly so well with logic and 
facts as that of racially discriminatory purpose. 
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Year 
1895 
1914 
1916 
1927 
195l(early) 
195l(Aug) 
1955 
1959 
1960 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1966(July) 
1967 
1971(June) 
1971(Aug) 
1975 
Table 1: Registration and Turnout Figures 
in Memphis and Shelby County 
Total Registration Black Registration %Black Registration 
- 3,6411 35.5 
- 8,0002 -
- 10,6123 -
- 12,0004 -
- 1,000• -
104,671 19,6086 18.7 
159,513 38,8477 24.4 
187,541 57,1096 30.5 
- 76,0008 -
- 77,0008 -
206,171 69,6976 33.8 
- 93,0008 -
268,171 86,6789 32.3 
235,505 80,0336 34.0 
289,487 94,78210 32.7 
302,266 99,4356 32.9 
336,287 1 17,00011 34.8 
Turnout 
-
-
-
-
-
25,000(est.) 
86,370 
129,286 
-
-
121,665 
-
146,158 
155,766 
169,646 
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Table 2: Basic Population Characteristics in Memphis and Shelby County, 
1880-1980 
Year Memphis Shelby County Outside Memphis % of Shelby 
Population 
Population Percent Black Population Percent Black in Memphis 
18801 33,573 56.0 44,838 64.7 42.8 
18902 20,061 38.8 10,931 48.1 64.7 
19002 31 ,405 45.4 12,438 50.9 71.6 
19102 44,309 38.9 15,786 44.9 73.7 
19203 107,868 39.4 31,521 43.7 77.4 
19303 167,868 39.0 27,553 41.2 85.9 
19403 200,352 41.5 39,565 47.0 83.5 
19503 264,888 35.5 47,457 35.9 84.8 
19603 294,534 37.1 64,748 33.7 82.0 
19704 398,370 34.l 61,879 21.0 86.6 
19804 501,532 40.5 40,105 21.0 92.6 
1. All ages, both sexes 
2. Males over 21 years old 
3. Males and females over 21 years old 
4. Males and females over 18 years old 
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